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ABSTRACT
THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES AND THE WAR ON TERROR:
EKPHRASIS AS CRITIQUE
MAY 2006
CHRISTOPHER D. ERICKSON, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
M.A., BOND UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMFCERST
Directed by: Professor James Der Derian
This dissertation is guided by two central questions. The first question is “Is the War on
Terror inevitable?” By comparing the language used by President Bush in a speech
given on September 20, 2001 to the language used by Homer in the Iliad, particularly
his depiction of the shield of Achilles in Book 18, the War on Terror can be recast
against a backdrop of mythology rather than fact. It is a tale we tell ourselves about the
world, and its status as inevitable is far less convincing. The second guiding question is
“How is the appearance of inevitability to be mitigated or resisted?” The second stage
of the dissertation addresses the concept of mimesis (representation) as it appears in
Plato’s Republic and in the work of Baudrillard. as means by which to resist the power
of the shield. As critical tools, mimesis and simulacra extend the promise of critical
distance, thereby allowing the "thus it is” claim to be understood as an illusion.
However, mimesis and simulacra tend to maintain an underlying "thus it is” of their
own. The thirds stage of the argument will challenge the '"thus it is” through a
discussion of Odysseus and Nietzsche, both ofwhom teach that life is poiesis. The final
stage will turn to the concept of ekphrasis, the verbal representation of a non-verbal
representation, in order to develop it as a tool useful for critical theorists. Ekphrasis has
VI
the advantage of both recognizing the power of mimetic
representation and disrupting
it. The dissertation will conclude with an ekphrastic reading
of the September 20, 2001
speech.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On September 1 1, 2001 two hijacked airliners loaded with fuel slammed into the
twin towers of the World Trade Centre. Another hit the Pentagon and a fourth crashed
in a field in rural Pennsylvania. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush
stood before a joint session of Congress and pronounced a War on Terror. His
insistence that “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”' was one of the
opening salvos in a rhetorical bombardment that has worked to confirm the presence of
what Samuel Huntington has famously dubbed a “clash of civilizations.” This
Huntingtonian theory has deeply influenced those in the Bush Administration and the
neoconservative agenda it pursues. In the words of Emran Qureshi, the premise of this
theory is that
such a clash is not the product of particular historical circumstances that
can change but that the essence of Islam as a religion is antipathetic to
the fundamental core values of the West; that Islam is inherently violent
in nature; and that, therefore, violent acts against the West are inevitable
and are provoked not by any particular grievances or set of
circumstances but by the very existence of Western civilization.^
' George W Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 (2001 [cited December 15 2004]); available from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.htm., 30. The full
text of the speech is given in Appendix A. All further references will be to paragraph
number.
^ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993).
^ Emran Qureshi and Martin A. Sells, "Introduction," in The NeM' Crusades:
Constructing the Muslim Enemy, ed. Emran Qureshi and Martin A. Sells (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003), p.2. Qureshi is less than charitable in his reading
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This dissertation is guided by two central questions. The first question is “Is the
War on Terror inevitable?’" There can be little doubt that it has been presented as such."^
Even a passing familiarity with the rhetorical pronouncements of the warring parties
makes this abundantly clear. An answer to this question will begin by looking more
closely at the speech of September 20, 2001. The argument to follow will show that
despite claims to the contrary, the War on Ten'or is not inevitable. This leads to the
and his interpretation does overstate Huntington's position. In the 1993 article,
Huntington says:
differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic.
Civilizations are differentiated Ifom each other by history, language,
culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different
civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man,
the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and
children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative
importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality
and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will
not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences
among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not
necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily, mean
violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations
have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.
Huntington. "The Clash of Civilizations," p.23.
Huntington therefore does not see these differences as a natural part of an ontologically
fixed reality. However in spite of this he does go on in the article to all but eradicate the
importance of this observation by treating these cultural differences as if they were
fixed. Although Qureshi overstates Huntington’s position, he does not overstate the
premises of others, including key figures in the Bush Administration, who have adopted
Huntington’s theory.
^
Others have dealt noted this consistency. For example, see Jenny Adkins and Maja
Zehfuss, "Generalising the International," Review of International Studies 31, no. 3
(2005).;Aima M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, "Power and Play through Poisies:
Reconstructing Self ahd the Other in the 9/1 1 Comission Report," Millennium: Journal
of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005).;Chris Brown, "Reflections on the 'War on
Terror', 2 Years On," International Politics 41, no. 1 (2004).;David Frum and Richard
Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Random House,
2003).;Emran Qureshi and Martin A. Sells, eds.. The New Crusades: Constructing the
Muslim Enemy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
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second guiding question: “How is the appearance of inevitability to be mitigated or
resisted?” The largest portion of the dissertation will address this question.
The phrasing of the second question is broad, and deliberately so. The War on
Terror, or more specifically the rhetoric coming from the Bush Administration
regarding the War on Terror, will serve as a centre of gravity around which the
argument will orbit. Yet the import of the argument goes beyond the example used to
articulate it. A case in point, although the focus is on the language of the Bush
Administration, the observations and analysis could also be made of the language of
Osama bin Laden, or any of a range of individuals and groups that share the structural
features of such “all or nothing” language in their pronouncements. The breadth of the
question is also potentially misleading. In saying that an answer will be provided, the
argument will proceed to do just that - to provide an answer. There is no claim here
that the argument provides the answer, as such a claim would in the end perpetuate the
problem the argument attempts to remedy. Given the focus on language it is not
surprising that the means of resistance discussed in the argument to come is drawn from
the field of literary criticism. That tool is ekphrasis, the verbal representation of a non-
verbal representation.
Methodologically, the aim of this argument is akin to Geertz's ‘Ihick
description” in that it shares his assumption that culture, including political culture, is
semiotic.
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the
3
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law
but an interpretative one in search of meaning.^
Public pronouncements by political figures are intended to have an effect on public
opinion in regards to a given policy decision. Speeches are made to convince an
audience of the rightness or wrongness, desirability or undesirability, benefit or cost of
some policy. These speeches become at least part of the background against which
decisions have been, are, or will be made and against which public opinion is formed.
They are strands of the webs of significance we spin for ourselves. "Our double task is
to uncover the conceptual structures that infoiTn our subjects' acts, the ‘said’ of social
discourse, and to construct a system of analysis in those terms what is generic to those
structures.”^
Geertz insists that "thick description” is not directed towards causal prediction,
but can provide a sense of anticipation. The important implication of this is that the
context within which a decision is made or a policy direction chosen does not determine
that choice, but may anticipate which choices are more likely to be made. A visible
figure only ever appears against an invisible background. Of course any particular
background can become visible, but only as a figure against some other (invisible)
background. This is an important observation because it is not just sense data that
appear this way. The same can be said of policy options as figures. The figures that
appear depend entirely on the background against which they appear, or on the context
in which they are articulated.
Clifford Geertz, "Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in The
Interpretation ofCulture (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
^ Ibid., p.27.
4
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For example, the binary set of options expressed in President Bush’s “either you
are with us or you are with the terrorists” appear as the only viable options given a
background understanding of the world as unambiguously divided between “good” and
“evil” camps. This does not pose a problem, nor even appear as one, from the
perspective of George W. Bush or those sharing his neoconservative ideology. It would
be problematic from the perspective of, let us say, the French. The American led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was packaged as a continuation of the War on Terror. If the
binary option set named above were valid, than the French would have had no other
choice but to either join with or fight against the Americans. One would be hard
pressed to say that the government of President Chirac embraced the agenda of al
Qaeda, but neither did it embrace the agenda of the Bush Administration. This example
indicates that the background against which the original option set appears is not the
only background against which options can appear. With this in mind, the argument
will proceed based on the following premises:
1.
) Policy decisions are made based on the rational selection of the best
option among a range of options. The apparent nod to the rational
choice model here is conditioned by the observation that “rationality”
is itself embedded in a contingent web of significance, and does not
exist outside of such a web. What is “reasonable” at one place and
time may not be so in another. The entire understanding of “the
rational” as a conceptual category is itself subject to alteration.
2.
) The range of likely options is not the same as the range of all
possible options. The framing of options has much to do with
prevalent (normative) interpretations of the context within which
they are articulated. This is simply to say that the way one thinks of
the world is closely related to how one lives in the world.
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3.) These frames can be (and often are) presented
as a set of simple or
natural facts about the world and therefore not open to
question.
They are bracketed from further inquiry.
It will argued that the bracketing of the frames con be
challenged and that doing so can
broaden the range of policy options available in a given situation.
Such a challenge will begin using an approach similar to what
Skocpol and
Somers have called “comparative history as the parallel demonstration
of theory. In
this approach, “historical instances are juxtaposed to demonstrate that the theoretical
arguments apply convincingly to multiple cases that ought to fit if the theory in
question
is indeed valid.”^ The approach here is akin to this in that an historical case
- the War
on Terror - will be juxtaposed with a mythological case - Homer’s account of the
Trojan War. In making this comparison the argument will show that the War on Terror
can be understood as appearing against a background of mythology rather than fact.
The “theory in question” in this case is that political speeches, like mythology, are
^ On the role of frames and framing in politics, see George Lakoff, Moral Politics:
What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don’t (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996), George Lakoff, Simple Framing: An Introduction to Framing and Its Use in
Politics (2005 [cited January 12 2006]); available from
http;///www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/simple_framing, George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
* Theda Skocpol and Somers Margaret, "The Uses of Comparative History in
Macrosocial Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, no. 2 (1980).
^ Ibid.: p. 176.
This is in accord with, albeit a mirror image of, the logic guiding the
19*
* century
archaeologist Heinrich Schlieman who sought to uncover the historical Troy, thereby
recasting that conflict against a backdrop of fact rather than myth.
textual constructs subject to textual analysis rather than uncontestable presentations of
fact.
Why Homer? Irving Kristol, the oft named and self-avowed “Godfather of
Neoconservativism” has said, “the favorite neoconservative text on foreign affairs,
thanks to professors Leo Strauss of Chicago and Donald Kagan of Yale, is Thucydides
on the Peloponnesian War.”” Thucydides, who’s work is often cited as a key text in
the canon of realism,’^ wrote at a time when Western traditions of thought tend to
understand themselves as emerging from the mythological fog of the past onto the solid
ground of empirical facts. This is quite evident in the work of Plato in which Socrates
and his insistence on logical reasoning is often represented as a direct challenger to
Achilles as the central cultural (heroic) figure.” So too can it be seen in the shift of
both perspective and aim between the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides.” Where
Herodotus is still prone to flights into what might be labelled mythological fancy,
excerpts from Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War are routinely called upon
” Irving Kristol, "The Neoconservative Persuasion," The Weekly Standard 008, no. 47
(2003).
” This list of authors most often includes, inter alia, Clausewitz. Hobbes and
Machiavelli. To be most precise, it is not the whole of Thucydides’ text that is drawn
upon. Most often it is Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue that gamer the
most attention.
” This is a recurrent theme in Plato's work. For an early example, see Plato,
"Apology," in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1997).
” See Thucydides and Steven Lattimore, The Peloponnesian War (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1998).;Herodotus, Michael A. Flower, and John
Marincola, Histories, Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. (Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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as evidence of the veracity of the realists’ claims to “tell it
like it is.”'^ Writing in 1939,
Simone Weil states that:
Those who had dreamed that force, thanks to progress now belonged to
the past, have seen the [Iliad] as a historic document; those who can see
that force, today as in the past, is at the centre of all human history, find
^
16
the Iliad its most beautiful, its purest mirror.
It is difficult to read this quote without finding in it an accurate description
of the
position adopted by neoconservatives such as Richard Perle and David Frum that force
is indeed “at the centre of ail human history.” It is most intriguing that this same
position, which takes such pride in itself as simply relaying the facts of the world as it
is, which places such an emphasis on the empirical and rational underpinnings of its
prescriptions and proscriptions, should find its “most beautiful, its purest mirror in
mythology. The Iliad is, of course, the epic tale of another, far older, arguably
archetypical “clash of civilizations.”'^ It depicts, one may say, “the mother of all” such
clashes. How fitting to examine one epic struggle from the vantage point of another?
The discussion of Homer will focus on Book 18 of the Iliad where he describes the
shield of Achilles.
The shield of Achilles presents its audience with a divinely sanctioned overview
of the world. It makes the claim “thus it is” and implies the corresponding ethos “there
Neoconservatives consider themselves the rightful heirs of the canonical tradition of
realism in so far as they insist that they “tell it like it is.”
Simone Weil, "The Iliad or the Poem of Force," in Critical Essays on Homer, ed.
Kenneth Atchity, Ron Hogart, and Doug Price (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1987), p.l53.
17 On the concept of the archetype, see Carl Jung, ed., Man and His Symbols (New
York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1964) p.58.
8
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is nothing to be done about it.” This same double claim is to be found in the rhetorical
(re)presentation of the War on Terror. The purpose of this double claim is to induce a
kind of paralysis on the part of the audience. Resistance becomes impossible. Yet the
“bearing of the shield” is not a sufficient condition for this pernicious. Medusa-like
effect to take hold.** It is also required that the audience accepts the “thus it is” at face
value. It follows that resistance to the effects of the shield must be rooted in a challenge
to the “thus it is” claim.
This is a critical point of departure along a variety of vectors. First, it is at this
point that the analysis offered by the argument moves from observation to intervention,
thereby diverting from the “scientific” insistence upon neutral objectivity. This
departure is very much in line with a key feminist challenge to traditional
methodological approaches. Patricia Siplon states, “the problem of losing ‘objectivity’
is formidable only if the researcher genuinely believes that objectivity is both desirable
and achievable, something a host of scholars, led by feminist theorists, have
questioned.”’^ She then quotes Sandra Harding as saying “scientific beliefs, practices,
institutions, histories, and problematics are constituted in and through contemporary
’* The shiled of Achilles is a central metaphor and “the bearing of the shield” is a phrase
that will recur often in this dissertation. It is used in what George Lakoff would call a
prototypical sense.
A prototype is an element of a category (either subcategory or an
individual member) that is used to represent the category as a whole in
some sort of reasoning. All prototypes ore cognitive constructions used
to perform a certain kind ofreasoning: they ore not objective features of
the world. Lakoff. Moral Politics p.9.
**^
Patricia Siplon, "Scholar, Witness or Activist? The Lessons and Dilemmas of an
Aids Research Agenda," PSOnline (1999).
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political and social projects, and always have been.”"° It is
exactly this point that the
present argument highlights by displaying the War on TeiTor against
a mythological
backdrop. This move alone alters the status of the thus it is
claim.
The call for resistance via a challenge to the “thus it is” claim
requires a
questioning of the unquestionable. The “thus it is” claim (re)presents for its
audience a
backdrop against which policy options appear as viable or not, and opinions
acceptable
or not. If these background conditions are to be questioned, it will not do to employ
any
method that accepts them as premises. Put differently, if the task is to challenge the
bearing of the shield, it is neither appropriate nor possible to do so utilizing a method
that is itself a bearer of the shield. This will be demonstrated in the dissertation as it
turns to the second of its guiding questions: “How is the appearance of inevitability to
be mitigated or resisted?”
Keeping with mythological metaphors, two figures are prominent in their ability
to offer resistance to the irresistible, vis. Perseus and Paris. Perseus is able to defeat
Medusa by avoiding her direct gaze. He relies instead on the distance offered by a
reflection, a simulation. Paris too is successful in defeating the invincible Achilles
precisely because he does not face the shield, but maintains his distance from it.
Critical distance is the key to success for both, and critical distance is equally important
for the theorist. Critical distance, from the point of view of the theorist, is similar to
objectivity in that the observer (the theorist or researcher) is somewhat removed from
the object observed, thereby permitting an otherwise unavailable sense of perspective.
At the same time critical distance directly contradicts objectivity in that the distance is
“ Ibid.
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not sought so as to detach one’s self but so as to bring one’s object or target within
range. Interdiction and not detachment is the operative guide.
How is the power of the shield to be resisted? The second stage of the
dissertation addresses the concept of mimesis (representation) as a means by which to
resist. Perseus’s approach is shared by Plato - under the rubric of mimesis - and by
Baudrillard - under the rubric of simulacra, a later development of mimesis. As critical
tools, mimesis and simulacra extend the promise of critical distance, thereby allowing
the “thus it is” claim to be understood as an illusion: “Thus it is like” masquerading as
“thus it is.” However both are also guilty of bearing the shield. In Plato’s Republic, the
concept of mimesis is used to make a direct attack on Homer. Homer’s representations
of the world are exposed as imitations and distortions of the world, which does indeed
open up the possibility that these illusions will be less easily accepted at face value. Yet
a closer look at the way Plato makes this argument in The Republic shows that he
merely postpones the problem.
Plato’s mimesis relies on a clear distinction between the real and the illusory.
His famous metaphor of the cave in Book VI spells out the distinction rather
beautifully. Be that as it may, by doing this he replaces what he sees as a Homeric
“thus it is” with his own “thus it really is.” He is left with the same problem he had
hoped to resolve. He may have stripped the shield from the hands of Homer, but now
he carries it himself.
Baudrillard's notions of simulacra and the hyperreal also promise to provide
critical distance. Like Geertz, he too adopts a semiotic approach. He sees the sign as
11
having four historical phases. The first two phases - the sign as a reflection
of reality
and the sign as a distortion of reality - correspond nicely to
Plato’s good and bad
mimesis. In the third phase the sign serves to conceal the absence of an
underlying
reality, and in the fourth, the sign ceases to make any reference whatsoever. Signs
21
become pure simulacra.
Utilizing this perspective, Baudrillard offers an analysis of the War on TeiTor.
In his short text. The Spirit of Terrorism, he takes up a number of themes that are
prominent throughout his works. In particular he discusses the role of the twin towers
of The World Trade Centre as
the visible sign of the closure of a system in the vertigo of doubling
while the other skyscrapers are each the original moment of a system
22
continually surpassing itself in the crisis and the challenge.
The collapse of the towers indicates a collapse, or rather an implosion of that closed
system of communication. In spite of the undeniable suffering of thousands upon
thousands of people, Baudrillard says that the power of the September 1 1 attacks rests
not in their physical destructiveness, but in their symbolic disruptiveness. And yet
although the symbolic heart of this system collapsed, the system itself did not. Rather it
has reasserted itself, in a very literal sense, forcefully. Great effort has been put into
reabsorbing the event into its simulation.
Mark Poster, ed/, Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988).
22
Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, ed. Michael Featherstone, trans.
lain Hamilton Grant, Theory, Culture & Society (London: Sage Publications, 1993)
p.69-70.
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Where Plato encounters the problem of bearing the shield by his reliance on
Being, Baudrillard encounters the problem by (seemingly) doing away with Being
altogether. Once the fourth phase of the sign is reached and the hyperreal takes over,
there is no going back. What is becomes a perfect reflection ofwhat it is believed ought
to be. A feedback loop is generated by the proximity of model and representation so
that the difference between the two vanishes. The ideal is perfected in the image and
all difference collapses into sameness from which there is no escape route.
Baudrillard’s insistence on the ubiquity of illusion gets as far as “thus it isn’t” - which is
simply a veiled “thus it is” - but remains locked in to the ethos of “there is nothing to be
done.” He too bears the shield.
The approach adopted by Perseus, as well as by both Plato and Baudrillard of
utilizing the representation, does not, in the end, deliver on the promise of critical
distance. Perseus succeeds in decapitating Medusa, but this does not extinguish the
power of her gaze. Similarly, in attempting to mitigate the effects of the shield, both
Plato and Baudrillard end up carrying it. The question remains as to how one is to
escape this problem?
Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1994).
Perseus himself encounters a similar problem. After Medusa is defeated, her gaze
retains its power. The defeat of one particular use of that power may have been
defeated, but the problem persists. It is only resolved when Perseus decides that it is too
dangerous for any human to wield. He gives the head of Medusa to Athena as he is
returning her mirrored shield. She affixes the Gorgon’s visage to that shield. The
power of the “thus it is” rightfully belongs only in the hands of a god. It should also be
noted that the shield of Achilles is prefigured in the Iliad by the shield carried to battle
by Agamemnon, which also bears the image of Medusa upon it. See Appendix C: The
Shield of Agamemnon.
13
How is the power of the shield to be resisted? The third stage of the dissertation
will look to the fate of the shield after the death of Achilles. The shield presents
itself
as invulnerable and impenetrable. The death of Achilles indicates both the
hollowness
of this claim and the danger inherent in believing in it too much. This is a
lesson that
remains unlearned by Ajax who would claim the shield, and by Neoptolemus. who
bears it. The inability of either character to comprehend the dangers of the shield leads
to their deaths. Both Ajax and Neoptolemus are undone by their stubborn insistence on
their own transparency of motivation and purpose. They are in this sense one-
dimensional. They are already predisposed to the easy acceptance of "thus it is” type
claims. Odysseus, on the other hand, is different. He wins the right to bear the shield,
but never actually bears it.
Odysseus understands the power of illusion rendered possible by the shield. He
already knows that any claim to "tell it like it is” is always much more problematic than
it would make itself seem. He is already a master of strategy, deception, and trickery,
hence he is both a suitable bearer of the shield, and has no need to bear it. He has no
need to as he is already aware of the lesson it can teach - namely that a claim to certain
knowledge, "thus it is”, is always a means to some other end. Odysseus is exemplary in
not being taken in by his own tales, by his own representations of himself and the world
to others. He is able, in other words, to maintain a critical distance from his own
(dis)simulations. He is able to embrace the poiesis intertwined in his mimesis.
Odysseus is forever making and remaking himself He is a difficult figure
because he both resides in and overturns the value system of heroes such as Ajax and
Achilles. He disturbs the easy lines between noble and base, honorable and
14
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dishonorable, truthful and untruthful. To borrow a phrase from Friedrich Nietzsche,
Odysseus opens up a horizon of possibilities “beyond good and evil.” Indeed, it is to
Nietzsche’s work that the dissertation next turns. Specific attention is given to his focus
on language and his challenge to the Platonic notions of Being that underpin the very
possibility of making “thus it is” claims.
What the character of Odysseus suggests, Friedrich Nietzsche develops.
Nietzsche does see in Homer an emphasis on “artfulness above all else,” but rather
than rejecting this as somehow removed from the truth, as Plato does, he celebrates it.
What Nietzsche points out is that the unfathomability of art. its illusion and mystery, are
required, even by science that self-avowedly seeks to dispel such things. The whole of
human cultural development, he tells us, is best understood not as a dialectical operation
in which a thesis and its antithesis are both overcome in a linearly progressive synthesis,
but in terms of the interminable tensions between what he calls the Apollonian and
Dionysian drives. The interplay between the two is that between order and chaos,
individuation and its complete dissolution, in becoming god and becoming animal.
Both Apollo and Dionysus, as Nietzsche makes abundantly clear, require the other in a
constant making and unmaking of claims to show the world “as it is.” The error of the
anti-Dionysian Socrates, as Nietzsche sees it, is that he has bought fully into what can
only be, at best, a partial truth. His emphasis on aesthetics reorients the framework
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil; Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). Hereafter
BGE.
The phrase is from L. Pratt, quoted in Barbara Clayton, A Penelopean Poetics:
Reweaving the Feminine in Homer’s Odyssey, ed. Gregory Nagy, Greek Studies:
Interdisciplinary Studies (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004) p.78n.59.
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employed by Plato, and ironically preserved by Baudrillard.
The role of Nietzsche s
new philosopher is not to contemplate the truth and to
pronounce, "thus it is.
Actual philosophers...are commanders and law givers: they
say ‘thus it
shall be!”, it is they who determine the Wlierefore and the Whither
of
mankind..’.they reach for the future with creative hand, and
everything
that is or has been becomes for them a means, an instrument, a
hammer.
Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is law giving,
their will to
truth IS - will to power.
It is with Nietzsche and his turn to the role of language in
the creation of knowledge
that one can see the broad scope of life as poetic. This
shift brings us closer to an
answer of the question of how to resist the power of the shield. The strategic
approach
of Perseus is a hazardous one, and this is especially the case
after Nietzsche s
pronouncement that "God is dead!”^* Perseus, after all, was able to turn his lethal prize
over to the gods for safekeeping. No such possibility remains after Nietzsche. Another
strategy is required.
Again, whow is the power of the shiled to be resisted? One strategy is to be
found in Paris. Paris the archer, son of Priam, prince of Troy, brings down Achilles
precisely by not facing the shield. Rather than facing the shield directly, he launches
his attack the margins of the battlefield. It is precisely because he maintains his
distance that he is able to resist the further advancement of the shield. Nietzsche, one of
the forefathers and progenitors of deconstruction once said:
The struggle against Plato, or, to express it more plainly and for ‘the
people’, the struggle against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of
millennia - for Christianity is Platonism ‘for the people’ - has created in
Nietzsche, Bge p.2 1 1
.
^ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathiistra : A Book for Everyone and No
One, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Classics. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) p.l2.
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Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit such as has never existed on
earth before: with so tense a bow one can now shoot for the most distant
targets...We good Europeans and free, very free spirits - we have it still,
the whole need of the spirit and the whole tension of its bow! And
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perhaps also the arrow, the task and, who knows? The target...
Deconstruction as a critical tool works /i'ow the margins of a text to show how the text
works against itself It begins from the same assumptions as Geertz’s semiotic
approach, but takes those assumptions much further. Where Geertz is a structuralist,
following in the tradition of Claude Levi-Strauss, deconstruction is a tool of the post-
structuralists. Where structuralists insist that meaning is only to be found through an
understanding of the context within which a given event occurs - the “webs of
significance [Man] himself has spun”- post-structuralists argue that the implication of
these very webs themselves is that the universe becomes decentered. That is to say that
meaning for human beings is autopoietic. It is always mediated through language and
does not derive from any strict correspondence to “the real world.” There is no certain
benchmark against which to measure anything.
If knowledge is poetic, if it is a text, then it should be possible to subject it to
textual analysis. Erich Auerbach in his central work Mimesis effectively demonstrates
how the concept of mimesis itself can be employed to reveal the poiesis built into it.^^
He does this by comparing one instance of mimesis with another. On the assumption
that each example provides what was considered to be a “life like” portrayal of events,
one is free to notice the obvious stylistic differences between them. As one encounters
Nietzsche, Bge.
See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Realit}' in Western Literature
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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the divergent examples of mimesis presented in his book, it becomes more and more
difficult to simply accept the existence of an underlying, unchanging reality (Being) that
speaks for itself. This is a valuable approach when more than a single example is ready
to hand. But is there a theoretical tool that renders it possible to make the same
observations within a single example?
Just such a tool is to be found within the ground already covered by the present
investigation. Homer’s description of the shield of Achilles is recognised as the
archetypical example of ekphrasis. Originally used to mean any description, the term
has come to refer to the verbal representation of physical (non-verbal) representation.^'
As a literary term, this has most often been used in the context of works of art being
described in poetry. This argument hopes to develop the use of ekphrasis as a tool
useful in the field of critical political theory.
The greatest advantage to ekphrasis is that it is able to provide and sustain the
kind of critical distance mimesis has difficulty sustaining. Mimesis can open a space
for questions by at least suggesting the difference between the “original” and its
representation. Seen through the lens of mimesis, the claim of Achilles’ shield cannot
be “thus it is” but only “thus it is something like.” This gap immediately suggests the
questions “how is it different?” and “could it be otherwise?” However the enchanting
effects (thlexis) of mimesis work to quickly close this gap. Ekphrasis on the other hand
can open the same gap, and then widen it. It does this by calling attention to the
31
W.J.T. Mitchell, Ekphrasis and the Other (University of Chicago Press, 1994 [cited
April 12 2004]); available from
http://www.rc.umd.edU/editions/shelley/medusa/mitchell.html#one.
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representation as a creation, as poiesis. Andrew Sprague Becker breaks down ekphrasis
into four component parts. These are:
1
.
) Res ipsae - the referent or that which is represented by the work described.
2.
) Opus ipsum - the physical medium of the work.
3.
) Artifex el ars - a focus on the creator and the creation.
4.
) Animadversor - a detached commentary on the effect of or reaction to the
work on the part of the observer, and by extension, the audience.
Although this dissertation will make use of his methodological formula, if you will, it
differs from Becker’s project in that it demonstrates the usefulness of ekphrasis as a
critical tool beyond the scope of the analysis of poetry. It argues, in other words, for a
much wider application than Becker has in mind.
Mimesis as a critical tool promises to expose the representation as a
representation. However it does this by reference to the “real thing” behind the image.
At the same time the mimetic image, if it is to be truly effective, works to conceal itself
as an image. Ekphrasis, on the other hand both recognises the power of mimesis, by
means of the res ipsae and opus ipsum, and backs away from that image, by the artifex
et ars and especially the animadversor. Where mimesis presents an enchanting image,
ekphrasis allows for that same image, but then says to the reader (the observer or
researcher) “what an enchanting image this is.” Thus in a deeply ironic move, by
highlighting the power of the enchantment, it breaks the enchantment.
Ekphrasis renders the bearing of the shield impossible except in so far as it is
borne as a (dis)simulation, a tool for the obtainment of some other end. Ekphrasis is a
reminder to the audience that they claims they are presented cannot be of the type “thus
Andrew Sprague Becker, The Shield of Achilles and the Poetics of Ekphrasis
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995) p.42.
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it is.” Counter to the claims of the shield, the audience is not
presented with the world
as it is, nor even with a representation of the world as it is. They are presented
instead
with a representation of a representation; with something like something like.
This is
not the same as saying that there is no real world, or that “anything goes”,
but it is to
say that access to that world is never immediate (unmediated). Any claims about that
world must therefore be uncertain and any “thus it is claim must be rejected outright as
there is no available perspective, standpoint or grounds from which to make such a
claim.
Becker’s ffour part schema of ekphrasis allows him to draw useful insights from
close readings of Homer and other ekphrastic poets. This dissertation will take his four
part schema and show how it can be applied to texts not normally considered poetry.
Thus the dissertation will conclude where it began, with a close reading of the
September 20, 2001 speech by President Bush. Only this time around, the speech will
read as an example of ekphrasis. By showing the claims made to be less than they
appear, the argument intends to show how the conclusions regarding the inevitability of
the conflict and the necessity of the policy decisions made in its execution are
themselves illusory.
It is to take seriously Socrates’ seemingly paradoxical understanding that “I only
know that I do not know anything.”
CHAPTER II
THE GOD OF FIRE’S GIFT:
THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES AND THE WAR ON TERROR
In the context of the current conflict, there has been a steady stream of messages
from President Bush and those around him that the world is a fearful place where
constant vigilance is requisite and the consequences of “dreaming” dire.^"^ We are told
the appropriate response to this pervasive fear is to employ force, “to end this evil
before it kills again and on a genocidal scale. There is no middle way for Americans: It
is victory or holocaust.”^^ The overwhelming ferocity of this response is intended to
“shock and awe” the opponent into paralysis. It can be said that those who profess such
This is the daydream of the idealist, criticized by the likes of E.H. Carr and other
adherents of the realist approach to understanding international relations. Edward
Hallett Carr, The T-went}' Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). The “dreaming”
objected to by neoconservatives akin to that discussed by Plato in The Republic when he
says:
Is this not dreaming, namely, whether asleep or awake, to think that a
likeness is not a likeness but the reality which it resembles? Plato,
Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hacked Publishing
Company, 1974) 476c.
The dire consequences of the dream are that one will be utterly overtaken by the real,
lost in ones’s own illusions. (Ironically, the scope of the dream may extend much
further than the realists may wish to admit, as is implied in much of the later chapters of
this dissertation.) This is different from the dire consequences of the dream as outlined
by Osama Bin Laden. For Bin Laden, the dream has a prophetic function. It is an
avenue by which insight into the unknown and unknowable might be gained. Dreams
of airplanes and tall buildings in the lead up to September 1 1, 2001 threatened to expose
his plans. For a discussion see James Der Derian, Dreams, Lies, and Videotapes (2001
[cited December 20 2005]); available from
http://www.watsoninstitute.Org/infopeace/9 1 1 /index.cfm?id=8.
Frum and Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror p.9.
21
rhetoric advance carrying the shield of Achilles, the mere sight of which led “each
fighter [to shrink] away.”^^ This observation is indicative of the intent of this argument
to recast the War on Terror as a myth. This is not to say that it is not really happening.
Nor is it to say that it does not produce tangible, even devastating effects. To recast the
War on Terror as a myth is to open the possibility that the conflict and the stark options
it presents are not as inevitable as it may otherwise seem. Although a variety of
speeches delivered by President Bush and those within his administration can and do
serve to highlight specific points of argument, I will focus on a comparison of Homer’s
account of the shield of Achilles with a speech delivered by President Bush to a joint
37
session of Congress on 20 September, 2001.
Homer's account of the shield of Achilles presents its audience with an
overview of the cosmos as seen from the unimpeachable vantage point of the divine.
Corresponding to the divinely inspired claim “thus it is” is an ethos that can be stated,
“there is nothing to be done.” The difficult, yet only acceptable response is to embrace
The leap from the War on Terror and the war in Iraq to the Trojan War may not at
first seem the most obvious, but it is not random. Over the past few years there has
been a notable fascination with the epic struggles of mythological heroes. An
exploration of why this should be is best left to the Jungians, but examples of this
referring specifically Homeric themes range from a made for television version of the
Odyssey, to Philip Bobbit’s book, Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles War, Peace,
and the Course of History, 1st Anchor Books ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 2002).)
See also James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-
Entertainment Network (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001 ). Of course there is also to the
recent film Troy, starring Brad Pitt as Achilles. (It should be noted that the Hollywood
rendition of Homer’s. ///arf, though entertaining enough, departs significantly from the
story of the Iliad and is not the focus of discussion in this paper. However, one suspects
there is another set of analogies to be drawn between the film and the contemporary
political situation, just as one might be mildly surprised that the role of Agamemnon
was not cast by an actor with a faux-Texas drawl.)
37
See Appendix A.
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*1
one’s fate and play one’s role. This same logic, this same interaction between cosmos
and ethos, is in play in much of the rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror.
Despite the many similarities between the worldview offered on the shield and
that offered by the Bush Administration, there is one major difference that will be
discussed. Where Homer emphasises the similarities between the combatants. Bush
emphasises the utter incompatibility between “us” and “them.” The presence of this
distinction is not particularly remarkable in itself, but when seen against the
mythological backdrop of Homer’s epic, the consequences of this distinction becomes
chillingly clear.
The 30 Second Iliad
“Rage - Goddess, sing the rage of Peleus’ son Achilles... ”(1:1)
The opening line of Homer’s Iliad is very clear as to its main topic. The
enraged Achilles, greatest of all Greek heroes, makes the decision to stop fighting after
King Agamemnon publicly humiliates him. In his absence, the war goes badly for the
Greeks. As the Trojans are about to reach the Greek ships, Achilles’ friend Patroclus
pleads with him to return to battle. Achilles refuses, still consumed by his rage towards
Agamemnon, but permits Patroclus to don his armour so that the Trojans might believe
Achilles has returned. Patroclus manages to frighten away the main force of the
Trojans, but is then killed by Hector, son of the Trojan king and the mightiest of the
Homer, The Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).
Throughout the dissertation, all references to Homer’s epic are taken from Robert
Fagles’ translation. Given the preponderance of available translations, all references
will be provided in parentheses within the text using the fonnat (Book:Line(s)).
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Trojan warriors. Hector strips Patroclus of Achilles' armour, taking it for himself
When Achilles hears of the death of Patroclus, he decides to redirect his rage away from
Agamemnon and towards the Trojans. Before he can reenter the battle, his mother, the
goddess Thetis, makes him promise not to fight until she returns with a new set of
annour for him. Thetis flies up to Mount Olympus where she begs Hephaestus, the god
of fire, to make this gift. Achilles accepts the arms from his mother - a breastplate, a
helmet, greaves, and most significantly, a shield- and plunges back into the bloody thick
of the fight. His murderous rampage eventually results in the death of Hector. After
killing Hector, Achilles ties the body to the back of his war cart and drags the fallen
hero through the Greek camp. Having thus offended the gods, Achilles is ordered to
return the body by a messenger from Zeus. Priam, the Trojan king, sneaks into the
Greek camp with the help of the gods and begs for the return of his son's body. The
epic concludes with the reconciliation between Achilles and Priam and the funeral of
Hector.
The Shield of Achilles
The shield that Thetis provides to her son is notable in Homer’s epic. Nowhere
else does he devote so many lines to the description of a single object. Homer is
quick to point out the terrible power of the shield saying that at its mere presence “a
tremor ran through all the Myrmidon ranks - none dared to look straight at the glare,
each fighter shrank away.” (19:17-18) Despite the reaction of his allies and kinsmen,
the images do not appear on the surface to be fearful at all. The shield depicts the earth
and sky, sun and moon and the constellations. There are also images of a city at peace
39
The relevant passages from Book 1 8 are included as Appendix B.
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and a city at war. The former is complete with wedding celebrations and court cases.
The latter contains the expected depictions of carnage and strife, but these should not
have been overly frightful to veteran soldiers in the tenth year of an ongoing war. Aside
from this there are images of a more pastoral nature - the ploughing and planting of
fields, a king's estate, the growing and harvesting of barley and grapes, a herd of cattle
set upon by lions, a dancing circle filled with young dancers and tumblers. Largely
absent are the standard images of terror to be found on other shields described by
Homer. There are no mythical beasts, no Gorgons or Griffins, no serpents or Sphinxes,
nor even that much straightforward gore.
Another notable feature is that Homer's description of the shield is more of a
narrative than an exposition. He does provide some detail as to the materials and expert
craftsmanship of the various scenes, but most strikingly and most engagingly he retells
the story of each scene. The audience is drawn into these stories to an extent that it is
quite easy to forget that the poet is describing a particular object. The shield is an
interesting feature within Homer's epic and it raises equally interesting questions.
The shield of Achilles can be spoken of in many ways. It can be taken at face
value as an object preexisting its description by Homer. It can be treated as existing
only in its description. It can be treated figuratively and archetypically as a model for
specific types of truth claims. The shield is therefore an object, a description, a claim,
and a model of any such truth claims.
The shield as an object has multiple functions, not all of them equally obvious.
First, it is a tool for the provision of physical protection - a mobile wall behind which
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the body of its carrier may take shelter. Yet it is important to
remember that all but the
heel of Achilles is invulnerable, his mother having dipped him in the
river Styx as an
infant.'^ But if this is the case, what is the purpose of this new arniour?
Its pui-pose
cannot be strictly protection as this would be redundant. Nor, for that matter
does the
armour provide any form of protection for his single vulnerable part. An indication
of
this second function is provided in the text when Thetis says to Achilles Hector gloi ies
in your armour, strapped across his back.” (18:156)'*' The clear indication is that that
which the armour most protects is not the body, but the status of its bearer. Hector
glories in the armour as an outward sign of his superiority over Achilles, and therefore
over all the Achaeans."*^ The armour serves to situate the bearer within a social order.
The Arms ofAgamemnon
43
Agamemnon’s armour is a useful model and comparison in this respect. The
king's armour, described in some detail by Homer (1 1:19-52) has an obvious function
Alternately it is said that his mother held him over the fire of immortality in order to
bum away all mortal parts of him. See Robert Graves, The Greek Myths (New York:
George Brazillier, Inc., 1955).
Emphasis added.
By wearing the armour. Hector claims his superiority, but as anyone familiar with the
events of the epic will immediately recognise, the making of the claim and the veracity
of the claim are not one and the same.
The intimate connection between the notable individual and their specific armaments
is to be found throughout the Iliad. Witness Telamonian Ajax’s tower shield, Nestor’s
chariot, Pandarus’ bow. Hectors “flashing helm.” See Blair Campbell, "The Epic Hero
as Politico," History of Political Thought 1 1, no. 2 (1990), Ian C. Johnston, The Ironies
of War: An Introduction to Homer’s Iliad (Lanham: University Press of America,
1988).
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in its protectiveness, but it also serves to show Agamemnon’s status.^^* The exquisite
craftsmanship of the object itself speaks to the wealth and nobility of its bearer.
Furthermore, the Gorgon’s head emblazoned on a glittering shield echoes the shield of
Athena, the warrior goddess of wisdom. In carrying the shield then, Agamemnon is
staking a claim to a status above that of all other kings, a status bordering on divinity.
Such a claim suits the character of Agamemnon whose hubris, it must be recalled, was
at the very root of the conflict between himself and Achilles. In the very opening lines
of the epic, Homer says:
What drove them to fight with such a fury?
Apollo the son of Zeus and Leto. Incensed at the king
He swept a fatal plague through the army - men were dying
And all because Agamemnon spumed Apollo’s priest. (1:9-12)
If Agamemnon’s armour, crafted by human hands, hints at the likeness to
divinity (and perhaps also the hubris) of its bearer, the divine origin of Achilles’ new
armour specifically serves to encase him in a sheathing of divinity. It is created with
the specific intent of being “armour that any man in the world of men will marvel at
through all the years to come - whoever sees its splendor.” (18:544-546) It thereby all
but guarantees the permanent glory of its bearer.
The structural relationship between the shield of Agamemnon and the shield of
Achilles helps to reveal yet another function of the shield. The shield is also a medium
for the transmission of a message intended (though not exclusively) for those faced with
its advance. M.W. Edwards notes that in the Iliad:
The text of this description is included as Appendix C.
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Often... a short form of a type-scene (or other structural pattern)
precedes
a fuller version, as if to familiarize the hearer with the
concept before its
most significant occurrence.
Such is the case with the two shields in question, the former
serving as an introduction
to the latter. Thus the shield of Agamemnon is of the same type as the
shield of
Achilles and can be of considerable assistance in understanding how the latter works to
produce its effects. The shield of Agameirmon echoes the shield of the goddess Athena
and hence offers a significant clue as to how the shield of Achilles works. Athena had
lent her mirrored shield to the hero Perseus to aid him in his quest to kill the Gorgon,
Medusa. Medusa, once beautiful, had been cursed by Athena so that whomsoever
looked upon her would be instantly turned to stone. Perseus was able to avoid her gaze,
thanks to the reflective properties of the shield, and decapitate her. The hero then
returned the shield and the severed head to Athena, who in turn affixed the terrifying
visage upon the shield."*^
Homer describes the shield Agamemnon carries as being decorated with “the
Gorgon’s grim mask - the burning eyes, the stark, transfixing horror - and round her
strode the shapes of Rout and Fear.” (11:39-40) The Gorgon’s head on his shield
threatens to paralyze the viewer, to remove from him the possibility of resistance.
Quoted in Becker, The Shield ofAchilles and the Poetics ofEkphrasis p.67.
See Graves, The Greek Myths. Perseus and his strategic approach will be discussed
in more detail in chapters II and IV.
Of course, as with Hector’s claim to superiority over Achilles, Agamemnon’s
message that resistance is impossible is not entirely true. The conflict between
Agamemnon and Achilles is explicitly based on Achilles’ promise to the seer Calchas to
defend him against the wrath of Agamemnon. ( 1 :85-98) Were it the case that resistance
to the authority of Agamemnon were as impossible as he claims, then whole of the epic
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The production of fear and reverence (anticipating “shock and awe”) is intended both
for enemies and subjects alike. This kind of psychological warfare is easily found in
both historical and contemporary settings. As a later example, the Spartan hoplites
were known to have their shields uniformly embossed with the single character A
(lambda) for “Lacedemonia.” This sent a distinct message to their opponents and allies
alike that that the Spartans fought, moved, and were victorious as a single unit. This
was extremely powerful within the context of phalanx based warfare. To face such a
uniformed wall without the benefit of being part of one oneself must have been
daunting indeed. This effect on its own contributes to the very efficiency and efficacy
of which it bespeaks. An intimidated opponent is a more easily defeated opponent.
Intimidation lends itself to panic and poor decisions on the part of the intimidated. The
shield of Achilles works in much the same way.
Homer is quick to tell the reader that the shield of Achilles was a terrifying
sight. Even the allies of Achilles could not look at it directly. Only Achilles himself
was capable of this. Where others “shrank away,” the more Achilles looks, the deeper
his anger goes, fearful not for his own life, but that the body of his lover Patroclus “may
rot to nothing.”^ It is clear that an important function of the shield is to enthrall its
audience into inaction. Thus there is a genealogical relationship of sorts between the
would be groundless. This is a critical point and will be addressed in much more detail,
albeiti in a slightly different context, later in the argument.
Given more space, there is an opening here to examine the parallels between
Patroclus as a symbol of the core values of friendship and other-connection and the
present challenges to traditional notions of family, national pride and other “core
values” as they are perceived by conservatives. Could it be that Bush too fears that
these conservative “core values” may also “rot to nothing?”
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paralyzing gaze of Medusa, the shield of Agamemnon, and
the shield of Achilles. It
does not perfonn this function in the expected way,
as exemplified in the cold eyed
stare of the Gorgon depicted on Agamemnon’s shield. Yet
its paralyzing effect is more
powerful. How then does it enthrall?
The links between Medusa and the shields of Athena, Agamemnon,
and Achilles
indicate the importance of fear in their respective operations.
Certainly each of them
work, at least in part, by paralyzing their audience thi-ough fear.
Yet at the same time
there is more going on. The reader is introduced to the shiled of Achilles
as “a world of
gorgeous immortal work.” (18:564) Agamemnon's shiled is introduced as
“beautiful
blazoned work.” (11:35) Even Medusa herself was once very beautiful before
being
cursed by Athena.^^ Both beauty and fear are central in the operation of
the shield.
There is an immense and irresolvable tension between repulsion and attraction built into
the shield. Homer captures this tension when he describes the shield as “gleamig bright
as the light that reaches sailors out at sea.” (19:443-444) Such a light may be a beacon,
guiding the sailors home. But it my also be a warning, telling of treacherous waters and
unsafe passage.
Graves notes that Athena affixes the Gorgon’s head onto her shield
doubtless to warn people against examining the divine mysteries hidden
behind it. Greek bakers used to paint Gorgon masks on their ovens, to
discourage busybodies from opening the oven door, peeping in, and thus
allowing a draught to spoil the bread.^*^
Consider that after her death, Pegasus, the very symbol of beauty, is bom from her
corpse.
Graves, The Greek Myths 129.
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These descriptions, too, make note of an underlying tension between repulsion and
attraction. Were Athena’s shield and the mysteries hidden behind it not attractive, there
would be no need for the warning visage. Were it not a matter of attractive curiosity as
to what is happening in the unseen confines of the baker’s oven, the doors would remain
unadorned. To inquire into these mysteries, to seek to reveal that which is hidden is to
disrupt their power and to destabilize their operation. If one wants to sustain the
mysteries of the gods, they must remain unknowable. If one wants to make a loaf of
bread, the oven door must remain closed. If one wants to represent a War on Terror as
inevitable, all other options must remain closed. The power of the shield is the power to
close off the other options.^’ The shield enthralls by suspending its audience between
beauty and fear, between attraction and repulsion, between the known and the
unknowable, between life and death. The shield by paralyzes by destroying hope.
Beauty, Hope and Fear
The majority of Homer’s description of the shield is taken up by events that take
place away from the city at war. Homer dedicates relatively few lines to the description
of war on the shield. Yet the intensity of the battle scenes cannot be denied. It is as if
Homer is telling the reader, or that the shield is reminding the viewer, that the quieter
life of abundance and the rule of law is the backdrop against which the sacrifices of war
can make sense. Thus it would at first appear that war is but a relatively small part of a
larger world. War can be seen as set against a backdrop of more civil, ordered modes or
And to disrupt that power is to allow for alternatives. The later chapters of the
dissertation will discuss ways in which this power can be disrupted.
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forms of living. For what soldier does not think of a return to
the life he has left
behind? This is very clear throughout Homer's epic. Note, for
example, how quickly
the Argives embrace Agamemnon’s suggestion that they leave Troy
(2:168-180). How
else could Helen's mimicry of the voices of the wives of those hidden in
the wooden
horse be so compelling?^^ Or again, how else is it that the most intense fighting comes
when the Achaean ships are threatened? For these ships are nothing if not an ever
present and necessary reminder of the possibility of return to a peaceful life
beyond the
battlefield. It is this possibility, this promise of a better world that the
shield
(understood as a claim) takes away.
The overwhelming power of the shield, its paralyzing effect, is achieved in a
manner as subtle as the artwork embossed upon it. Although the battle scenes are a
small part of the overall picture, they bleed into everything. They absorb the
background against which they appear. This takes place largely through the multiple
parallels between the images on the shield and the lives led by its immediate audience,
those faeed with its advance on the battlefield. Some of these parallels are obvious.
Clearly the language used by Homer in the description of the battle by the river could be
taken from one of a thousand other places in the text of the Iliad. It is not difficult to
see the fate of Hector in Homer’s reference to “hauling a dead man through the
slaughter by the heels” (18:630) This image bears a sense of the prophetic, but only in
so far as the reader is already familiar with the outcome of the greater narrative. This
“prophetic” character of the images on the shield become recognized as such only de
Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1996) 4:310.
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facto. Retrospectively the events can be seen as fated, inevitable. Of course. Hector’s
corpse is not the only one to be accorded such treatment. Sarpedon, Patroclus and a host
of others are subjected to such indignity within the epic. Thus this particular image on
the shield both describes events that have happened and events that will happen. Indeed
to the immediate audience, they are representations of events that are happening. This
lends weight to the shield’s claims to timelessness and to its acceptability as an accurate
reflection of the world.
The images of the soldiers in battle are those that most closely and obviously
mirror the experience of the shield’s immediate audience. Trojans and Greeks alike see
themselves reflected in those figures, which
clashed and fought like living, breathing men
grappling each others corpses, dragging off the dead. (18:627-628)
These lines simultaneously describe the craftsmanship of Hephaestus and the existential
state of the combatants themselves. Due to this proximity of image and experience, the
combatants, like the reader, see the blurring of the lines between the representations on
the shield and their own realities. The soldiers and the reader (the audience) are taken
in by the mirroring effect of the shield, forgetting that these images are representations,
not reflections, and most certainly not the ’’things themselves.” The immediate
audience of the shield, Greek and Trojan alike, are caught in the ambiguity of the lines
quoted above. In these lines, in this image, the viewers of the shield are told that they
are already dead; that they are only "'like living, breathing men” even as they appear -
even to themselves - to live and breathe as men.
The obvious parallels are powerful, but they are far from exhaustive. Nor for
that matter are they necessarily the most powerful inducers of paralysis on the shield.
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The direct parallels may suggest the impossibility of any combatant
making it out alive,
but they do nothing to disturb the backdrop of a peaceful life for
the sake of which a
continual, if ultimately fatal, struggle might make sense. That is, the unavoidability
of
death underscored by the obvious parallels between the images on the
shield and the
existential condition of its immediate audience does nothing in itself to
remove the
motivation to struggle on.^^ It is precisely this motivation that is eroded,
and even
erased by the subtler mirroring to be found on the shield.
Take, for example 18:676-685, which reads:
...-a savage roar! -
a crashing attack - and a pair of ramping lions
had seized a bull from the cattle's front ranks -
he bellowed out as they dragged him off in agony.
Packs of dogs and the young herdsmen rushed to help
But the lions ripping open the hide of the huge bull
were gulping down the guts and the black pooling blood
while the herdsmen yelled the fast pack on - no use.
The hounds shrank from sinking teeth in the lions.
They balked, hunching close, barking, cringing away.
Compare this image on the shield to the description of a Trojan assault in Book 15:
Routed like herds of cattle or big flocks of sheep
When two wild beasts stampeded them away in terror.
Suddenly pouncing down in their midst (15:382-384)
Or again compare these lines to 17:69-75:
Menelaus fierce as a mountain lion sure of his power.
Seizing the choicest head from a good grazing herd.
First he cracks its neck, clamped in its huge jaws.
Mauling the kill then down in gulps he bolts it.
One could argue that on the contrary it is precisely the inevitability of death that
renders possible the ethical code by which the Homeric heroes operate. Glory is to be
found in the accomplishments of one’s life and the way in which one chooses to face an
unavoidable death. See Graham Zanker, The Heart of Achilles: Characterization and
Personal Ethics in the Iliad (Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 1 997).
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Blood and guts, and around him dogs and shepherds
Raise a fierce din but they keep their distance.
Lacking nerve to go in and take the lion on -
The fear that grips their spirit makes them blanch.
Although nearly identical language is used to describe these events, the events
themselves belong in the two opposing worlds of peace and war. With these passages
one can begin to discern the erosion of the boundaries between the two worlds. But this
is not all. Another of the more pacific scenes on the shield depicts:
...a thriving vineyard loaded with clusters,
bunches of lustrous grapes in gold, ripening deep purple
and climbing vines shot up on silver vine-poles.
And round it he cut a ditch in dark blue enamel
And round the ditch he staked a fence in tin.
And one lone footpath led toward the vineyard
and down it the pickers ran
whenever they went to strip the grapes at vintage -
girls and boys, their hearts leaping in innocence,
bearing away the sweet ripe fruit in wicker baskets. (18:654.663)
The images here bear a strong resemblance to the physical layout of the Achaean camp,
surrounded by a trench filled with sharp stakes and accessible by a single gate. (12:65-
79) It is not overly difficult to see the similarities between the youths bearing away the
vintage they have “stripped” and the Trojan soldiers carrying away the spoils they have
stripped from the dead Argives within the gates of the encampment. (15:409) With
only a small amount of visual imagination, one can quite easily see the similarities
between the baskets dripping with the dark juice of the grapes, and the spoils of the
encampment, dripping with the dark blood of the Achaeans.
The similarities in this image work by placing the combatants in the dual role of
both harvester and harvested. This is significant when one considers the number of
agricultural scenes depicted on the shield of Achilles. Elsewhere Homer compares the
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sound of battle to the thud of a timber cutter's axe when clearing a forest. (15:736)
The
work of war and the work of peace are equated. They are made interchangeable. Thus
within the conext of the message of the shield, the reach of war extends
that much
further.
There is one particular scene on the shield that seems most removed from the
bloody grind and feverish activity of the battlefield;
And the famous crippled Smith forged a meadow
deep in a shaded glen for shimmering flocks to graze,
with shepherds’ steadings, well roofed huts and sheepfolds. (18:686-688)
This scene is quintessentially pastoral. Quiet and still, it seems almost an antipode to
the battle scenes. And yet one can find echoes of the imagery of this scene in the most
pitched, most heated moments of the war. After the death of Sarpedon when both
armies are in a desperate struggle to claim his corpse, Homer says:
But they still kept swarming round and round the corpse
Like flies in a sheepfold buzzing over the brimming pails
In the first spring days when the buckets flood with milk.
So veteran troops kept swarming around that corpse.
Never pausing - (17:745-749)
Echoes of war are to be found even in the tranquility of the “deep shaded glen.” The
message conveyed is that the reach of war is universal, its presence ubiquitous.
Sarpedon’s Body
The description of the death of Sarpedon contains within it one of the key
images that work' to confirm the universality of war, and the ensuing battle for his
corpse is instructive in another way. Immediately prior to the passage quoted above
Homer says:
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Not even a hawk-eyed scout could still make out Sarpedon,
The man’s magnificent body covered over head to toe.
Buried under a mass of weapons, blood and dust. (17:742-744)
This is significant in that the ostensible rationale for the ongoing fight at that time and at
that place is the recovery of Sarpedon’s body either to gain glory by stripping it of its
armour, or else to save it from such a fate. Yet the object of the struggle, the purpose
for which it is waged becomes obscured by the struggle itself This is true both in a
literal sense in that the body is hidden from sight, and true on a grander scale in that it is
during this fight that Patroclus is killed by Hector. Sarpedon’s body as a causiis belli is
lost, just as are all such causes for war, and the fighting ultimately continues for its own
sake.
It is in this realization that the shield at last displays its most terrifying power.
Its claim ’’thus it is” carries with it the full weight of the realization that there is no quiet
life to return to, there is no greater cause that makes the continuing struggle meaningful.
The claim of the shield is that there is no cause for war at all, only war for the sake of its
own perpetuation. Each and every one of the participants is already dead, and only
“like living, breathing men.” (18:627) The potency of the claim made by the shield, the
veracity of its “thus it is” and its effectiveness as a tool of war depends on the constant
recreation of the context within which its claim is true. The shield presents its audience
with an apparently inescapable and foregone conclusion that a life of peace “is not for
you.” The combatant, the audience, is always irretrievably cut off from that other world
to which the soldier hopes to return. Ironically enough, the shield achieves this by
presenting the worlds of war and peace as distinct entities.
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Such a presentation resonates with a preexisting framework of experience on
the
part of its audience. Every soldier faeed with the advancing shield
has distinct
memories of a life before the war, and harbors hopes of a return to a life after the war.
As the war drags on, these memories fade and these hopes diminish. It is likely that
had
Thetis given the shield to Achilles upon his departure for Troy, the claim thereon
would
have had less of an impact. The memory of the world of peace would still have been
too fresh in the minds and hearts of the audience (the adversary) to be so radically
excluded. Ten years on the same conclusion has come to bear significant weight. It has
become utterly believable and thus utterly effective. In a way the shield works to alter
the realities of its audience and its bearer alike. It takes what is obviously true
- that
war and peace are distinct; that a peaceful world does precede and will follow on the
intermittent and limited eruption of war - and turns it into an illusion. It supplants that
"reality” with its own claim to “reality.” Speaking anachronistically, the shield
accomplishes something of a Copemican revolution. The empirical evidence remains
the same, but its meaning is radically altered. Again, as with the claims of both Hector
and Agamemnon, the making of a claim is not the same thing as the truth of the claim.
The shield may make a powerful “thus it is” claim, but this does not in itself make the
claim true. However there are features of this claim that do work to recreate the
conditions within which it is true, or rather becomes true. To simply state, “thus it is”
does not make it so. Yet if this claim is believed to be true and acted upon as if it were
true, it does, after a time, become true. The claim, which presents itself as a reflection
of the world, can and does work to shape the world in its own image.
38
An example of this can be found in a discussion of the function of the paralysis
induced by the shield. What exactly is meant by “paralysis" in this context? Clearly
this paralysis is not literal in the same way as the Gorgon’s stare causes paralysis.
Although the sight of the shield does not turn its audience into stone, its “blazoned
glory” (19:16) does induce a momentary pause. It is, quite literally stunning in its
“well-wrought beauty.” (19:23) This stunning takes place on both an experiential and
existential level, as has already been discussed. It is in this moment of disorientation
and despair that the audience (the enemy soldier) is most vulnerable. It is in this
moment of inaction that the bearer’s spear finds its mark. It is during this brief
paralysis that the sword falls. The net result is that the momentary pause becomes the
permanent paralysis of death. The claim of the shield thereby generates empirical
evidence (in the form of a corpse) to back itself. It is critical to note that this piling of
corpses upon corpses - for the shield must constantly recreate the conditions of its own
veracity - does not serve to hasten the end of the war, but to perpetuate it. When
Achilles reenters the battle, shield in hand, he is not interested in winning the war,
thereby bringing it to a close so that he might return to a life of peace. He is fully aware
that such a life is, truly, not for him. Having been told by his father’s horse. Roan
Beauty, that his death is immanent:
Achilles burst out in anger,
“Why, Roan Beauty -why prophesy my doom?
Don’t waste your breath. I know, well I know -
1 am destined to die here, far from my dear father,
far from mother. But all the same I will never stop
till I drive the Trojans o their bloody fill of war!” (19:496-501)
Rather than desiring an end to the fighting, Achilles says:
-what 1 really crave
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is slaughter and blood and the choking groans of men! (19:254-255)
In other words, Achilles is not interested in bringing the war to an end but in its
perpetuation
The Shield of George W. Bush
The Shield of Achilles produces paralysis in its audience by the subtle
manipulation of fear. There are elements of what might be called "shock and awe,” but
the greatest share of its power is achieved more insidiously. It is frightful because it
presents a divinely sanctioned worldview in which there is no place for hope. The same
can be said of the rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror. It is obviously ridiculous to
suggest that President Bush goes around ducking behind an enormous golden artifact
from the ancient world. Nonetheless it can still be said that he carries the shield of
Achilles if he is seen as making the same kind of claim as is embodied by the shield.
Just as the shield purports to reflect a world of perpetual warfare in which the struggle
to keep hope alive is that which makes its absence more palpable, so too do President
Bush’s speeches render conflict inescapable, hope impossible and resistance to his
particular plan of action futile. In short, both Achilles and George W. Bush move
forward behind the divinely sanctioned claim “thus it is.”^'*
This is not to say that it is only these two parties that advance behind the shield. It
would not be difficult to demonstrate that the same sorts of claims are made by Bin
Laden and representatives of A1 Qaeda. Indeed these types of claims are very
widespread, but no less problematic for it.
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Evidence for this is not at all difficult to find. Almost any speech by a Bush
administration official on the topic of the War on Terror is replete with examples.55
For a brief sample of these speeches, taken from Secretary and Undersecretary of
Defence, see Donald H. Rumsfeld, Beyond Nation Building (2003 [cited April 12
2004]); available from http://www.dod.gov/speeches/2003/sp20030214-
secdef0024.html, Donald H. Rumsfeld, A New Kind of War (2001 [cited); available
from http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010927-secdef.html, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation (2004 [cited); available from
http://www.dod.gOv/speeches/2004/sp20040517-secdefD422.html, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Secretaiy Rumsfeld Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2004
[cited 06/07 2004]); available from http://www.dod.gOv/transcripts/2004/tr20040605-
secdefD816.html, Paul Wolfowitz. America's New Allies in the War on Terrorism (U.S.
Dept, of Defense, 2004 [cited December 5 2004]); available from
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040709-depsecdefD561.html, Paul
Wolfowitz. "Bridging the Dangerous Gap between the West and the Muslim World”
(2002 [cited Jume 1 2004]); available from
http://www.dod.gOv/speeches/2002/s20020503-depsecdefhtml, Paul Wolfowitz,
"Building a Better World: One Path from Crisis to Opportunity’" (2002 [cited June 1
2004]); available from http://www.dod.gOv/speeches/2002/s20020905-depsecdef.html,
Paul Wolfowitz, Building the Bridge to a More Peaceful Future (2002 [cited June 1
2004]); available from http://www.dod.gov/speeches/2002/s20021206-depsecdefhtml,
Paul Wolfowitz, The Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific
Security (2002 [cited June 1 2004]); available from
http://www.dod.gOv/speeches/2002/s20020601-depsecdef.html, Paul Wolfowitz,
Georgetown Iden Lecture: "Winning the Battle of Ideas: Another Front in the War on
Terror" (2003 [cited June 1 2004]); available from
http://www.dod.gOv/speeches/2003/sp2003 1 030-depsecdefD642.html, Paul Wolfowitz.
A Strategic Approach to the Challenge of Terrorism (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004
[cited September 16 2004]); available from
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040908-depsecdefD721.html.. The
President himself also provides numerous examples, including George W Bush,
Innaugural Address (2005 [cited February 2 2005]); available from
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2005/0 1 /print/20050 1 20- 1 .html, George W
Bush, President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2003
(2003 [cited December 15 2004]); available from
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/09/print/20030923-4.html, George W
Bush, President Bush Speaks to United Nations (2001 [cited December 15 2004]);
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/! 1/2001 1 1 10-3.html,
George W Bush, State of the Union Address (2003 [cited December 15 2004]);
available from http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html,
George W Bush, State of the Union Address (2002 [cited December 15 2004]);
available from http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-l l.html,
George W Bush, Transcript from Bush Speech on American Strategy in Iraq (2004
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One early and thematically archetypical example is President Bush’s address to a joint
session of the congress delivered only nine days after the fall of the World Trade Centre
Towers and the burning of the Pentagon. The speech was given was within context in
which there was a profound sense that the world had changed, that nothing would ever
be the same again:
In the normal course of events. Presidents come to this chamber to report
on the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has
already been delivered by the American people.^^
From the outset there is a clear demarcation between competing worlds, one normal,
one not. The opening lines of the speech both recognize the exceptional circumstances
in which they are delivered and subsume the exception with the parameters of an
accepted and established tradition. This modified State of the Union address proceeds
to offer a portrayal of the current condition as replete with cooperative and coordinated
action, compassion, piety and orderliness. There is no overt mention in these early lines
of the chaos and confusion against which these manifestations appear. Here, even in the
most dire of circumstances the American union is orderly, structured, and adherent to
the rule of law. It is notable that in re-establishing the hegemony of the normal, the
usual roles of leader and led are reversed. It is not the President who reports on the
state of the Union, but the people themselves. In this way, the role of the people as the
primary locus of authority is highlighted. This is not unexpected in a liberal democratic
state, and is in fact a restatement of the core feature of such a state. The audience is
[cited May 24 2004]); available from www.nytimes.eom/2004/05/24/politics/25PTEX-
FULL.html.
Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 ([cited)., 2.
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subtly reassured that political power, of which America is the greatest contemporary
example, is in their hands.
More than this. President Bush’s reference to “the unfurling of flags, the lighting
of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers”^^ presents a series of symbolic
images all indicating a sense of belonging to and partaking in a life beyond the self
Each of these actions may be highlighted as especially significant in a time of crisis, but
the symbolic and material infrastructures upon which they depend are not themselves
reflex responses to crisis. For these acts to be meaningful, the symbolic frameworks
within which they are meaningful must already be in place. That is, the unfurling of a
flag in a time of crisis relies upon an already existing sense of political unity. The
lighting of candles obtains its symbolic power from a pre-existing framework of
memorial practices. The giving of blood and the saying of prayers require an already
existing means of doing so through hospitals and churches. None of the gestures are
selfish. All are other directed, selfless. Each of these gestures, in other words, is
indicative of a selflessness that was already institutionalized prior to the crisis in which
such gestures are highlighted. They are indicative of “the decency of a loving and
giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.”" It is not that the
September 1 1 attacks have made us this way. It is who we were already. More than
once, and in no uncertain terms, the audience is reminded that this is the “city at peace.”
Ibid.([cited)., 4.
Ibid.([cited)., 4.
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The images of orderliness and compassion are extended beyond the boundaries
of a single country. Indeed the reflections on the similarly orderly responses offeied in
various locations and settings around the globe - lawmakers singing on the Capitol
steps;^^ the American national anthem playing in London. Paris and Berlin; prayer
services outside the embassy in South Korea and inside a mosque in Cairo, moments
of silence in Australia and Latin America — all tend to indicate the presence of a
greater “civilized” world. The formula (if treated as such) can be stated as:
International Community = Civilization = America^^
This greater polls, like that portrayed on the shield of Achilles, is both concerned with
and representative of justice. This is made abundantly clear in the statement “whether
we bring our enemies to justice, or justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”^^
Ibid.([cited)., 7.
“ Ibid.([cited)„ 9.
Ibid.([cited)., 10.
“ Ibid.([cited).
One effect of this formula is to reassert the continued viability of American
hegemony which had been so recently shaken by the profound sense of helplessness and
uncertainty that followed the September 1 1 attacks.
^ Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 ([cited)., 10. There is a discrepancy between the transcript of the
speech and the audio record of it. The quote is taken from the transcript, but in the
audio record the President says “whether we bring our enemies to justice, or injustice to
our enemies, justice will be done.” This slip of the tongue, if it is one, is instructive
because when stated this way, the President implies an adherence to a Hammurabic
code of justice; an eye for an eye, a life for a life, injustice repaid by injustice. Given
his consistency in adhering to a “fight fire with fire” response to the attacks, this may
not be far off the mark.
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Against this enlarged “city of peaee” there is a corresponding “city at war.” The
shift from the “city at peace” to the “city at war” comes with the declaration: “On
September 1 1 , enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.”^^
This “city at war” is characterized by a complete lack of compassion, an inability, or
worse, an unwillingness to recognize and respect the rule of law. Evidence for this is
indicated by the institutionalized lack of a distinction between civilian and combatant.
Just as in Homer’s description of the shield, it is here that the most blatant images of
terror are to be found.
The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to
kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians,
including women and children.^^
Immediately, there are clear lines established: freedom versus enslavement, justice
versus cruelty, rationalism versus radicalism, civilization versus barbarity, good versus
evil. It is true that much of the gore to be found in Homer's account of the city at war is
absent, but no less shocking to the contemporary audience - and perhaps more so - is
the revelation that “you can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced
only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long
enough.”^^ There is a double move in Bush’s litany of abuses to be found in Taliban
Ibid. ([cited)., 12. The declaration begins the description of “city at war,” but also
establishes a framework within which the attacks can make sense - as acts of war. The
confusion as to how to respond is reduced, since “Americans have known wars.” This
patterning of responses is a common semiotic theme of the speech, and more will be
said of it below.
“ Ibid.([cited)., 15.
lbid.([cited)., 18.
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controlled Afghanistan. He provides a glimpse into a particular legal code, a particular
social order, yet his purpose is to expose it as pure disorder. Murder and the arbitrary
display of power is the only “rule’ here. Just as the the citizens of 80 other nations
who died with our own"^* are united in a single event, so too are “thousands of these
terrorists in more than 60 countries”^^ united by a single unified puipose; to hasten the
downfall of civilization itself The sides are clearly demarcated. There is no room for
any other consideration. The choice, if it can be considered that, is stark: “Every nation,
in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the
* *
’'"^0
terrorists.
Bush's speech, much like the shield of Achilles, presents itself as an accurate
reflection of the world. There is nothing particularly surprising in his demarcation of a
line between peace and war. Such a distinction is obvious from a common sense
perspective. Yet by marking this distinction, he establishes a framework within which
the attacks can be nothing else but acts of war. In doing so, he also establishes the
parameters of an appropriate response. He says at one point “by sacrificing human life
to serve their radical visions — by abandoning every value except the will to power —
^Ibid.( [cited)., 11.
Ibid.([cited)., 16.
Ibid.f [cited)., 30. The corresponding “identity formula”(see above) is less apparent in
this early speech by President Bush than it is in the work of Frum and Perle, where it is
effectively stated as “Islam = Radical Fundamentalist Islam = Chaos.” See Frum and
Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. Of course to choose to be “with
us” means to “choose” to take part in a global, all out war against those who have
chosen to fight a global, all out war.
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they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”^* By directly
equating the terrorists with fascists, Nazis and Communists, the President is translating
the threat of militant Islam into a symbolic, mythological language that bears
considerable weight for those portions of the population who lived through the later half
of the last century. Not only is he representing this threat in terms that can be easily
understood, he is also implying an already patterned response to that threat. If
militant Islam is Nazism and Communism, it should be fought in the same way, namely
wholeheartedly, in all places, at all times, with all necessary sacrifices:
Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will
direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy,
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every
financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the
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disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.
Thus the struggle against teiTorism becomes just another episode in a perpetual war
between “freedom and fear.”’'* Within this formula, one cannot “come to terms” with
Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 ([cited)., 27.
” See Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, eds.. Haunted by Histoiy: Myths in
International Relations (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1998). For another discussion of
this rhetorical technique see Maja Zehfuss, "Writing War, against Good Conscience,"
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 1 (2004).
Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 ([cited)., 28. Note that there is an ambiguity in the language here.
While obviously true that some Americans are asking this question, this is also a
suggested definition of what it means to be an American. By this interpretation, if you
are not asking this question, and therefore if you have not accepted the framework that
dictates the events of September 1 1 as acts of war, you are un-American.
There are affinities between this effect and Philip Bobbit's argument. (See Bobbitt,
The Shield ofAchilles War, Peace, and the Course of History.) His title selection seems
odd for a book in which Homer scarcely appears in the index, but if the argument of this
47
the enemy. One can only destroy the enemy outright. “The only way to defeat
terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it
grows.”^^
The shield of Achilles accomplishes something of a Copemican revolution. It
presents its audience with familiar observations, but radically alters the meaning of
those observations. Although President Bush s speech makes repeated reference to the
values of America” and repeatedly reinforces the priority of peace over war, the
measures he proposes in the speech work to invert that relationship and to redefine
those values. In specific terms. Bush speaks of “our freedom of religion, our freedom
of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”’^ The
operational term is “freedom.” As his opening lines imply this freedom resides in the
fact that each individual is the primary locus of power. That is political power is not
centralized in the institutional hierarchies of government officials, but resides in the
people themselves. It is notable that in the name of defending this freedom. President
Bush proposes a centralization of power by creating an Office of Homeland Security.
In the name of securing freedom, his policies, which he deems “essential,” are more
paper is correct, (that the message of the shield is the inevitability of war), it is not an
accidental choice. I would disagree that A1 Qaeda is best understood as a “virtual state”
(that is to say “as good as a state”) as this leads to the perpetuation of a state-centric
model within which one epochal war must follow another. Bobbitt too is trapped by his
own mirrorings.
Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 ([cited)., 33.
Ibid.([cited)., 24.
Ibid.( [cited)., 33.
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appropriate to the establishment and operation of a police state. In the name of securing
freedom he proposes “to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs,”^^ “to
dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights.”^^ to “strengthen
our intelligence capabilities” so that - hopefully - “in the months and years ahead, life
oi
will return to almost normal.”
If “remaking the world - and imposing [their] radical beliefs on people
everywhere” is a goal of A1 Qaeda and its supporters, then President Bush appears to
be conceding at least partial defeat. If a return to life that is “almost normal” is at best -
“hopefully” - years away, then the terrorists have indeed remade the world. “All of this
was brought upon us in a single day - and night fell on a different world, a world where
freedom itself is under attack. And yet there are strong indications in the speech that
the world has not changed, only our awareness of it has. In describing America as “a
country awakened to danger,” the President implies two things. First, he points to the
presence of danger in the world well before the September 1 1 attacks. Second, he
Ibid. ([cited)., 47.
™ Ibid.([cited)., 46.
Ibid.([cited)., 47. One begins to suspect that the “we” referred to in this passage is
not the same as the “we” that hold the freedoms enumerated earlier. If the latter “we
’
refers to the people as a whole, the former appears to refer more to the institutions of a
government over and above the people.
Ibid.([cited)., 52.
lbid.([cited)., 14.
Ibid.([cited)., 12.
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implies that America's security in its fi'eedoms was an illusion. More precisely its
sense
of “normal” was a daydream. In his statement, "normal” is rendered illusory. In so
far
as the “city at peace” is representative of that normalcy, he inverts the priority of
peace
over war. From now on, we are awake to the fact that war is the norm, just as it will be
for the foreseeable future, andjust as it ahvays has been. This is indeed one of the key
functions of the shield; to perpetuate the war it depicts as perpetual. In the end, the
bearing of the shield itself creates the world it puiports only to represent.
In the discussion of Homer's epic, the body of Sarpedon was said to represent an
ever self-perpetuating catisiis belli. Although beyond the parameters of the September
20 speech, a similar loss of the causus belli can be seen in the execution of the War on
Terror.®^ Active American involvement in the war began in Afghanistan and was a
retaliatory strike in response to the September 1 1 attacks. The purpose was to destroy
A1 Qaeda training camps known to be there. This cause for war overlapped with the
stated aim of liberating the Afghani people - most especially its women - from the
oppression of Taliban rule. In January of 2002, the scope of the war widened with the
identification of the so-called “axis of evil.”®^ As the focus shifted to weapons of mass
destruction, multiple and ever broader causes for war became apparent. Just as the
cause of the fight shifts in Homer's epic from the recovery of Sarpedon’s body to the
recovery of Patroclus’ body, to Achilles raw craving for “slaughter and blood and the
^ Although a detailed .analysis of this phenomenon would certainly prove fruitful, it is
beyond the scope of the present paper. For the time being a few salient points will have
to suffice.
Bush, State ofthe Union Address ([cited).
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choking groans of men” (19:254-255), the cause for the War on Terror shifts from the
September 1 1 attacks to the liberation of oppressed peoples, to the halting of the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, to the mere presence of evil in the world.^ As
the cause for the war becomes more abstract, its scope increases. With a stated aim of
the eradication of evil itself, the war becomes an existential feature of the world. Just as
in the image on Achilles’ shield, there is no option but perpetual, universal warfare. If
there remains any doubt on this point. Bush forthrightly announces it in his speech of
September 20, 2001: “Americans [read the civilized world] should not expect one
battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any we have ever seen.” Even the appearance of
peace is no indication of its existence because the possibility of ongoing “covert
operations, secret even in success” cannot be ruled out.^^ Indeed, the ubiquity of this
war is made quite clear by observing that Bush is speaking as commander-in-chief
when he says, “I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children.”^® Even the
mundane becomes the action of a dutiful soldier. In the same breath as he condemns
the enemy for a lack of regard for the civilian/combatant distinction, he eradicates the
same boundary. “Like flies in a sheepfold” indeed.
As has been the case, to date, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, with an eye to North
Korea, Iran, Syria, and possibly Saudi Arabia.
^ For a detailed discussion of the war in such terms see Frum and Perle, An End to Evil:
How to Win the War on Terror.
Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20
September, 2001 ([cited)., 30.
lbid.( [cited)., 30.
lbid.([cited)., 38.
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Achilles and Priam: Setting aside the Shield
The shield of Achilles and the rhetoric of the Bush administration differ in at
least one key aspect. One of Homer's central points, as is readily discemable in the
depictions on the shield, is to mark the similarities between the combatants. They are
not radically different, but rather nigh unto undifferentiated. The Greeks under
Agamemnon and the Trojans under Priam worship the same gods, speak the same
language, and hold the same standards of proper conduct. In the narrative, it is easy to
become lost in a blur of names of the dead of both armies. The dead are simultaneously
marked as different and subsumed as a mere fraction of an increasing mass of corpses.
All different, all the same. It is on this point that one of the main differences between
the Homeric myth and the War on Terror is to be found.
The Bush administration and the neoconservatives around it have gone to great
lengths to mark clear and untransgressable boundaries between “us” and “them,” the
(good) “citizen” and the (evil) “terrorist.” The effort to mark the distinctions between
combatants as absolute and diametrically opposed has the effect and express intent of
rendering any reconciliation impossible. It is obvious that given an adversary who is
not subject to the jurisdiction of logic or diplomacy, an adversary who cannot be
appeased, then the only remaining option (and because of it, no option at all) is to fight.
Given that “they” are not even beholden to the rules of a “fair fight,” one has no choice
but to bend those rules in return.^*
Achilles provides a good example of this when re-enters the fight newly
rearmed. In his bloodlust he willfully abandons the conventions of what might be
called “civilized” behavior. The death of Patroclus changes Achilles for the worse.
Patroclus is the beloved of Achilles. He is that which is valued above all, even above
Achilles' own life. Ironically the return to combat, motivated by the cherished value of
friendship and close human connection, reveals the animalistic aspects of Achilles’
character. He is angrier, more likely to kill a defeated enemy less likely to recognize
and respect the bounds of honor and civility more prone to hubris.^^
Achilles is magnanimous in his suffering. He spreads his suffering out to make
it universal. A comparison can be made to a common theme of the Bush
administration’s rhetoric, encapsulated in Paul Wolfowitz’s statement that “the way to
defeat extremism is to demonstrate that the values we call Western are indeed
It is for this reason that the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal should not come as a real
surprise. It is the same with revelations that the legal council for the Bush
Administration has been implicated in giving the green light to the use of torture.
See Achilles' treatment of Lycaon. (21:38-155) Lycaon, a son of Priam, had been
captured “in Priam’s well fenced orchard” by Achilles twelve days before, then
ransomed back to his family. As Lycaon grasps Achilles knees, begging for mercy, he
is run through and killed. His death is strikingly similar to that of Leodes in the
Odyssey. Homer, The Odyssey 22:324-45.
This is particularly evident in his treatment of the corpse of Hector. (22:465-476)
^ One of the most notable examples is his open combat with Scamander, the river god.
(21:240-320)
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universal.”^^ The logic employed by Achilles, and implied by Wolfowitz, is that
“if 1
must suffer, so shall you all.” Certainly this suffering and these values are not
universal
until they are made so in the press of battle, by the application of force.
The one whom Achilles makes suffer the most is Priam, Hector's father. If
Achilles’ treatment of Hector's body marks his furthest foray from his own humanity, it
is also the precondition of his return to it. The encounter between Achilles and Priam
has been noted repeatedly as the moment when Achilles returns to the fold of
humanity.^ In this encounter two enemies recognize themselves in each other and are
united by a common bond of suffering and loss. This leads in turn to a further forging
of mutual respect when Achilles is convinced to return the body of Hector, and to offer
Priam safe passage out of the Greek encampment. Achilles comes once again to
recognize his place as one human being among many. The hubris he had displayed in
his combat with the river god Scamander is wiped clean in the restraint he shows in not
killing Priam.
This case of recognition and respect for a divine order is important. Achilles is
farthest removed from his own humanity when he returns to battle armed with the
^ Wolfowitz, "Building a Better World: One Pathfrom Crisis to Opportunity" ([cited).
As in President Bush's speech of September 20, 2001, Wolfowitz does not spell out
exactly what these values are. This gives him a certain flexibility in his proscriptions.
The logic of spreading suffering, of responding to force with force, may be guided by a
sense of (Hammurabic) justice, or by a kind of egalitarianism. It may even be guided
by a variation of the so-called “Golden Rule.” (“Do unto others as you would have
them do unto you.”) The variation eoming in the doing unto others as they have already
demonstrated they would have done unto themselves. Thus by causing suffering, the
terrorists wish to be made to suffer.
^ See Mark W Edwards, ed.. The Illiad: A Commentary, vol. 5: books 17-20
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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shield. The claim of that shield is that war is omnipresent and perpetual. To challenge
that claim, even by defending one’s self when one is already only “like living breathing
men,” is an act of hubris. It is to directly contradict the voice of the gods. Yet Achilles
himself challenges that claim by making peace with Priam. There is no small irony in
this. His rage unleashed, Achilles is guilty of hubris, as evidenced by his combat with
Scamander, (21:264-434) and by the outrage of the Olympian gods at his actions.
(24:25-60) His rage in check and his humanity regained, he is also guilty of hubris as
he exposes the gods as liars.^^ His peace with Priam is a direct rejection of the divinely
sanctioned “thus it is” of the shield. His actions prove that there is more to life than
killing. There is a broader suggestion in the truce forged between the king and the
warrior that war can come to an end. Figuratively, the reconciliation flows from and
displays the eternal possibility that any universal claim of the type "thus it is” can be
mistaken. He puts an end to war, even if temporarily, thereby making the counter claim
“thus is isn’t,” effectively placing the authority of his will above that of the gods. The
deeper irony is that he achieves this only by recognizing the authority of the gods.
Achilles does this in two stages. The first recognition is more a matter of course
than conviction. Having been instructed by the gods to return Hector’s body:
The swift runner replied in haste, “So be it.
The man who brings the ransom can take away the body.
If Olympian Zeus himself insists in all earnest.” (24: 1 68- 1 70)^^
This means he has also exposed himself as a liar. In making the shield, the gods
make a “thus it is” claim, the specific content of which is “all is war.” In bearing the
shield, Achilles makes the same claim. His reconciliation with Priam however puts an
end to war, even if only temporarily, thus exposing both himself as a bearer of the
shield and the gods as guarantors of its “thus it is,” as liars.
Emphasis added.
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This recognition of divine authority can be seen as bearing the hallmarks of hubris.
Specifically, the conditional aspect of the remark suggests that if it were not the case
that “Zeus himself insists in all earnest.” then the act would not be done. Such a
conditional agreement is more to be expected in a negotiation between equals than in an
exchange between god and man. In making these remarks Achilles places himself on
par with the king of the gods. He remains therefore in a precarious position, trapped by
his own arrogance.
The second stage comes later, and in a much quieter, more thoughtful way. In
the presence of Priam, Hector’s father, Achilles is reminded of his own father. As
Priam begs for the return of his son's corpse, Achilles warns him:
Don't stir my raging heart still more.
Or under my own roof I may not spare your life, old man -
Suppliant that you are - may break the laws of Zeus! (24:667-669)
And again, having agreed to return Hectors body to Priam, Achilles does not permit
Priam to see his son before the body is washed, for:
He feared that, overwhelmed by the sight of Hector,
Wild with grief, Priam might let his anger flare
And Achilles might fly into a fresh rage himself.
Cut the old man down and break the laws of Zeus. (24:684-687)^^
99
It may also be argued that by the time Achilles reconciles with Priam he has already
exacted his revenge by killing Hector, hence exhausting his propensity for hubris. In
diis case he would be best understood as exhibiting exhaustion rather than restraint.
The quotes just offered speak against such an interpretation. So too does the fact that
even after the death of Hector and the funeral of Patroclus, Achilles “kept on raging
sham.ng noble Hector.” (24:25) Even Apollo notes that "his temper can neve, bend and
Change. (24:48)
^
It is not altogether surprising that twelve days would not be enough to
exhaust Achilles anger and pride, given that it has not been exhausted, but ratherincreased, from the very opening line of the poem as a whole.
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Here, Achilles is fully aware of his tenuous grip on his own anger and because of this he
is better able to control it. This recognition of the laws of Zeus is not an off the cuff,
automatic reply delivered in a heated mood. In the second instance, where Homer
makes the reader privy to the private thoughts of Achilles, it is clear that this is a
genuine recognition of those laws. There is a sincerity and palpability to his deference
to those divine laws. It is this second stage that frees Achilles from the precarious
heights of arrogance and hubris. But this is not to say that Achilles has found his
footing in a place beneath the gods.
Zeus does not stay the hand of Achilles from killing Priam. Rather Achilles
restrains himself. It is up to him to follow the will of the gods or not. It should be noted
that Achilles is fully aware of his own fate and that his death must closely follow that of
Hector. He cannot therefore seek to avoid offending Zeus for fear of his own life. To
give deference to the divine for the sake of one’s own skin may be prudent, but it is not
honorable. By not killing Priam. Achilles adheres to the dictates of a divine order out
of a sheer sense of unambiguous honor {time). He does not spare Priam in order to save
his own life, but because it is what he believes is the right thing to do. This display of
time in turn renders the immortality of Achilles possible. It is what makes him a hero.
Simply by having this choice, to follow the laws of the gods or not, he is not, strictly
speaking, bound by the laws of the gods. Put differently, he is not a participant in the
cosmological/ethical matrix of “thus it is” and “there is nothing to be done.” It is more
appropriate to say that this matrix is a tool useful in the furthering of his own will: a will
that is equal to or greater than the will of the gods. Thus in gaining control of his anger.
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and restraining his animalistic instincts he elevates himself above the station
of the gods
and simultaneously terminates his hubris.
This conclusion appears to be borne out by Homer himself as the scene
immediately following what I have called the second stage recognition describes a
meal
shared by Priam and Achilles. Two points make this notable. First. Achilles suggests
that Priam dine with him by retelling the tale of Niobe, a woman punished for her
hubris. This certainly brings the subject of hubris to the foreground of the audience’s
(reader’s) attention. Second, the description of the meal itself is notably devoid of the
usual offerings of the first cuts of meat as a sacrifice to the gods. In other parts of the
epic, such an omission is a near certain way to gamer the wrath of the gods. Here,
however, the context is such that the gods are assuaged.
Achilles’ reconciliation with Priam, his laying aside of the shield, not only saves
the life of Priam and the dignity of Hector, but elevates the station of Achilles above
that of the gods. He outstrips the power of the gods by recognizing and respecting that
power, (mueh as Odysseus will do repeatedly in the Odyssey). He transcends himself in
a way that the gods cannot do. Without his reconciliation with Priam, it is clear that the
wrath of Achilles would destroy him. Without it, the world that is his rightful domain
and creation would utterly debase and consume him. Were he to become beholden to
his own portrayal of the world, were to be taken in by his own artificial “thus it is, it
would devour him. The risks of believing one’s own spin are serious indeed. It is his
Even in the depths of her suffering, Niobe had to eat.
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ability to set aside the shield, to escape its illusory effects, that makes Achilles a
suitable bearer of it.’®'
The recognition of sameness in the other is a critical part of Achilles’ decision to
follow the laws of Zeus, thereby elevating himself above those laws. It is precisely
such a recognition that is overtly disallowed by the rhetoric of the war on terror.
Without the possibility of reconciliation, the claim of the shield, that is the parameters
within which the war is understood as a necessity, cannot be challenged. So long as
these parameters remain unchallenged both the speaker and the audience of these claims
are doomed to live and die by them. There is a quiet usurpation in which the creator
becomes subject to the creation. Authority is surrendered by the author, agency
surrendered by the agent. Having abdicated authoritative power, the author can make
the argument that he or she bears no responsibility for "things being the way they are.”
The radical othering of the enemy, so prevalent in the rhetoric surrounding the
War on Terror, renders reconciliation impossible, along with any redemptive qualities it
might contain or imply. On the ground, this translates into a pervasive message that
opposition to the Bush administration's policies is somehow dangerous, unpatriotic,
even traitorous. It is seen in the 2004 Republican presidential campaign theme that to
choose any other course of action (never mind choosing a new commander-in-chief) is
'®' Despite his transcendence of both himself and the gods, it can be argued that
Achilles does not escape his fate. There is a subtle alteration in this fate however. In
his reconciliation with Priam, Achilles’ fate is less laid out for him than it is chosen by
him. Just as his acceptance of the laws of the gods comes not at the behest or the
command of the gods, but by his own volition, so too has he risen above his fate by
willing it. His death becomes not that which is presented to him by the gods, but that
which he has chosen for himself. Achilles becomes the master of his own fate, even if
the fate he chooses does not differ in content from that given him by the gods.
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to risk catastrophe. Achilles overcomes this limitation precisely by setting the shield
aside. Until President Bush is able to do the same, he remains unable to recognise the
possibility that his claim of “thus it is” might be mistaken.
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CHAPTER III
MIMESIS AS RESISTANCE:
PLATO AND BAUDRILLARD ON THE SHORES OF ETHIOPIA
The shield of Achilles is a powerful physical instrument of war. And yet as
powerful as it is, it is far more powerful in its figurative operation. The shield makes a
dual claim, “thus it is “ and “there is nothing to be done.” The bearing of the shield can
be understood as a shorthand reference to any position making such a claim. The shield
is in this way a container. Achilles filled that container with the message “all is war,” as
did his son Neoptolemus.’*^^ This is not the only message the shield can put forward. It
is capable of holding many and various contents, three of which will be discussed in this
chapter. These will be Plato’s Forms and his insistence on a single proper ordering of the
soul as found in The Republic, Jean Baudrillard’s insistence on the triumph of the
simulacra over the real, and an understanding of Homer’s position, drawn from Plato’s
arguments, that the word triumphs over the deed. The variety of possible contents does
not alter the structural features or operation of the shield. Whatever its particular
message, it remains a weapon of war, underpinned by violence and the bearing of the
shield can have deadly effects. Given that the shield makes an apparently unimpeachable
claim “thus it is,” the simplest line of resistance to it would be the counterclaim “no it is
not.” From this point, the corresponding ethos, “nothing to be done” can potentially be
called into question. But just how is one to gainsay the “thus it is? What is more, is
anything achieved by such a gainsaying?
Neoptolemus will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
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This chapter will look at one particular avenue through which resistance has been
sought. Specifically, the focus will be on the concept of mimesis as a critical tool and a
countermeasure to the advancement of the shield. Mimesis, generally defined as
representation or imitation, is a vast topic and has occupied the thought of many of the
brightest minds in the history of Western intellectual history. A detailed examination of
this history would, and does, take up volumes. Such an examination is well beyond the
scope of the present project. This chapter will therefore restrict its scope to a discussion
of mimesis as it is developed by Plato in The Republic and to its postmodern
development in the work of Jean Baudrillard. There are two centers of gravity in this
project. Homer and the War on Terror. Plato and Baudrillard are suitable figures for
discussion within this constellation, as each can be understood as revolving around the
two respective centers, while at the same time maintaining an orbit with each other.
Having started with Homer, Plato’s Republic is an obvious choice for closer examination,
as that is where he addresses the poet directly. His concept of the Forms establishes a
solid ontological background against which images - including those that comprise the
"thus it is” of the shield - can be seen as images. As such they are simultaneously like
and unlike that which they purport to represent. Baudrillard on the other hand is
concerned with applying his particular critique to the War on Terror. He too is concerned
with the images and their effects. His notion of the simulacra, the hyperreal, can be seen
as an end-stage development of the concept of mimesis. It is through the concept of the
image that Plato and Baudrillard are linked. Through this shared concept, both Plato and
Baudrillard extend the promise of resistance to the shield. This chapter will not only look
at how that promise is extended, but whether or not it is a promise that they can meet.
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Plato
Shields and Rings: Plato Against the Poets
Figuratively speaking, the ill effects of the shield are of great concern to Plato,
who sees Homer himself as a bearer of it. Plato does not speak of the shield directly, but
he does speak of the ring of Gyges, which functions in a strikingly similar way. The ring
of Gyges, first mentioned by Glaucon in Book II of The Republic, allows its bearer to
become invisible. Protected by this invisibility, the wearer of the ring is free to act with
impunity. The wearer is free to disavow any and all responsibility for his or her actions,
just as the bearer of the shield can disavow any role in creating the world the shield
purports to reflect. The claim voiced by Glaucon is that:
[If] there were two such rings, one worn by the just man, the other by the
unjust, no one, as these people think, would be so incorruptible that he
would stay on the path ofjustice or bring himself to keep away from other
people's property and not touch it, when he could with impunity take
whatever he wanted from the market, go into houses and have sexual
relations with anyone he wanted, kill anyne, free all those he wished from
prison, and do the other things which would make him like a god among
men. His actions would be in no way different from those of the other and
they would both follow the same path.'°^
The proximity of the ring and the shield is evident through a number of clues in
Glaucon’s speech. Gyges is said to have obtained the ring from the hand of “a corpse
which seemed of more than human stature” buried inside “a hollow bronze horse.”’*^ It
is difficult to read these lines without being reminded of the Trojan Horse that housed the
Greek heroes who themselves “seemed of more than human stature” in the eyes of Plato's
Plato, Republic 360b-c.
Ibid. 359d.
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less philosophically inclined contemporaries. The spectre of Homer looms large indeed.
It is far from a controversial statement to say that Homer played a profoundly important
role in ancient Greek culture. The ancients looked to the texts as the core of their
educational systems.^®^ and the Homeric heroes provided role models for the citizenry.
His work provided a central worldview against which the actions of moral agents could
be judged.
Athenian politics in Plato's time was defined in terms of public debate and the
course of action taken by the poUs was determined by these debates. In the broadest of
strokes these topics of debate included the goals of the state and the means by which to
best achieve those goals. The importance of these issues and the manner in which they
were determined helps to explain the prominence of the art of public speaking, and of its
teachers, the sophists. The sophist earned his living by fees earned through educating the
young men of Athens in the art of public speaking. That is, the sophist effectively
charged for lessons in citizenship. The emphasis of these instructors, (at least as
portrayed by Plato), was on the use of various rhetorical devices to evoke the passions
and sympathies of an audience. The object was to win the argument, thereby affecting
the policies adopted by the polis, hence the character and condition of the polis itself As
such the effectiveness of a sophist was best measured by the actions resulting from his
speech. In an exchange with Adeimantus, Plato has Socrates say:
Do you agree with the general opinion that certain young men are
corrupted by sophists, that private sophists corrupt them to any extent
worth mentioning? Are the people who say this not the greatest sophists.
See Ibid. 606e-07a. In these lines, Plato openly recognizes those who see Homer as
‘Hhe educator of Greece” and and that one should learn from him “the management of
human affairs and of education, and arrange one’s life in accordance with his teaching.”
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who educate most effectively and make young and old, men and women,
into the kind of people they want them to be? -When do they do this?
When ever, 1 said, many of them are sitting together in assemblies,
in courts, in camps, or is some other public gathering of the crowd, they
object very noisily to some of the things that are said or done, and approve
others, in both cases to excess, by shouting and clapping. Moreover, the
rocks and the place of meeting re-echoes and redoubles the din of their
blame or praise. During such a scene, what is the effect on the young
man’s psyche, as they say? What private training can hold out against this
and not be drowned by that kind of censure or approval, not be swept
along by the current withersoever it may carry it, and not declare the same
things to be beautiful or ugly as the crowd does. Our young man will then
follow the same kind of pursuits as the crowd, and be the same kind of
man? -Quite inevitably Socrates.
And yet, I said, we have not mentioned the strongest compulsion -
What is that?
It is that which these educators and sophists add by their actions if
their words fail to persuade. Or do you not know that they punish the
recalcitrant with disenfranchisement and fines and death?^^^
Here then is Plato's understanding of what it means for Homer to bear the shield,
for it is Homer who “seems to be the first, the teacher and leader of all these fine
tragedians.” It is Homer who teaches the many what is to be considered good and bad,
right and wrong. Homer’s “thus it is,” as Plato sees it, differs in content from that of
Achilles’ “all is war,” being more akin to “everywhere among the race of men, it is the
tongue that wins and not the deed.”**^^ The extended quote above also shows that
according to Plato, Homer, as the first among the sophists, makes a compelling “nothing
Ibid. 492a-d.
Ibid. 595c.
This could also be stated as “appearance is everything.” See Sophocles, "Philoctetes,"
in Sophocles 2, ed. David Greene and Richard Lattimore, The Complete Greek Tragedies
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 1.97-99.
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to be done about if' claim. To resist is to be silenced. Recalcitrance is death.
And it is
not hard to see that Socrates himselfwas one of "the recalcitrant.”
The death of Socrates gives rise to a problem. In one sense, his death is clearly a
case of justice having been served. Socrates' case was heard before the demos and a
judgment was made according to the applicable institutional standards. And yet at the
same time his death is clearly a travesty ofjustice. How is it that a just decision can be so
utterly unjust? The question ofjustice motivates The Republic, and a possible resolution
to this problem can be extrapolated from the arguments found there. This possible
resolution is to be found in Plato's insistence on a distinction between justice and the
appearance of justice. In order for Plato's argument to work, he requires a firm
distinction between truth and its image. The concept of mimesis allows him to make this
distinction. According to Plato, the images, charms and enchantments of poetry are
Siren-like, simultaneously profoundly alluring and profoundly dangerous. The poets and
the sophists claim to have knowledge without having it at all. The power they wield is
the power to foster and even impose ignorance while claiming to dispel it.'°^ In short.
Plato sees the poets as wielding the power of the shield, and as sharing in the hubris of
doing so.”° This power is disrupted by the distinction between the representation or
It is no mistake therefore that Plato says "we must first of all, it seems, control the
storytellers.” Plato, Republic 377c.
Testimony to this power is given by Socrates in the opening lines of the Apology’:
I do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers affected you; as for me, I
was almost carried away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak.
And yet, hardly anything of what they said is true. Plato, "Apology," 17a.
Plato takes this distinction between persuasiveness and truth with him into the arguments
of The Republic, where he challenges Homer directly. The issue of hubris is raised in a
notable way in Socrates’ conversation with Euthyphro. His failed attempt to discover a
fixed definition of piety from one with a reputation for expertise on the matter calls into
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image and the real, between dreaming and waking. Plato hopes to show that the power of
the image is not derived from the image itself, but from the willingness on the part of the
audience to grant it veracity, to accept it as real. He hopes to show that to rescind this
acceptance is to short-circuit the power of the image and thus to escape the power of the
shield.
Plato sees the sophists, as measuring the goodness or badness (and by extension
the rightness or wrongness, even the truth or falsity) of a given statement by the response
it elicits within its audience, taking their lead from the tragedians. Plato himself takes
a much different stance. For Plato the goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness, truth
or falsity of a claim is measured by reference to a fixed standard, that is, by reference to
the Forms and to the Good itself The important distinctions made possible by his
introduction of the Forms are most clear in his (in)famous attack on Poetry in The
Republic.
The sophist and the poet alike are not concerned with truth, as Plato understands
it, but with eliciting a desired response in their audience. Plato identifies Homer as being
"the first, the teacher and the leader of all those fine tragedians.” Homer is therefore at
the very head of the tradition that has resulted in the death of Socrates. In a move
question the self-righteousness of those who have aecused Socrates of impiety. How can
one be accused of impiety when no one can say what piety is? To claim knowledge one
does not have is hubristic. See Plato, "Euthyphro," in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John
M. Cooper (Indianapolis; Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). Similarly, the character
of Gyges in The Republic serves as an example of the hazards of "bearing the shield (or
wearing the ring, as it may be).
It is exactly this ad extensio that Socrates challenges in the Apology' when he decries
the craftsmen as erroneously convincing themselves that their knowledge in a limited
area was broadly generalisable. Plato, "Apology," 22c,e.
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reminiscent of the actions of Perseus. Plato aims to decapitate this tradition. Already in
Books II and III of The Republic Plato has expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the
poets. His introduction of the Forms in Books VI and VII sets the stage for the sudden
exclamation in Book X that "we are accustomed to assuming one Form in each case for
the manv particulars to which we give the same name. This statement shows one of
the key distinctions relied upon by Plato in his efforts, namely that between the particular
(the object or article) and the universal (the Form or Idea).
For example there are many beds and tables - Of course.
But there are only two forms for these two articles, one of the bed and one
of the table.
In addition to this two part distinction, Plato adds a third, that of the image. Where the
object or article is a product of the craftsman with an eye to its Form - its perfection and
true being - the image is a product of the poet or painter, or even simply the person
carrying a mirror, with an eye to the object. Thus Plato claims that “an imitator is at three
removes from nature.”’'"^
Plato’s use of the concept of mimesis is not entirely consistent within The
Republic, but clearly one of its key meanings is the production of images.”^ Since these
Plato, Republic 596a. Julia Annas points out that this “accustomization” is something
of a surprise given that all prior discussions of the Forms had been introductory. The
only thing that makes the utilisation of the Forms “customary” is Socrates’ (Plato’s)
declaration of that status. Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981).
Plato, Republic 596b.
Ibid. 597e.
Gebauer & Wulf list of different meanings of the term in The Republic. See Gunter
Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis : Culture, Art, Society (Berkeley: University of
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images are disconnected from the truth they claim to reveal, they are censured (and
censored) by Plato as dangerous and misleading. The danger posed by these mimetic
images, including the word-image,”^ is heightened by another aspect of Plato’s mimesis,
which in modem parlance is best summed up in the actions of the mime. That is, the
danger of the mimetic image is compounded by what Girard will later call the “mimetic
instinct” of the audience of those images.”^ People will shape their behaviors to mimic
the role models provided to them. In Book VI, Socrates says “do you think one can
consort with things one admires without imitating them in one's own person?” to which
Adeimantus replies “not possibly.””^ If the “things” one “consorts with” in Homer do
not provide a consistent model of that which is to be admired, but rather contradict one
California Press, 1995). Plato marks a distinction between the user, the maker, and the
imitator that runs parallel to the distinction between the Form, the object and the image.
He argues that the user is in the best position to judge the quality of an object, moreso
than its maker. The mimic is in the position of least authority in regards to the quality of
an object. By this line of argument, the products of the mimetic poet are only ever
images. However, Plato runs into a problem in regards to the word-image. In the case of
the sophist or poet, the product is the word or text, which is both made and used by what
Plato considers the imitator. It is the sophist or poet, therefore that is in the best position
to jugde the quality of their own products.
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“Yhe verbal lie is a mere reflection of that which exists in the soul, a reflection of it
which comes later, and is not completely untrue”. Plato, Republic 382b. The verbal lie is
not entirely untrue because it does not exist in Plato's ontological framework as real. The
utterance is always removed from the reality behind it. Hence the verbal lie is like the
true lie, which is entirely untrue, but it is not the true lie and thus not entirely untrue.
More will be said on this point below.
See Rene Girard, "to Double Business Bound" : Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and
Anthropolog)’ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), Rene Girard, Violence
and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1977).
Plato, Republic 500c.
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another - as do equally admired tales of piety and impiety, moderation and excess then
the end result can “not possibly” be anything but a fragmented, self-contradictory
and
confused ordering of both the soul and the city.”^ An education based on what Plato
sees as the Homeric "thus it is ” can only produce a man "long suffering,” constantly at
odds with both himself and others. An excellent example of this is provided very early
in The Republic by Polemarchus:
Socrates: The just man then has turned out to be a kind of thief. You may
well have learned this from Homer, for he likes Odysseus’ maternal
grandfather Autolycus, and at the same time he says that he excelled all
men in thieving and perjury. It follows that justice, according to you and
Homer and Simonides, appears to be a craft of thieving, of course to the
advantage of one’s friends and to the harm of one’s enemies. Is this not
what you meant?
It must be noted that Plato, through the character of Socrates, denies the very
existence of "a Homeric manner of life.” Ibid. 600b. Yet in doing so he is reinforcing its
existence. George Lakoff reminds us that "evoking a frame reinforces that frame.”
Lakoff, Simple Framing: An Introduction to Framing and Its Use in Politics ([cited). In
denying the existence of "a Homeric manner of life,” Plato is not only reinforcing the
existence of such a way of life, but also denying that his objection to the poets, to the
sophists, and to public life informed by the tragedians has any grounds whatsoever.
(Could it be then that he is offering only a simulation of resistance to such a (non-
)“manner of life?”) Yet shortly thereafter, Plato turns back from this denial when he
recognizes the existence ofjust such a thing.
Those who praise Homer and say that the poet educated Greece, that he
deserves that one should take up his works, learn from them the
management of human affairs and of education, and arrange one’s life in
accordance with his teaching. Plato, Republic 606e.
For what are such people espousing, if not a Homeric manner of life? See n.4, above.
Homer in the Odyssey systematically refers to his protagonist as "long suffering
Odysseus.” Plato recognises Odysseus as a key figure in Homer’s epics, and he tends to
equate the two figures. He is far from alone in doing this, as noted by Clayton. See
Clayton, A Penelopean Poetics: Reweaving the Feminine in Homer's Odyssey. Odysseus
is a critical figure, but he is also a tremendously difficult figure. More will be said about
Odysseus and Plato’s understanding of him in Chapter IV.
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Polemarchus: No, by Zeus, he said, I don’t know any longer what I
t 121
meant...
A city guided by such a model, according to Plato, cannot help but be in a constant state
of strife and upheaval. This upheaval is precisely what Plato himself lived through in the
war with Sparta. It is expressed in the collapse of the Athenian empire under the weight
of its own hubris}^^ It is expressed in the rapid flux of the Athenian government from a
democracy to an oligarchy and back again. The predominance of what Plato sees as
Homeric models allows for the sophist, with the approval of the many, to “justly” murder
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the just man, Socrates.
The primary exemplar of one beholden to such a model in The Republic is
Thracymachus. For Thracymachus, “the just is nothing else than the advantage of the
stronger.”'^"^ Plato sees in this position the figural bearing of the shield. He is aware, as
indicated earlier, that this position is illusory. Plato is equally aware that as such it
cannot withstand logical scrutiny, but will instead maintain itself by force. The entry
Plato, Republic 334b.
Thucydides, famous for his recounting of this conflict, is perhaps best known for two
segments of his account, namely the Melian dialogue and Pericles’ funeral oration. Both
show Athens in the height of its power and self-righteousness in that power. However,
Thucydides follows each of these pieces with a calamity, the plague and the disastrous
Sicilian campaign. Although a detailed argument is not possible here, it does appear that
Thucydides' juxtaposition of these events (hubris and disaster) is not accidental. See
Thucydides and Lattimore, The Peloponnesiou War.
In so far as Socrates represents the presence ofjustice itself in the Athenian po/A, this
is the truest tragedy. See Plato, "Apology."
Plato, Republic 335e.
The shield is, after all and above all else, an instrument of war.
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of Thracymachus into the argument comes at exactly such a moment. Polemarchus,
arguing the traditional position that justice is to help one's friends and harm one's
enemies, has Just been exposed as “[not knowing] any longer what [he] meant.” The
argument has come to the conclusion that “it is never just to harm anyone.”'^^
But when we [Socrates and Polemarchus] paused after these last words of
mine he [Thracymachus] could no longer keep quiet. He gathered himself
together like a wild beast about to spring, and he came at us as if to tear us
to pieces.
Polemarchus and I were afraid and flustered as he roared into the
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middle of our company.
There are a number of features that are notable about these lines and the ones
immediately following. First, the description of Thracymachus as “a wild beast about to
spring... as if to tear us to pieces” echoes quite strongly a number of scenes in Homer’s
Iliad, and especially those in his description of the shield of Achilles. Socrates
subsequently comments that “his words startled me, and glancing at him I was afraid. 1
think if I had not looked at him before he had looked at me, 1 should have been
speechless.”'^^ This comment is very appropriate to an exchange contextualized by
Plato, Republic 335e.
Ibid. 336b-c.
One can easily see Thracymachus filling the role of a lion in the following lines:
- a savage roar!-
a crashing attack - and a pair of ramping lions
had seized a bull from the cattle’s front ranks -
he bellowed out as they dragged him off in agony.
Packs of dogs and the young herdsmen rushed to help
But the lions ripping open the hide of the huge bull
Were gulping down the guts and the black pooling blood
While the herdsmen yelled the fast pack on - no use! (18:675-683)
Plato, Republic 336e.
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references to the shield, as it provides an excellent example of the operation of the shield.
The words of Thracymachus exemplify the paralyzing power of the shield. It is this
stunned moment that would normally spell the end of resistance. Were it not for the good
fortune of a glance in the right direction, the dialogue would have ended here, Socrates
having been rendered “speechless,” leaving Thracymachus the defacto victor.
It is also notable that there is more going on here than a confrontation between
Thracymachus the lion and Socrates the bull. Indeed the stage is set for a confrontation
between Socrates and the entire tradition Thracymachus represents.'^® This becomes
apparent through a number of subtle clues. Socrates refers to Thracymachus as one of the
“clever people.”'^* This particular moniker is often applied to Odysseus, who had just
been brought up in the discussion with Polemarchus. The allusion to Odysseus and his
craftiness carries on. Thracymachus accuses Socrates of being “captious” and when asked
if he believes that Socrates intends to trick him. he says:
1 know it very well, he said, but it will not do you any good, for I
would be well aware of your trickery; nor would you have the ability to
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force my argument in open debate.
In this comment, Thracymachus exposes himself even more clearly as being a figural
descendant of Odysseus (as Plato understands him). For Thracymachus to know trickery
when he sees it, he must also be adept at it. Following the logic of the exchange with
Polemarchus. if Thracymachus is adept at trickery, he must also be adept at its opposite.
A tradition Plato would characterise as Homeric.
Plato, Republic 337a.
Ibid. 341b.
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honesty or truthfulness. It is fairly clear that Thracymachus believes this of himself
Socrates must therefore prove that Thracymachus is not even adept at trickery if he is to
show the sophist's claim to knowledge to be false. Plato has subtly established that
this is not just a debunking of Thracymachus, but of Odysseus, and by extension, Homer
himself.
The scope of Plato's task is further expanded to include the replacement of even
more cultural icons. Again this is done in a most subtle, almost sub-textual manner and
begins with Thracymachus' evocation of Heracles. This in itself would be relatively
unremarkable, were it not for the later statement of Socrates: “Do you think. 1 said, that I
am crazy enough to try to shave a lion or trick Thracymachus?"^^^ This rather odd
saying, combined with the earlier portrayal of Thracymachus as a lion brings to mind the
labors of Heracles. In a fit or insane rage - “craziness" -Heracles had murdered his wife
and children. As a way to redeem himself he was assigned twelve labors. The first of
these tasks was to confront and conquer the Nemean lion, whose hide could not be
pierced by any weapon. At this point, multiple parallels between this tale, and Plato's
implicit criticism of the state of affairs under the guidance of the Sophists are readily
apparent. Thracymachus, already a stand in for the entire tradition of sophistry (which
Plato identifies as being led by Homer), here becomes a stand in for the Nemean lion.
Which he does as the exchange with the sophist proceeds.
A more detailed discussion of the connection between Homer and Odysseus will be
taken up in Chapter IV.
Plato, Republic 341c.
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The position of the Sophist, protected as it is from all attacks, a substitute for the lion’s
hide.'^^ Socrates, then, takes the place of Heracles. Heracles succeeds in his task by
stunning the lion with a club made of an olive tree, then strangling it to death. He defeats
the beast without piercing its hide. He then proceeds to skin the lion using its own razor
sharp claws, taking the hide as armour for himself. It is exactly this operation that
Socrates performs on Thracymachus. First, Thracymachus is forced to stay by the
onlookers to the conversation, then Socrates turns the Sophists’ own tools, his words,
against him. This is to say that Socrates out tricks the trickster. Rather than addressing
the Sophist’s concept of justice directly, Socrates uses an oblique approach, discussing
ships’ captains, doctors and musicians rather than tyrants or other political rulers.
Thracymachus finds himself in a position where his concept of justice is no longer
tenable, and his recourse to force has been sidestepped. “And then I saw something I had
never seen before; Thracymachus blushing.”’^^ He is shamed into submission.
Thracymachus puts forward the suggestion that to understand trickery is to avoid
being caught by it. This is a suggestion that Plato embraces when he befriends
Thracymachus. It is Plato’s intent to mitigate the ill effects of sophistry and poetry - of
1-^6
“You are clever Thracymachus, 1 [Socrates] said, for you know very well that if you
asked anyone how much is twelve, and as you asked him you warned him: ‘Do not, my
man, say that twelve is twice six, or three time four, or six times two, or four times three,
for 1 will not accept such nonsense," it would be quite clear to you that no one can answer
a question asked in those terms.” Ibid. 337b.
Ibid. 344d.
Ibid. 350d.
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what he sees as Homer’s bearing of the shield - by putting forth an understanding of how
poetry operates mimetically.
To speak between ourselves - for you will not denounce me to the tragic
and all the other imitative poets - all such poetry is likely to damage the
minds of the audience unless these have knowledge of its nature, as an
antidote.
He offers the concept of mimesis as this antidote {pharmakon)}'^ Plato seeks to undo
the paralyzing power of the shield by showing that power to be illusory. His concept of
mimesis (as the production of images) extends the possibility of a properly educated
audience of the shield to declare "that is not the way it is.” The paralyzing "thus it is”
can be understood as having nothing whatsoever to do with how "it is.’ Plato thus
displays the grounds upon which he can censure Homer (and hence an entire ethico-
political system) for providing “a bad image of the nature of gods and heroes, like a
painter drawing a bad picture, unlike the model he is wanting to portray.”''^'
™
Ibid. 595b.
The pharamkon has come to be the subject of a good deal of later theorizing. Of
particular note is Jacques Derrida’s essay "Plato’s Pharmacy” collected in Jacques
Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1981). Derrida’s opening words are:
A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first
glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its game. A text
remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its laws and rules are not,
however, harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply that they
can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could rigorously be
called a perception, (p.63)
There is an implication here that Plato must also be invisible to the first comer, to the
casual glance. Could it be that Plato himself is wearing the ring of Gyges? This
possibility will be addressed below.
Plato, Republic 377e.
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The concept of mimesis as presented here is useful in showing that the mimetic
image cannot deliver what it claims to deliver. The image is concerned with the object,
which is not real within Plato’s ontological framework. The image is capable of
expressing opinion but not knowledge. The image cannot claim, “thus it is.” Or rather it
can, but the referent of the claim, the “it”, is “my opinion about the world” rather than
“the world itself.” The corresponding ethos, “nothing to be done about it,” can remain in
force, but the implications of this statement too are altered radically. It is one thing to say
that the world is as it is and there is nothing to be done to change it. It is quite another to
say that my opinion about the world is what it is and there is nothing to be done to change
it.
This observation is made more explicit using Plato’s image of the line from Book
VI. G.M.A. Grube presents this image as a diagram:
noeisis B
understanding forms, dialectic
dionoio E
reasoning
C
pistis
opinion D
eikasio
image-making A
or imagination
mathematical realities,
science
objects of sense
images, reflections,
(works of art?)
This diagram is to be found in Ibid. p.l67nl6.
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Plato's critique of the poets is that they operate solely within the realm of the visible (line
segment AC), and yet they argue as if they offered understanding, which is beyond the
ream of the visible (line segment AB). But Plato's line does not permit the image (AD)
to provide any kind of direct access to true understanding (BE). Thus to bear the shield,
to make a "thus it is" claim is to present an image that, simply by being on image, cannot
be a representation of the Forms, which are. The image can say “thus it is” but the “is"
can only ever be an opinion. It may be that this opinion is a reasoned opinion (EC) and
reason is a guide to what is (BE), but a reasoned opinion is not reason itself, just as
reason is not the Good itself
The great promise of mimesis as a critical tool is that it can disrupt the paralyzing
effects of the shield. It promises to provide critical distance from which the "thus it is"
can never be anything other than “thus it is like.” Where "thus it is" does not allow for
the possibility of things being different, “thus it is like” opens considerable space for such
possibilities. “Thus it is like” implies similarity without identity. To be like is to
simultaneously be unlike, for a perfect likeness ceases to be a likeness at all, as Plato
notes in the Cratylus:
Socrates: An image cannot remain an image if it presents all the
details of what it represents. See if I am right. Would there be two things
— Cratylus and an image of Cratylus — in the following circumstances?
Suppose some god didn’t just represent your color and shape the way
painters do, but made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth
and softness, and put motion, soul, and wisdom like your into them -in a
word, suppose he made a duplicate of everything you have and put it
beside you. Would there then be two Cratyluses or Cratylus and an image
of Cratylus?
Cratylus: It seems to me, Socrates, that there would be two
Cratyluses.
Plato, Cratylus," in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 432b-c.
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This reverberates through the ‘‘nothing to be done” claim of the shield, which can
at best only ever be “it is like there is nothing to be done.” The implication here is that
there is something to be done. With this in mind, two questions emerge. First, it
becomes imperative to ask “how is this image unlike that which it purports to represent?”
Second, it is equally imperative to ask, “what can be done?” The imperative status of
these questions is evident in Plato’s discussion of the “true lie.”
Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if one may call it so, is
hated by all gods and men? -What do you mean?
1 mean this, 1 said: no one is willing to speak untruth with the most
important part of himself about the most important subjects, but most of
all things he is most afraid to have untruth in that part.
1 still do not understand, he said.
You think, 1 said, that 1 am saying something mysterious. I mean
to lie and to be in a state of untruth about reality in one’s soul, to be
ignorant, and there to have and to hold untruth. This is what men most
want to avoid, and they hate this state of soul most. - Quite so.
Surely, as 1 said just now, this would most correctly be called the
true lie, the ignorance in the soul of the man who has been deceived. The
verbal lie is a mere reflection of that which exists in the soul, a reflection
of it which comes later, and is not completely untrue. Is that not so? -
Certainly.
And the real lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men.'"*^
Plato thus establishes a situation in which the inquisition of the image is vital if one is to
avoid being hated by both gods and men alike.
Plato As A Poet
Given how harsh Plato is towards the poets, it would appear to be a damning
critique to point out that Plato himself is an imitative poet par excellence. Consider that
Plato, Republic 382a-c.
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the entirety of The Republic is written as a dialogue between Socrates and a variety of
more or less ignorant interlocutors.
But when he [the poet] makes a speech as if her were someone
else, shall we not say that he makes his language as like as possible to that
of whatever person he has told us is about to speak? - We shall say that.
Now to make oneself like somebody else in voice or form is to
imitate or impersonate the person one makes oneself resemble?
Certainly.
In these passages, it seems, he and the other poets tell their
narrative through impersonation - Quite so.''^^
Yet precisely in the act of critiquing such imitation, Plato is himself partaking of it. It is
intriguing that Plato, in the voice ofSocrates, states in the very next passage “if the poet
nowhere hid himself, the whole of his poem would be narration without impersonation,”
and “I am no poet.”^"*^
There are two things that make this particular passage so interesting. First, by the
standards set forth in the passages quoted above, none of The Republic is written as
narration. Everything from the setting of the scene for the dialogue to the retelling of the
Er myth at the conclusion of Book X are presented in the voice of Socrates or one of his
(lesser) counterparts.*"^’ The text is devoid of (non-mimetic) narration; therefore Plato
must be “hiding” himself everywhere. He is, at least in this respect, wearing the ring of
Gyges.'"** It may well be the case that his use of Socrates as a mouthpiece of Plato’s own
Ibid. 393c.
Ibid. 393d.
The Er myth of Book X comes closest to being narration, but it too is portrayed by
Plato as being spoken by Socrates.
Or perhaps the cap of Hades, as Perseus wore before him. See Plato, Republic 612b.
Plato’s mention of the cap of Hades is a further detail linking the ring of Gyges and the
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arguments was well known, even to his contemporaries, but this does not mean that Plato
IS not concealing himself. His dialogues carry on the same kind of questioning that the
death of Socrates was intended to outlaw, but Plato has left himself a safety valve, if you
will. If Plato finds himself brought before the court, he can claim that the words were not
his, but those of Socrates, who has already been punished for them. This is certainly a
measure of concealment on his part.’'^^ If it were not. then, by the very standards laid out
in The Republic, none of Plato's works would be presented in dialogue form, as this
necessitates the imitation of the other interlocutors. Indeed, the more faithful the author
is to the comments of others, the better concealed the author is as an author of those
words. The second thing that makes this particular passage so interesting is that Plato is
utilizing Socrates' transparency - the open rejection of any status as a poet - to conceal
his own poetry. There is a certain distance here between the author and the subject that is
being purposetully collapsed. Layers of removal are being effaced, but to what end?
One reason to collapse this distance is to work towards the elimination of the
ambiguities that such a distance can reveal. That is to say that a good deal of the power
of a mimetic representation comes from its concealing itself as mimetic. Images are most
powerful when they are most convincing, and less powerful when they are obvious as
imitations. This is what Thracymachus points towards when he says of himself that he
shield. After all, it was the cap of Hades that permitted Perseus to move within striking
range of Medusa without being seen.
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Not to mention further evidence, by virtue of his abilty to thereby deny his own
responsibility for his writings, that Plato does indeed wear the ring of Gyges.
This point is not diminished by Plato's argument that the observance of an overtly
mimetic performance is both “enjoyable" and dangerous as it provides a bad model of
proper behavior. Plato, Republic 605d-06d. The tragic play is powerful in its possibility
81
is aware of Socrates’ trickery, and therefore immune to it. This is supported as well by
the famous metaphor of the cave. For those chained in place, the dancing shadows on the
wall are utterly real. They have no grounds upon which to say that they are anything but
real. For the philosopher, however, these shadows are nothing but fleeting imitations of
something that is itself an imitation. The philosopher, having left the cave and turned his
eyes towards the sun. is not convinced by the shadow play at all. To hear Socrates speak
is one thing. To hear Plato tell us what Socrates said during a conversation where Plato
was not even present is another. By hiding himself, Plato attempts to block questions
about the accuracy or veracity of his account that might otherwise arise, just as the
prisoners in the cave are chained so that they cannot turn to see the fire behind them.
Plato, by concealing himself, is in effect holding his audience prisoner, and amplifying
the dream-inducing effects of his representations of the truth. “Consider: is this not
to confuse and mislead the audience, but this power is somewhat tempered by its easy
recognition as a mimetic performance. One can. in other words, relatively easily
recognize that what happens in the theatre is not necessarily what ought to happen in the
"real-world” outside of the theatre. (The phrase "real-world” is not Plato’s. He gives the
comings and goings of day-to-day life no ontological status in The Republic. This he
reserves for the Forms alone. It is intended simply to mark the boundary between the
inside and the outside of the theatre; between the imaginative realm of the performance
space and the (supposed) “reality” of life outside of it.) The larger threat, as Plato sees it,
is that the sophists and politicians in this ostensibly non-theatrical “real-world” operate
on exactly the same principles as do the tragedians. (Both appeal to audience response
rather than reference to a fixed and underlying Truth as the measure of goodness or
badness.) The problem is therefore not so much that the demos will be corrupted by
tragedy and mimetic poetry, as it is that the demos has already been corrupted. Mimetic
poetry has left the theatre and entered public life, concealing itself in the process. Plato
tacitly notes this shift when he speaks of “those who praise Homer” as an educator and as
one from whom to learn “the management of human affairs.” (606e) He is breaking
down the barriers between the “real-world” and the theatre, disparaging both as all too
"un-real.”
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dreaming, namely, whether asleep or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but
the reality which it resembles?”'^'
The amplification of the dream-inducing power of the representation has two
purposes. First, for those who are not by nature philosophical, it induces a powerful
stupor from which they are unlikely to awake. In this dream-state the reader is more
amenable to being led by the arguments being made as opposed to the way in which they
are made. Importantly, this dream state is a vast improvement over their previous
Homeric dreams by virtue of being dreams about, or at least oriented towards, the Good.
Second, it is all too simplistic to say that Plato is attempting to imprison his audience, for
he is at the same time offering a means of escape, at least for certain philosophical souls.
It is as if Plato, in order to liberate his audience, must first imprison them. For those
more philosophically inclined souls, this amplification of the dream also amplifies the
distortions of the dream. It is as if Plato were exposing the flaws of an audio recording
by playing it at a very high volume. In other words, by focusing so intently on the way in
which the poets make their claims, while at the same time utilizing those methods, Plato
invites the philosophically inclined reader to come and find him.
Then, I [Plato imitating Socrates] said, if I understand what you
say, there is one kind of style of narration which the true gentleman would
use to express himself and another different style which his opposite by
nature and education would favour, and in which he would narrate. - What
are they?
Well, I said, I think that when a moderate man in his narrative
comes upon the words or actions of a good man he will be willing to
expound it in character and not be ashamed of that kind of imitation; he
will impersonate this good man acting in a faultless and intelligent
manner, but he will do so much less when the good man is overcome by
disease or sexual passion, or by drunkenness or some other misfortune.
Ibid. 476c.
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When he comes across a character unworthy of himself, he will be
unwilling to make himself seriously like that worse character, except
perhaps briefly when he is doing a good deed. He will be ashamed to do
so, and also he is unpractised in the imitation of these types; he will resent
shaping and moulding himself after those worse than himself, since he
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despises them in his mind, except perhaps for the sake of play.
The greater purpose of this playful game of hide-and-seek is that Plato wishes the
philosophically inclined reader to follow him in his turn towards the Good. To this
end, he is quite happy to admit that he utilises the same mimetic techniques as the poets,
with one centrally important difference. Rather than pandering to the whims of the many,
his imitations are oriented towards the Good.*^^ He has taken the out he has left for
himself when he says:
Nevertheless it should be said that we at least, if poetry that aims at
pleasure and imitation has any argument to bring forward to prove that it
must have a place in a well-governed city, should be glad to welcome it,
for we are aware of the charm it exercises, but it is impious to betray what
one believes to be the truth. Are you not yourself, my friend, charmed by
poetry, especially when you see it through Homer? - Very much so.
Therefore it is right that is should come back from exile after
making its defence in lyric or any other meter. - Certainly
We should also give its champions who are not oets the
opportunity to speak on its behalf in prose to the effect that it not only
gives pleasure but is useful to cities and to human life. We shall listen to
Ibid. 396c-e.
Plato says:
No free man must learn anything under compulsion like a slave. Physical
labour performed under duress does no harm to the body, but nothing
learned under compulsion stays in the mind - True.
Do not, therefore, my excellent friend, I said, instruct the boys in these
studies by force, but in play, so that you will also see better what each of
them is by nature fitted for. Ibid. 536e.
We shall see, below, the extent to which Plato departs from his own rule in this regard.
Plato’s “good” mimesis, which is quite literally a mimesis of the Good, operates under
the rubric of the “noble fiction” or “necessary untruth.”
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them in a friendly spirit, for we shall certainly benefit if poetry is shown to
be not only pleasant but useful.
Plato in his discussion of poetry is offering both a critique and a defence of it. He is
banishing bad mimesis - that which distorts the truth and leads the audience away from
the truth - and embracing good mimesis - which is oriented towards the Good.
Plato As A Bearer of the Shield
The poetry of Plato's writing turns out to be not so much of a problem for him as
it first seems. The more serious problem facing Plato is that in his effort to distance
himself and his audience from the paralyzing effects of the shield, he ends up bearing it.
To bear the shield is to make a double claim; “thus it is” and “there is nothing to be done
about it.” This double claim is structured so as to block critical analysis of it. It presents
itself as unassailable. To resist its advance is to defy the gods, or in Plato's case, it is to
live in a dream,*^^ it is to live unfulfilled,'^’ it is to wallow in one’s own pettiness,'^^ and
to be hated by both gods and men.*^^ His use of mimesis as a critical tool is useful in
pointing out that the shield produces a dream for waking eyes, but it does nothing in itself
to challenge the structure that underlies the operation of the shield. Plato, in short.
Plato, Republic 607c-d.
Ibid. 476c.
Ibid. 585d.
Ibid. 586d.
Ibid. 382c.
85
replaces one "thus it is” with another. More specifically, at least in The Republic, he
replaces what he sees as Homer’s "thus it is’ with his own thus it really is.
If there remains any question that Plato is making such a claim in The Republic,
consider Socrates' statements to Adeimantus at the conclusion of Book V:
What about those who in each case contemplate the things
themselves which are always in every way the same? Do these have
knowledge, not opinion? — That too necessarily follows.
Shall we then say that these love and welcome the objects of
knowledge, as the others do the objects of opinion? Do we not remember
that we said that these latter loved and contemplated beautiful sounds and
colours and such things, but they would not allow that Beauty itself was an
existent? - We remember.
We shall then not be out of line if we call them lovers of opinion
rather than lovers of wisdom. Will they be very angry with us for calling
them that? - Not if they take my advice, he said, for it is not lawful to be
angry with those who speak the truth.
And those who welcome that itself which truly is in each case we
must call philosophers or lovers of knowledge, and not lovers of opinion?
- Most definitely.
This passage shows quite clearly that there is a profound "thus it is” at work. The "things
themselves” are what they are and they do not change. They are not therefore subject to
alteration by any human action. The ontological status of "the things themselves
solidifies the claim "there is nothing to be done.” Within this framework, knowledge,
unlike opinion, is not challengeable or in any way contestable. It simply is. Furthermore,
Adeimantus’ observation that “it is not lawful to be angry with those who speak the
truth” brings the coercive power of the state to bear against any that would question the
pronouncements of the philosophers.'^' The tensions caused by the death of Socrates are
Ibid. 480a.
'^' Concerning, for example, the structuring of familial relations, or the restrictions
imposed on the educational system in the just city. It is true that Plato envisions very
little in the way of policy pronouncements or legislation from the philosopher. Such
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therefore resolved by an inversion of the power relations that led to his death. Now it is
the Sophist who must defend himself in the language of the philosopher and not the
philosopher who must defend himself as a Sophist.
Plato, like Perseus, is successful in his attempt to decapitate his foe. In Perseus’
case it was Medusa and her paralyzing gaze. In Plato’s case it is Homer as the head of a
tradition that is epistemologically and politically paralyzing. However unlike Perseus,
Plato is unable, at least in The Republic, to come to the realization that his prize is still
too dangerous to wield. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the scene
described by Plato in Book VI where he rails against the sophistry of the many^^ - a
legislation would largely be limited to the structuring of the educational system,
especially in regards to the regulation of artistic and physical innovation. (424b) The
Philosopher will not concern himself with the operations of marketplace, the bringing of
lawsuits and the like for “It is not worthwhile ...to make orders about these for good men
and true; they will easily discover most of those which need legislation.” (426e) But
importantly, the philosopher is charged with not only the maintenance of the goodness
and truth of the citizenry, but of the creation of that status among them. Since the
philosopher is not always in a position where he is working with “good men and true” he
is in a position where more legislation is required. The philosophers walk a very thin line
then between leading the polls as Plato envisions it and;
[spending] their lives enacting many laws and amending them, believing
that they are attaining what is best.
You mean, I said, that they will live the same sort of life as those sick
people who, through lack of self-control, cannot give up their bad diet? -
Quite so. (425e)
See Plato, Republic 607c-d. Thus the injustice dramatized in the Apology is corrected.
The “paralysis” induced by the “Homeric manner of life” is implied in Plato’s
comment that the adherents of such a way of life “are as good as they are capable of
being.” Ibid. 607a. The “paralysis” is therefore a stasis at a given moral and rational
plateau, well below the potential heights of both morality and reason. The “Homeric
manner of life,” as Plato sees it, can only ever leave its adherents shackeld in the
subterranean depths of Plato’s cave.
Ibid. 492b-d.
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quote that has already been presented above - is repeated as a miiTor image of itself.
This would not seem to be a problem at all, since in the first instance the opinion of the
many is based on nothing but itself, where in the second this opinion is based on
knowledge of the Good. Thus, on one hand, the inversion of the scene is also a corrective
measure.
On the other hand, this also reveals a difficulty for Plato. Plato describes a
situation in which the philosopher must either be divinely guided - as is the case with
Socrates and his daemon - or be the end result of a proper public education.
There is not now, has not been in the past, nor ever will be in the
future, a man of a character so unusual that he has been educated to virtue
in spite of the education he has received from the mob, a human character
that is, for the divine, as the proverb goes, we exclude from our argument,
my friend. We must realise that if any character is saved and becomes
what it should, in the present state of our societies, you would not be
wrong to say that it has been saved by a god’s intervention.'^^
The establishment of the just city must therefore be accomplished by a philosopher of the
second sort, for the city that could produce the uncorrupted philosopher by public
education is already the city that such a philosopher would found. Furthermore, the task
of this philosopher king is to “take the city and men’s characters as a draughting
board... They would erase one thing and draw in another, I think, until they had made
human characters as dear to the gods as possible. This is problematic for two reasons.
First, the erasing and redrawing process implies that errors will be made in the attempt to
make “human characters as dear to the gods as possible.” There will be moments in this
Ibid. 492e.
'“ibid. 50Ia,c.
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process when the philosopher-king discovers that what he had thought was the correct
measure turns out not to be. Yet this does not seem possible if the philosopher-king has
the knowledge he claims to have. By Plato’s own reasoning, the object of his knowledge
- that which is - cannot change. Therefore in so far as the philosopher errs in his policy
measures he does not have knowledge, but something else.
It is possible that the philosopher may have knowledge of the Good, but not of the
human beings he hopes to shape into its likeness. Indeed, given that human beings are
malleable in this way precludes there ever being knowledge of them until such time as
they are perfected and no longer change. Thus the en'ors of the philosopher are
attributable to the deficiencies in the medium in which he works, and are not indicative of
his knowledge, or lack thereof, of the model. This may help explain the process of
drawing and redrawing, but it leads to a second problem.
The second problem is that for the philosopher to shape human characters so as to
make them “as dear to the gods as possible,” he must know what is dear to the gods. Yet
how does one know unquestioningly what is dear to the gods without being a god? It has
already been shown that the philosopher is prone to error in his policy decisions. In this
respect he is most definitively human, as his opinions about what the best policy is to be
will change from time to time. The philosopher is in a position where he both must be
and cannot be a god. As the philosopher remains a human being, he remains prone to
error and to the altering of his beliefs. However, the city under the rule of the
This is tantamount to the claim that knowledge of human beings is not possible until
they cease to be human beings and become gods. See Ibid. 38Ia-d. The possibility that
the philosopher does not have knowledge of the medium through which he works, vis.,
the human character, is given further support by Plato’s claim that the affairs ot men and
the comings and goings of phenomena are of no interest to the philosopher. (486a)
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philosopher is organized so as to preclude any debate as to whether the beliefs of the
philosopher-king are correct or not. Even though the philosopher can be wrong, and by
Plato's own implication via the image of the draughtsman, sometimes is wrong, his
correctness is both assumed and enforced.
There is a distinct danger that the power of this image - the conectness of the
philosopher-king - could become enchanting even to the philosopher-king. This issue
comes to the fore in light of another, albeit related, question. If the philosopher-king is a
draughtsman drawing and redrawing the image of the human character so as to perfect it
in the eyes of the gods, how is he to know when his task is complete? Plato is quite clear
that "until the philosophers attain power in a city there will be no respite from evil for
either city or citizens,” and that at such time there will be no grounds for dispute. One
possibility therefore is that the philosopher may understand his task to be complete when
there are no grounds for dispute, as this is an indication of social harmony. Interestingly
however, for all of his vehemence against the power of the image, Plato (disguised as
Socrates) then says, "they [those people who were straining to attack us] have become
altogether gentle and are convinced, if only for shame of disagreeing.’’’’^^^ The qualifier
“if only” indicates that disagreement may not be resolved so much as the disagreeing
party becomes too ashamed to continue arguing his point.'™ It need not then be the case
™*Ibid. 501d-e.
'®^Ibid. 502a. Italics added. There is a clear allusion to Thracymachus who blushes after
suffering a logical reversal of his position.
Compare this to the punishment and disenfranchisement levied by the Sophists against
those their words cannot convince. Ibid. 492d.
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that there is genuine accord among the citizenry as to what is correct, so long as there is
the appearance of it. Recall that since human beings are changeable, they are not
knowable, for strictly speaking, knowledge is of what is, and they are not. As it is not
possible to have knowledge about human beings, one only has access to empirical
observations of their comings and goings. The danger is that the philosopher-king, led
astray by the appearance of social harmony and god-like human character may stop short
of his goal of actually shaping such harmony and character.
What is worse, the possibility of this error being pointed out to the philosopher-
king, either by another philosopher or anyone else, has been removed in the process of
categorically rendering such challenges impious and illogical. The “good” citizen will,
by force of habit, remain within the parameters set by the philosopher. Those that do
not are subject to the coercive power of the state. Thus the parameters set by the
171
Thus Glaucon's challenge at the beginning of Book II where he says “Do you,
Socrates, want to appear to have persuaded us, or do you want truly to convince us” is
disallowed. He makes this challenge based on what he sees as Socrates incomplete
answer to the argument put forward by Thracymachus, who is no longer willing to pursue
his case, less because he is convinced than because he is ashamed. Of course, almost the
whole of the argument made in The Republic stems from Glaucon’s challenge and the
lessons contained therein would be lost were it not for this challenge.
For the problematic fate of these souls who are good by habit, see Plato, Republic
619b-c. The Er myth, which concludes The Republic is troublesome in a myriad of ways.
Most notably, the selection by an immortal soul of a life that is already fated hollows out
the role of education that has payed such a central role in the rest of the text. The fate of
the habitually good soul may even suggest that a good education, as defined by Plato
through the text may prove harmful in the end. It is notable that Odysseus is depicted as
choosing “the quiet life of a private individual”, in other words, a complete nobody.
(620c) He has in the end become “Udeis” (“Nobody”). In his choice, he has relegated
himself to what Plato would consider to be his (and by extension, Homer's) “proper”
position, unheralded by anyone.
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philosopher, even if they are set in error, cannot be questioned. They are ultimately
maintained by force.
It is apparent that Plato’s attempt to disrupt the power of the shield has failed. He
has succeeded only in overturning its particular contents as it is wielded by the Sophists.
This inversion does nothing to alter the structure and operation of the shield, but rather
reinscribes and reinforces that power. Yet the promise of mimesis remains. Perhaps a
more developed understanding of the concept may prove better suited for the task?
From Crat>1us to Baudrillard
Despite the inability of Plato's concept of mimesis as presented in The Republic
to follow through on its promise of critical distance, one can, at the very least, retain from
it a sense of the promise itself. Plato's inability to undo the thiexis (total enchantment)
of the shield is no reason in itself to abandon the promise of critical distance altogether.
But from what direction might this promise be fulfilled? One avenue of pursuit begins
with Plato's Cratylus. In that dialogue Plato offers one of the first extant treatments of
language - how words have meaning. The key positions in the dialogue are held by
Hermogenes, who sees language as operating on a purely conventional basis, and
Cratylus who advocates a correspondence model in which words have meaning by
hooking onto the world in an appropriate (or what might be called “good mimetic”)
fashion. Cratylus holds that words are likenesses or imitations of that which they name.
Plato, in the character of Socrates, addresses each of these positions in turn. He counters
the notion of language as purely conventional by saying:
Socrates: [If] speaking or saying is a sort of action, one that is about
things, isn’t using names also a sort of action?
Hermogenes: Yes.
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Socrates: And didn’t we see that actions aren’t in relation to us but have a
special nature of their own?
Hermogenes: We did.
Socrates: So if we are to be consistent with what we said previously, we
cannot name things as we choose; rather, we must name them in the
natural way for them to be named and with the natural tool for naming
them. In that way we’ll accomplish something and succeed in naming,
otherwise we wont.'^^
Thus he establishes that language must make reference to an underlying "nature” in
relation to which it has meaning. At the same time, he counters Cratylus’ position by
insisting that language tends to reflect a cosmos that is in constant motion. The
problem with this is that it renders knowledge impossible:
Socrates: Indeed, it isn’t even reasonable to say that there is such a thing
as knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are passing on and none remain. For
if that thing itself, knowledge, did not pass on from being knowledge, then
knowledge would always remain, and there would be such a thing as
knowledge. On the other hand, if the very form of knowledge passed on
from being knowledge, the instant it passed on into a different form than
that of knowledge, there would be no knowledge. Hence, on this account,
no one could know anything and nothing could be known either. But if
there is always that which knows and that which is known, if there are
such things as the beautiful, the good, and each one of the things that are,
it doesn’t appear to me that these things can be at all like flowings or
motions, as we were saying just now they were. So whether I’m right
about these things or whether the truth lies with Heraclitus and many
others isn’t an easy matter to investigate. But surely no one with any
understanding will commit himself or the cultivation of his soul to names,
or trust them and their givers to the point of firmly stating that he knows
something - condemning both himself and the things that are to be totally
unsound like leaky sinks - or believe that things are exactly like people
with runny noses, or hat all things are afflicted with colds and drip over
everything.”^
Plato, "Cratylus," 387c-d.
And of course “language” here means ancient Greek.
Plato, "Cratylus," 440a-d.
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This dialogue ends in a suspended state of indeterminacy. Socrates has not been entirely
successful in his attempt to convince Cratylus that words can at best reveal the prejudices
of the name giver, nor has he succeeded in convincing Cratylus that names must be
judged in their goodness or badness by reference to a fixed being, rather than a ehanging
one.
Baudrillard
The Shield as Simulacrum
Since Plato’s time, mimesis has remained an important, even central topic of
Western traditions of thought. Much of this thought has accepted the tacit premise of the
argument stated above that there is “such a thing as knowledge” that becomes more and
more perfected with further inquiry. The basic argument is that words provide insight
into the nature of that which they name. Over time the relationship between the word and
the world is increasingly refined, more closely perfected. However with the advent of the
linguistic turn in philosophy, this premise has come under increasing scrutiny and
doubt. One of the more notable contemporary developments of it is offered by the
The power of this premise is such that it is most often accepted as common sense.
The sense of human history (or rather History) as found in Hegel and Marx stand out as
two particularly influential and important examples.
Of particular note on this point is the work of Ferdinand de Suassure. He takes up the
argument of the Cratylus where it leaves off:
Some people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as a
naming process only -a list of words, each corresponding to the thing that
it names...This conception is open to criticism at several points. It
assumes that ready-made ideas exist before words; it does not tell us
whether a name is vocal or psychological in nature [arbor, for instance,
can be considered from either viewpoint); finally, it lets us assume that the
linking of a name and a thing is a very simple operation - an assumption
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French semiotician and cultural critic, Jean Baudrillard. He is of particular interest here
not only because of his thoughts on language, representation and the image, but because
he has offered a direct critique of the War on Terror using the tools he has developed. He
is also of interest because of an interesting relationship he has with Plato. As Christopher
Norris notes:
Philosophers and political theorists since Plato have taken it as axiomatic
that though must at some point distinguish between truth and falsehood,
reason and rhetoric, essence and appearance, science and ideology. One
way of describing Baudrillard’s project is to see it as a species of inverted
Platonism, a discourse that systematically promotes the negative terms
(rhetoric, appearance, ideology) above their positive counterparts.*’^
The relationship between Plato and Baudrillard can be seen quite clearly against the
backdrop of Baudrillard’s four phases of the image, as detailed in Simulacra and
Simulations:
This would be the successive phases of the image:
-it is a reflection of a basic reality
-it masks and perverts a basic reality
-it masks the absence of a basic reality
-it bears no relation to any realty whatever: it is its own pure
simulacrum.*’^
that is anything but true. But this rather naive approach can bring us near
the truth by showing us that the linguistic unit is a double entity, one
formed by the associating of two terms.
Ferdinand de Saussure and Jonathan Culler, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade
Baskin (New York: Fontana/Collins, 1974) p.67. The two terms he classifies as the
concept or signified and a sound-image or signifier. Both terms are entirely
psychological and the relationship between them is arbitrary, hence “r/zc linguistic sign is
arbitrary." If the sign is arbitrary, then it cannot provide any direct access to an
underlying reality. Baudrillard takes this point and pursues it to an extreme.
*’* Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the Ends
ofPhilosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) pp. 165-66.
*’^
Poster, ed.. Jeon Baudrillard: Selected Writings p.l70.
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Plato’s mimesis is exemplary of the first two phases, where Baudrillard’s work is more
closely associated with the last two.
In the first phase, the image, which, as in Plato and Saussure can be a sound-
image, reflects a basic reality.'®*’ The image acts as a mirror, and it remains faithful to
that which it represents. This is the kind of image in operation in Plato’s good mimesis.
It is also the putative image put forward by the unchallenged operation of the shield of
Achilles. The image in this phase serves to reveal the world behind it. An excellent
example of this particular phase of the image is to be found in Cratylus’ position in the
Platonic dialogue that bears his name. There, Cratylus maintains, “the correctness of a
name consists in displaying the nature of the thing it names.”'®' It may be, however, that
this mirroring function is only in place because there is no means by which to question
the image.
This kind of questioning is made possible in Plato’s challenge to Homer in The
Republic. As has been demonstrated, Plato critiques Homer for offering a distorted
representation - bad mimesis — of the real. This is Baudrillard’s second phase of the
image. It is in this phase that the image becomes associated with the imitation or
counterfeit, along with all accompanying negative connotations. Where the first phase of
the image is more or less self-evident and uncritical in its approach, the introduction of
the second phase allows for a measure of critical distance from the image. In terms of the
bearing of the shield, the second phase of the image can be employed as a critical tool.
Resistance is possible to the “thus it is” of the shield by way of the counter claim “thus it
'®°
Ibid.
'®'
Plato, "Cratylus," 428d.
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really is.” (The implication being a precursoiy “no it isn’t.”) Viewed as a second phase
image, the rhetoric of the Bush Administration surrounding the War on Terror, with all of
its attendant claims to “tell it like it is” can be seen as a distortion of the truth. This is an
important step in that it also brings a challenge to the attendant claims that “there is
nothing to be done.” Thus, for example, when Perle and Frum state that we have no other
choice but to fight the War on Terror, the arguments they put forward can be seen as
misleading, as would be any conclusions drawn from them. Such a strategy of
resistance requires access to objectively “better” information, and is an inherently
empirical counter-argument. Of course, resistance to a particular instance of the bearing
of the shield made along these lines can do nothing to challenge the bearing of the shield
itself
The emergence of the second phase of the image is already implicit in Plato’s
Cratylus.
Socrates: Perhaps it will seem absurd. Hermogenes, to think that things
become clear by being imitated in letters and syllables, but it is absolutely
unavoidable. For we have nothing better on which to base the truth of
10-J
primary names.
This position is a classic statement of a model of language that obtains meaning by
mapping onto reality in what can be objectively called better or worse ways. Indeed, this
is the argument that Plato, in the character of Socrates, brings to bear against Cratylus.
He says that most primary words portray a cosmos in constant motion, a portrayal Plato
sees as incorrect. The objective classification of words, that is to say sound-images, as
Frum and Perle, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror.
Plato, "Cratylus," 425d.
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good or bad representations implies an unfettered and, importantly, non-lingiiistic access
to the real. Without such access, no such judgment is possible “unless you want us to
behave like tragic poets, who introduce a dens ex machina whenever they're
perplexed.”'^
The deus ex machina of the tragic poets is a headlong rush in to the inscrutability
of the gods, and exposes the limits of reason. Plato clearly sees this as an artificial limit,
reflective more of the non-philosophic nature of the poet, his own lack of reason, than of
an actual limit to reason itself It is clearly not “the best answer we can give.” By
invoking the inscrutability of the gods, the strategy of the tragic poets implies that there
are aspects of the real that are not available to human perception or understanding. There
are, in other words, places where the truth or falsity of a word, the goodness or badness of
its imitation of the truth, becomes undecidable. Without decidability, especially in the
case of the so-called “primary names” the entire system of meaning presented by Plato
comes crashing down.
And yet regardless of what kind of excuse one offers, if one doesn’t know
about the correctness of primary names, one cannot know about the
correctness of derivative ones, which can only express something by
means of those others about which one knows nothing. Clearly, then,
anyone who claims to have a scientific understanding of derivative names
must first and foremost explain the primary ones with perfect clarity.
Otherwise he can be certain that what he says about the others will be
worthless.
i^^Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 426a-b.
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In Plato’s case, this phase poses a few distinct problems, as he himself operates as an
“imitative poet.” Just as the poets he criticises mislead their audiences by distorting and
therefore concealing the truths they purport to reveal, so too does Plato. This is most
evident in his metaphors of the sun, the line, and the cave. These are well known and
very powerful images, but their very power is what makes them problematic. Indeed it
has been noted that the power of these images is such that they may even get in the way
of understanding. Plato is well aware that any representation of the Good must
simultaneously distort that which it hopes to reveal. His images can never be the Good
they strive to represent. With this realisation, even his so-called “good mimesis” must
bear a close kinship to “bad mimesis.”
Indeed, the distinction between good and bad mimesis is faced with a paradox.
Even the best mimesis is not the equivalent of that which it strives to represent. The
problem is that the “better” the image is as a representation, the greater is its threat to
distort its underlying reality (and therefore be bad mimesis). That is, as the mimetic
image more closely approximates the real, the more it threatens to obscure the real
entirely by fostering the (false) belief that it is the real. The more realistic the image, the
more likely it will simply be accepted as real, thus hindering further refinement of the
image. Yet. as we are told in the Croh’his, the image cannot be perfected so long as it
remains an image. If the image is falsely accepted as the real, then the unobstructed
access to the real that underpins the status of the image as good or bad develops a fatal
blockage. An unproblematic relationship to the real is no longer possible. Once this
paradox becomes apparent, the image functions so as to conceal it. thereby
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circumventing, or at least postponing the ascendancy of absolute lelativism and chaos.
Once this paradox becomes apparent, the image has entered its third phase.
In Baudrillard’s third phase, the image ceases to be either a representation or a
distortion of a basic reality and comes to “mask the absence of a basic reality.”
Baudrillard's favorite example of this third phase of the image is Disneyland. The
“Magic Kingdom” in Baudrillard's understanding makes use of its blatant non-reality to
conceal the fact that the real “magic kingdom” is outside the gates of the park.
Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the “real” country, all of
"real” America, which is Disneyland (just as prisons are there to conceal
the fact that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, which
is carceral). Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us
believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the
America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal
and of simulation. It is no longer a question of a false representation of
reality (ideology), but of concealing that fact that the real is no longer real,
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and thus of saving the reality principle.
This is a difficult phase to grasp, but an example is to be found in the shield of
Achilles. The images on the shield as it appears in Homer's epic, in the guise of a
divinely sanctioned revelation of the world as it is, serve to mask the absence of the
world as it is depicted. The claim of the shield is “all is war” and yet this is clearly not
the case. This is evident not only by the remembered experiences and future hopes of the
soldiers, but by Achilles himself in his reconciliation with Priam, and by the characters of
Nestor, Menelaus and Odysseus, each of whom ultimately returns to a life beyond the
confines of the battlefield. This is the Disneyland example reversed. The theme park, in
its blatant fictiveness, imbues the backdrop of the larger society with a sense of solid
188
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ireality. The shield, in its insistence on its own unimpeachable realty, imbues the
backdrop of life beyond the battlefield with a sense of fictiveness or illusion.
The third phase of the image is both promising and threatening. Turning once
again to the War on Terror, the possibility is opened that one might see in the rhetoric a
strategy of concealment. One could point to the clean lines between “us” and “them” or
“good” and “evil” as an attempt to conceal the absence of any such clear divisions. The
insistence that one take sides in the conflict, that there is no neutral ground, can be
understood as masking the impossibility of a meaningful taking of sides, and that there is
only “neutral ground.” To flesh this out somewhat, one must ask the question, “what
does it mean to take sides between fundamentalism and itself?” The War on Terror,
whatever else it may be, is a clash of fundamentalisms. The key antagonists. Bush and
Bin Laden (although the latter has become more of a shorthand for a variety of shadowy
figures than an actual antagonist) are both locked into an ideological matrix that is
totalizing in its reach. Their way is the right way, anything else is wrong. Both see the
other as the very embodiment of evil. Certainly within such a matrix, there is indeed no
neutral ground. But the third phase of the image, employed as a critical tool, can
highlight that both parties are attempting, by way of their images (the car bomb, the
surgical strike, the sound-image of a broadcast speech or audio tape) to force the image
back into its pre-contemplative first phase. This is an ironic gesture because the very
engine behind the need for such images is the ascendancy of the “relativism” it hopes to
ward off. It would be better to say that the images seek to hold the appearance of
relativism at bay, although it can do nothing about the disappearance of the real (or what
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might torturously be called the reality of relativism). It is not the ascendancy of
relativism, but rather the generalized awareness of it that is circumvented or
postponed. There is a profound shift then from the real to the perception of the real,
the appearance of reality, as the condition of the image.
Here begins the fourth phase of the image. In this phase, images become strictly
self-referential, and therefore not referential at all. They cease to have any connection “to
any reality.” Images become pure simulacra. The real becomes doubled in its perfected
image so that the only remaining difference between the real and the image is their
sameness. Mimesis, representation, becomes its own opposite.
Representation starts from the principle that the sign and the real are
equivalent (even if this equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom).
Conversely, simulation starts from the Utopia of this principle of
equivalence, the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign
as reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas
representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false
representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as
itself a simulacrum.
Baudrillard employs an analogy to clarify what has happened to the real. He says
that the obsession with perfect reproduction has created a “stereophonic effect” akin to
feedback,
which is produced in acoustics by a source and a receiver being too close
together and in history by an event and its dissemination being too close
together and thus interfering disastrously - a short circuit between cause
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Neoptolemus as portrayed in Philoctetes finds himself in just this position. His
(re)tum at the end of the play to a demonstrable honourability and transparency serves to
mask his irredeemable status as an accomplished deceiver and dissimulator. For a more
thorough discussion, see Chapter IV.
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and effect like that between the object and the experimenting subject in
microphysics (and in the human sciences!).’^'
As in acoustic feedback, once this stage is reached, there is no way to tease apart the
resultant tone into is original notes. Thus there is no way to distinguish between the real
and its simulation. The real ceases to be what it was, as does the representation of the
real. Both become hyperreal. In a way Baudrillard has come back to the Platonic notion
of the apparent as a pastiche of dreamwork. But he does so not to highlight the
surface/depth distinction, but to eradicate it. The model is perfected in its image and vice
versa.
In conjunction with the four phases of the image, Baudrillard outlines three orders
of simulacra. The purpose of discussing these three orders is not to offer a full and in
depth analysis of them, but to trace the effacement of the real in concrete historical and
material context. The first order of simulacra emerges with the decline of the feudal
system and the rise of the bourgeoisie during the European Renaissance. The caste
system of feudalism maintained its symbolic power by the strict limitation of the
diffusion of signs. That the sign remained privy only to select members of specific
classes, where they were transmitted by ritualistic practices, ensured that the signs “are
not arbitrary.” With the decline of the feudal order, the sign became emancipated from
Baudrillard, Illusion pp.5-6.
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Baudrillard's genealogical account is useful a guideline, but as is already evident, the
hallmarks of the various orders of simulation can be found outside of the timeline he
provides. A recognition of this on Baudrillard's part will lead him to the conclusion that
not only is our current situation one in which there is no recourse to an underlying truth,
but that it has always been so.
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its ritual transmission. The sign is no longer obligatory. It becomes “unburdened of all
restraint, universally available," and thus counterfeit. “Counterfeiting does not take place
by means of changing the nature of an ‘original,’ but, by extension, through completely
altering a material whose clarity is completely dependent upon a restriction.”'^'* This is
to say that the first order simulacrum, the counterfeit, replaces the obligatory sign while
continuing to play at being obligatory.
The second order simulacrum is closely related to serial production, and is coeval
with the Industrial Revolution. Here signs are no longer counterfeit. Signs do not play at
being obligatory, but rather override the question of “their uniqueness or their origin”
entirely. With the advent of serial production, objects do not appear in an original/replica
relationship, but in a series. “In a series, objects become undefined simulacra one of the
other. And so along with the objects do the men that produce them.”'^^ There is a shift
from a reliance on the skill of the individual, the craftsman, to a reliance on the machine,
on the technological means of production. Just as the status of the craftsman is effaced
by the technical capacity of the machine, the status of the original becomes entirely
hollowed out in the infinite reproducibility of the object. Production becomes its own
end. “Production itself has no meaning: its social finality is lost in the series.”'^^ Once
this stage is reached, third order simulacra begin.
Ibid. p.51.
Ibid. p.56.
Ibid.
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There is no more counterfeiting of an original, as there was in the first
order, and no more pure series as there was in the second; there are models
from which all forms proceed according to modulated differences. Only
affiliation to the model has any meaning, since nothing proceds in
accordance with its end any more, but issues instead from the model, the
“signifier of reference,” functioning as a foregone, and the only credible,
conclusion.
Here is the realm of the hyperreal.
The primary symbol for the triumph of the hyperreal and of the power monopoly
of capital is, or rather im^, the World Trade Centre in New York City.
The effigy of the capitalist system has passed from the pyramid to the
punch card. The buildings are no longer obelisks, but trustingly stand next
to one another like the columns of a statistical graph. This new
architecture no longer embodies a competitive system, but a countable one
where competition has disappeared in favour of correlation... This
architectural graphism belongs to the monopoly: the World Trade Center’s
two towers are perfect parallelepipeds, four hundred metres high on a
square base; they are perfectly balanced and blind communicating vessels.
The fact that there are two identical towers signifies the end of all
competition, the end of every original reference...The two towers of the
WTC are the visible sign of the closure of a system in the vertigo of
doubling while the other skyscrapers are each the original moment of a
system continually surpassing itself in the crisis and the challenge.*^®
It is within the realm of the hyperreal that Baudrillard offers his read of the War on
Terror.
The Spirit of Terrorism
In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard addresses the War on Terror directly, or
more specifically, he addresses the attacks of September 11, 2001. This short text is both
a rethinking and a reassertion of much of his prior work. In his previous books, notably
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in The Illusion of the End. Baudrillard makes reference to “the event strike.” This is the
condition of prevalent hyperreality where nothing happens that does not already conform
to a prior understanding of how it ought to happen. He uses the Timisoara massacre
during the Romanian revolution as his example. In this case, television images of the
aftermath of a clash between protestors and government forces were broadcast that
included numerous faked corpses. The “corpses” were there for the sake of the television
audience so as to give the event a certain sense of credibility, to make it a “real”
revolution in the eyes of the world:
The actors and the media sensed obscurely that the events in Eastern
Europe had to be given credibility, that the revolution had to be lent
credibility by an extra dose of dead bodies. And the media themselves had
to be lent credibility by the reference to the people. Leading to a vicious
circle of credibility, the result of which is the decredibilizing of the
revolution and the events themselves.
Events become bracketed by their expectation, and nothing can open up the horizon of
the possible as it has collapsed into is preset model. Nothing is ever anything other than
what it is expected to be. Events are “on strike.” They cease to be experiences, or for
that matter, events at all. The hyperreal is therefore the realm of the (non)event,
encapsulated in the concept of deterrence.
Events are not on strike any more. With the attacks on the World Trade
Centre in New York, we might even be said to have before us the absolute
event, the ‘mother’ of all events, the pure event uniting within itself all the
events that have never taken place.
Baudrillard, Illusion p.58.
Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers, trans.
Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2002) pp.3-4.
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The return of events is not accomplished through the destruction of lives or property,
(plenty of this had gone on throughout the “event strike”), but through the destruction of
the symbolic centre of an entire global system of the (hyper)real.
The symbolic challenge of September 1 1 is the one challenge the system of global
capital - and the code of the hyperreal that underwrites it- cannot respond to. The
inability to respond is based on the inability of the hyperreal to allow a distinction
between surface and depth. Nothing can stand for anything else because everything is
always already a perfect equivalent of everything else. The logic of the hyperreal,
hyperlogic, denies the very possibility of the symbol, as it is by way of the symbol that
the system can be challenged. In a way, this effacement of the symbol is something like
the third phase of the image that operates to conceal an absence. The hyperreal reasserts
its hegemony by denying the very possibility of its being challenged. That is, because the
hyperreal is vulnerable to symbolic challenge, it works to eradicate the very possibility of
the symbol. The question then becomes “how is the hyperreal vulnerable to symbolic
challenge?” An answer to this question is to be found in Baudrillard’s discussion of gift
giving.
This is the spirit of terrorism.
Never attack the system in terms of relations of force. That is the
(revolutionary) imagination the system itself forces upon you - the system
which survives only be constantly drawing those attacking it into fighting
on the ground of reality, which is always its own. But shift the struggle
into the symbolic sphere, where the rule is that of challenge, reversion and
outbidding. So that death can be met only by equal or greater death. Defy
the system by a gift to which it cannot respond except by its own death
and its own collapse.
107
The symbolic challenge of September 1 1 can be understood using the model of
the potlatch, a concept Baudrillard takes from Mauss.“^ The entire social institution of
the potlatch is predicated on the giving of gifts. The more resplendent the gifts given, the
greater the status of the gift-giver. Each gift is therefore a challenge. The receiver is
challenged to outdo the gifts he has received, and thereby outdo the prestige of the one
from whom he has received. The potlatch is therefore based on an economy of
escalation, prestige building on prestige. Each party in the exchange is under the
perpetual imperative to outdo both the other and themselves. This is a far cry from the
“zero degree”^'*^ of the hyperreal (non)exchange in which deterrence and not escalation is
the aim. The “prestige” of the parties in the latter (non)exchange is not even considered,
as it is always already equal. Prestige is not even possible within the ubiquitous non-
differentiation of the hyperreal. In the symbolic exchange of the potlatch, there comes a
point where a gift is given that is not returnable. This is the gift of death, the death-gift,
in which one party gives his own life to the other. The power of this gift is readily
discemable in the figure of the martyr.^*^ The only appropriate response to the death-gift
is the self-sacrificial death of the receiver in return. On September 1 1, 2001, the World
Trade Centre along with the entire code of which it was the primary symbol was given
the death-gift. The towers themselves responded to this gift according to the economy of
See Mike Gane’s introduction to Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange.
Baudrillard, Illusion p.63.
A recognition of and response to this power can be seen in the efforts made in the
Western press to downplay and deny the status of the September 1 1 hijackers as martyrs,
branding them instead as “cowards.”
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exchange in which it was given. “When the two towers collapsed, you had the
impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own
suicides.
The system of which the towers were the symbol has responded, to be sure, but
not within the same economy of exchange. The “appropriate” response would have been
for the system itself to implode, like the towers did. However, the response has been to
reject this gift. The system has reasserted itself “in the position of God (divine
omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy).”™^ As seen from within the logic of the
potlatch, this is to unilaterally declare the game to be completed with the giving of the
penultimate gift. It is to declare victory before the game has concluded. It is a
declaration of victory which is at the same time an admission of defeat. The events of
September 1 1 - and it is important to note that they were events — expose the vulnerability
of the system and its hyperlogic. The system rests on its perfection in accord with its
own models. Its “reality” is expressed in the form of the universal law. The “rule of
law” and the rule of the code are indistinguishable. Yet the basic tenets of law - that
crime is punished, and the state is the locus of executive power (literally the power to
execute) - are exposed to an unanswerable challenge. The ritual, crucial in the continual
reestablishment of the state monopoly on force, wherein crime is followed by state
Baudrillard. Spirit p.7.
Ibid. Consider “Operation Infinite Justice,” the original code name for the American
assault in Afghanistan. This name was changed only after an objection was raised that
infinite justice was the prerogative of God/Allah alone. Despite the name change,
Baudrillard’s assertion bears considerable weight. Consider also President Bush’s claim
that “freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and God is not
neutral between them.” Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People, 20 September, 2001 ([cited)., 55.
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sanctioned (and executed) punishment is interrupted when the crime and the punishment
are condensed in to a single moment.
A transcendent, “objective” agency requires a delegation of Justice,
death and vengeance. Death and expiation must be wrested from the
circuit, monopolised at the summit and redistributed. A bureaucracy of
death and punishment is necessary, in the same way as there must be an
abstraction of economic, political and sexual exchanges; if not, the entire
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structure of social control collapses.
On September 1 1, the crime (the murder of innocents) and the punishment (the death of
the perpetrators) are one and the same. The state is entirely excluded from the exchange.
It can only retroactively reassert its power monopoly, adding it on artificially to the fait
accompli.
The other response remaining for the state is to invert the situation, that is to
reabsorb the event into the simulation. The system feverishly reproduces the
spectacularity of the event so that it becomes lost in its own spectacle. It is not the
omnipotence of the system that is added to the event, but the event that is added to the
omnipotence of the system.
The fascination with the attack is primarily a fascination with the image
(both its exultatory and its catastrophic consequences are themselves
largely imaginary).
In this case, then, the real is superadded to the image like a bonus
of terror, like an additional frisson: not only is it terrifying, but, what is
more, it is real. Rather than the violence of the real being there first, and
the. frisson of the image being added to it, the image is there first, and the
frisson of the real is added.^^^
207
Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange p. 1 75.
Baudrillard, Spirit p.29.
In a move reminiscent of the third phase of the image, the system itself operates to
conceal the cracks made visible in its claims to omnipotence.^®^ Thus the “shock and
awe” strategy is not primarily that which marked the opening days of the war in Iraq, but
that which the entire system undertook from the moment the second plane hit the South
tower of the World Trade Centre. It is the immediate call to arms that reinstates the
power of the state. It is “Operation Infinite Justice” that repositions the state in the
position of God. Its intended audience was not so much the Iraqi military forces as the
citizenry of the “civilised” West. If the (counter)attacks of September 1 1 challenged the
system on the symbolic level, the subsequent (non)response of the system has worked to
efface and deny that challenge. The system that is already dead “proves” its vitality
by spreading death, by making its condition universal.
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacks on the pillars of
American power - globalised capital and military might. Much of the speculation
regarding the intended target of the fourth plane that went down in rural Pennsylvania has
claimed that it was headed to the White House. But what if, like the two planes that
crashed in New York, it was headed to the Pentagon as well? The question becomes
“what need is served by making the statement that it was intending to target the White
House?” Were the White House to have been hit. it would have been identified in no
uncertain terms as one of the central pillars of the American global hegemony. It is
possible that the insistence that the White House (or perhaps Congress) was a target does
the same thing. This claim is the reinstitution of a belief that power resides in the elected
leadership and therefore in the electorate, (the voting public). To say that the White
house was the target is to say “your vote counts!” in an oblique, yet enthymatically
discernable way, despite the evidence to the contrary to be found in the 2000 election.
1 use the term (counter)attack to indicate that the events of September 1 1 were already
embedded in an ongoing exchange, and did not occur entirely ex nihilo. An earlier attack
on the World Trade Centre had occun-ed in 1993, indicating that the grievances were not
new.
Ill
“Hyperrealist Abjection” or The Shield of Baudrillard
The critique offered by Baudrillard, like that offered by Plato, promises to provide
a sense of critical distance from the image of the shield by exposing it as an image.
Speaking of the 1991 Gulf War, he says:
The question is not whether one is for or against war, but whether one is
for or against the reality of war. Analysis must not be sacrificed to the
expression of anger. It has to be directed in its entirety against reality,
against manifestness - here against the manifest reality of this war. The
Stoics contest the very self-evidence of pain, when the body’s confusion is
at its height. Here, we must contest the very self-evidence of war, when
the confusion of the real is at its height. We must hit out at the weak point
of reality. It’s too late afterwards: you’re stuck with the “acts of
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violence”, stuck in realist abjection.
His comments are easily applicable to the current War on Terror, especially as it is played
out in the ongoing conflict in Iraq. He is right to suggest that war should be challenged in
its “manifest reality” - as something that “must be done.” He is also right in noting the
many parallels between the (Second) Gulf War and the Trojan War, thereby “givjingl
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force to the illusion of war, rather than becom[ing] an accessory to its false reality.”
However, he cannot escape the flip side of the “realist abjection” he so vociferously
Baudrillard, Illusion pp.63-64.
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Ibid. p.64. Drawing on the version of events dramatised in Euripides’ Helen.
Baudrillard says: “If the Helen of the Trojan War was a simulacrum, what was the Gulf
War's Helen? Where was there a simulacrum here, except in the simulacrum of war
itself?" (p.65) It seems to me at least that he too hastily jumps to this conclusion, as
Helen is a causus helium, a role filled in the Gulf War by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In
the current conflict in Iraq, (the Second Gulf War), the simulacrum of Weapons of Mass
Destruction looms large. Following Baudrillard’s logic, the current conflict is even less
real (or rather more hyperreal) than its predecessor. A simulated war waged on a
sirnulated premise. A reproduction of the original as it ought to have been (e.g. the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the institution of a friendly democratic state in the
Middle East). Current conditions, expressed in an increasing death toll and instability in
Iraq two years after the American invasion are evidence of the real that refuses to be
contained in its model.
opposes. In his many comments including “we no longer have the choice of advancing,
of preserving in the present destruction, or of retreating
-but only of facing up to this
radical illusion,” and “there is no remedy for this extreme situation, and war is
certainly not a solution”^'"^ Baudrillard remains deeply abject. The only difference is that
his is a hyperrealist abjection.
Like Plato before him, Baudrillard is incapable of following through on his
promise to provide critical distance. Indeed, he ends up doing the opposite and
collapsing all possible distance in an incessant onslaught of images that no longer fade
away into the past. Nor do they offer any promise for the future, but are always recycled
and recirculated in the now. Baudrillard, like Plato before him, ends up bearing the
shield himself. Phrased in terms of the dual claim of the shield, Baudrillard gets as far as
“thus it isn’t”, (or specifically “all is simulated”), which in the end is a thinly veiled
version of the “thus it is” claim. All the same, he arrives at the same ethos; “nothing to
be done.”
Baudrillard is quite explicit about this, and yet, interestingly, he is ambivalent in
his explicitness. As already discussed, he tends to leave his readers stranded in a deep
melancholia from which there is no escape. On the other hand, in his essay “The Masses:
The Implosion of the Social in the Media” Baudrillard notes the “forced silence of the
masses in the media” as not “a sign of passivity and of alienation, but to the contrary an
Ibid, p.123.
Baudrillard, Spirit p.34.
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Baudrillard’s point215
original strategy, an original response in the form of a challenge,
is that if the images produced by the mass media are intended to ensnare the will of the
masses, the masses have learned to resist by a wholesale abdication of rational choice, the
will, knowledge and liberty.
The deepest desire is perhaps to give the responsibility for one’s desire to
someone else. A strategy of ironic investment in the other, in the others; a
strategy toward others not of appropriation but, on the contrary, of
expulsion, of philosophers and people in power, an expulsion of the
obligation of being responsible, of enduring philosophical, moral, an
political categories.
Baudrillard is saying that once the masses are completely devoid of will, desire, even the
capacity to act independently, they are immune to manipulation by the media, much the
same way the soldier, allowing himself to be killed by Achilles’ spear, is immune to the
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stunning effects of the shield.
Poster, ed., Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings p.208. It is clear that Baudrillard sees
in the mass media another iteration of the bearing of the shield. For him, the media
operate in the realm of simulacra, but present their images against a traditional system of
values.
It is a lack of relationship between the two systems which today plunges
us into a state of stupor. That is what I said: stupor. To be more objective
on would have to say: a radical uncertainty as to our own desire, our own
choice, our own opinion, our own will. (p.209)
Here is exactly the paralysis engendered by the shield, even if Baudrillard is correct in
saying that this is “a completely new species of uncertainty, which results not from a lack
of information but from information itself and even from an excess of information.”
(P-210)
Ibid. p.2I5.
It does seem odd to declare this a form of resistance, but it does, ultimately, put an end
to the manipulative power of the mass media, or to the “all is war” of Achilles’ shield. In
the first case, it renders such manipulation entirely unnecessary, as its aim is already
accomplished. In the second, war will eventually stop if only because there is no one left
to kill. In either case the “success” of this resistance - one dare not call it a “strategy” fot
this implies a deliberate course of action - does not leave the possibility of any action
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Christopher Norris, noting the desperation of this position also notes its central
logical flaw. That is, Baudrillard’s position, while propounding the wholesale rejection
of appeals to truth must simultaneously sustain them:
Baudrillard in effect contrives to have it both ways by playing on these
distinctions - without which he could not even begin to articulate his case
- while rhetorically denying that they possess any kind of operative force.
So long as we do not read too carefully he can thus carry off the
performative trick of conjuring away with one hand those same criteria
(truth, reality, history, etc.) which he then summons up with the other for
purposes of contrastive definition.^’^
If Plato’s position suffers from what can be understood as an overabundance of the real,
Baudrillard suffers from the opposite malady. Baudrillard’s near total effacement of the
real leaves him no grounds upon which to articulate a system of justice. He cannot, if he
is to be consistent, mark any policy as favourable over any other. It does not matter if
one is opposed to the reality of war or not because there is no reality ofwar, and this is so
because there is no reality at all.
Baudrillard’s position may be even more tenuous than this because if he is to
insist on the radical illusion of the world, he must preserve the real that he says is
irretrievably lost. The real is not lost, for it were truly lost, Baudrillard would have
nothing upon which to rest his overwhelming melancholia. Indeed, through Baudrillard’s
work the real is decidedly not lost, but sealed away, cryogenically suspended and
whatsoever beyond its successful implementation. It is a “success” only in the way
Ajax's suicide was a “successful” resolution to his conflict with Odysseus - and Homer
brings even this into question. His portrayal of Ajax as unwilling to speak to Odysseus
when he visits the land of the dead demonstrates the conflict to be perpetually
unresolved, even unresotvable.
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Philosophy p. 1 82.
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permanently inaccessible, yet always locatable in its absence. In denying the real,
Baudrillard must simultaneously confirm it. The confiiTnation through cryogenization of
the real resuscitates the possibility of critical distance in spite of Baudrillard’s effacement
of it. It highlights his failure to follow through on his promise to provide a perspective of
critical distance. Like Perseus, Baudrillard is successful in his decapitation of Medusa.
So too is he successful in recognising the extreme hazard of his prize. But unlike
Perseus, he is not ultimately victorious, as for him there is no overriding locus of
responsibility, nor is there anything beyond the instantaneously transmitted image to
which one could be responsible. There is no Athena to whom he might return the
Gorgon’s head, and the (borrowed) shield.
Perseus, Plato, Baudrillard
Plato’s critique of Homer using mimesis as a critical tool adopts the strategic
approach of Perseus, as does Baudrillard’s hyperreal. Like Perseus, they approach the
offending problem by way of a representation. They attempt to diffuse the offending
power - Medusa’s gaze; Homer’s “thus it is;” the predominance of global capitalism - by
recreating a likeness of it. Like Perseus, They hope to better approach and (en)counter
the threat in this way. The logic of such an approach is that if one cannot resist the gaze
of Medusa, or the overwhelming “thus it is” of the shield, then if one is to resist, it must
be attempted on different grounds. The likeness and the simulation can potentially offer
such grounds.
This strategy is effective, but ambivalently so. First, there is the question of “the
strategy” itself, for indeed there appears to be more than one. Perseus either kills Medusa
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by turning her own gaze back on her, or renders his proximity and deadly aim possible by
recreating an image of her gaze in the mirrored shield, thereby diffusing its power. This
matter is far from settled in the ancient texts. The second strategy (that is the second
inteipretation of Perseus’ strategy) recognizes that the offending power is an effect
overcome by distance. The image in the mirrored shield, just like the mimetic image or
the simulation, acts as a buffer between the threat and the threatened, the claim and the
audience, the sender and the receiver. The buffer provides a kind of distance at which
critical reflection becomes possible. Here is the standpoint of the detached, rational
observer.
The first strategy overcomes the threat by turning its power against itself A good
example of this is Plato's use of mimetic poetry to undo what he sees as the untoward
power of mimetic poets. It is important to note that this turning of the threat, (the claim.
Medusa s gaze), against itself does not nullify its power. Perseus does not so much
eradicate as relocate the power of Medusa's gaze. Neither does Plato nullify the power of
mimetic poetry and image making. Nor does Baudrillard nullify the power of the
simulated non-event by turning the tools of its construction against it.^'^
In either case Perseus’ encounter with Andromeda’s father, (the king of Ethiopia),
and his army clearly demonstrates that the power of Medusa’s gaze remains perfectly
intact, even if her body does not. Perseus’ strategy does not result in victory over
Medusa, or rather over the problem and threat of her gaze, so much as it results in a
postponement of that problem. Indeed, the threat posed by her gaze may even be
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Baudrillard seems to recognise this, especially in his discussion of the Stealth Agency
whose role it is to utilise the mass media to undo the images produced by the mass media.
See Baudrillard. Illusion.
magnified after the death of Medusa who, after all, was quite content to remain hidden
away with her sisters. In the hands of the adventurous Perseus (winged sandals and all)
the gaze becomes much more mobile, less contained. A much larger demographic is now
subject to exposure to its fatal power, as the soldiers of Ethiopia would attest. Plato’s
reliance on the Forms, at least in The Republic, leads him into this same trap.
Baudrillard’s cryogenisation of the real and insistence on the ubiquity of simulacra does
the same in his case. Put in the terms of Perseus’ tale, Plato and Baudrillard alike remain
on the shores of Ethiopia. Their newly acquired power may permit them to defeat all
comers, and to render resistance an exercise in futility, but their quest to rid the world of
just this power remains incomplete.
CHAPTER IV
AFTER ACHILLES
Sing to me of the man. Muse, the man of twists and turns {polytropoi)
Driven time and again off course, once he had plundered
The hallowed heights of Troy.
For you only have to ask yourself carefully, “Why do you not want to
deceive?” especially if it should seem - and it does seem! - as if life
aimed at semblance, meaning error, deception, simulation, delusion, self-
delusion, and when the great sweep of life has actually always shown
itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi}^^
Both Plato and Baudrillard, while extending important promises, do not deliver.
Both end up bearing the shield they hope to resist. Plato's critique begins with his
accusation of Homer as a bearer of the shield. What Plato means by this has already been
detailed. However, it remains to be asked whether or not this is a fair accusation. In
order to provide an answer to this question, the argument must return to the events
following the death of Achilles. Achilles was quite unique as a bearer of the shield. In
the first place, he was half divine. He already straddled the border between humans and
the gods. Second, as has been argued here, he was a suitable bearer of the shield
precisely beeause he had the ability to put it down, to set it aside. His death shows that
not only is the shield hazardous for its audience, but for its bearer as well. It does not
deliver the impenetrability or invulnerability it offers. What is more, its appearance of
invulnerability can diminish the bearer's awareness of his or her own vulnerabilities.
Homer, The Odyssey 1.1-3.
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Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New
York: Vintage Books, 1974) p.282. Hereafter GS.
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After the death of Achilles, his armour, including the shield, becomes the prize in a
contest between heroes. What of the respective characters of those who would vie for its
possession after his death? Keeping in mind the central question of how one can resist
the power of the shield, can anything be learned about what it means to bear the shield
after Achilles?
Warnings Unheeded
The two contestants reaching for this prize were Odysseus and Ajax, son of
Telamon. Achilles had identified both as "my dearest friends in all the Achaean armies,
even in my anger.” (9:238-239)^^^ As such, both had a legitimate claim to the arms. Yet
the two contestants could not have been less alike in character. Ajax, a blood relative of
Achilles, is most like Achilles in his redoubtability on the battlefield and his transparency
in his motivation and purpose. Ajax is self-sure, steadfast, laconic, honest to a fault (even
to his own detriment as when he angers Athena). Odysseus on the other hand is much
more mercurial.^^"* He is a “great tactician” with a profound sense of the mutability of
context, the fluidity of the battlefield, and how those changing circumstances call at
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I am adopting the standard interpretation that these lines are spoken to Ajax and
Odysseus. For a different interpretation, see Gregory Nagy, Homeric Questions (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1996).
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See Sophocles, "Ajax," in Sophocles 2, ed. David Greene and Richard Lattimore, The
Complete Greek Tragedies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
Especially if taken literally, based on the etymology of the term being traceable back
to Mercury, the Roman counterpart of Hermes. Hermes is of course renowned as a
trickster, and Odyssesus, can name him as an ancestor.
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various times for a wide range of sometimes contradictory responses. Odysseus is as
likely to be found charging into the thick of battle as he is to be found leading a
clandestine night raid, or disguised as a beggar in his own house, depending on the
contextual requirements. Where Ajax is known for his “wall-like shield,” Odysseus is
one of the only major characters in the lUad not to be associated with a particular piece of
battle gear. Yet he is portrayed as a master of them all.^"'^ He is renowned for his
“cleverness,” relying as much, if not more, on his wit than his weapons.^^^
Based on the respective characters of these two heroes, what would it mean for
each to win the shield? It should be apparent at this point in the argument that to bear the
shield is a hazardous enterprise, both for its audience and its bearer. The power of the
shield is such that its claim “thus it is” can be utterly enchanting. Its claim is entirely
believable and it is only by virtue of a super-human act of will that Achilles, for whom
the shield was made, is able to break that spell, even if only temporarily."^
Ajax
Given the character traits of Ajax, it is doubtful that he would have been able to
release himself from this spell. Were Ajax to have won the shield, there is little doubt
that it would have been borne into battle, and become instrumental once more in an
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This is not to say that his prowess with a variety of weapons, is not a central aspect of
Odysseus* character. Weapons (the spear, the discus, and especially the bow), remain
important for him. One can imagine the limited success he would have had in
overcoming the suitors with words alone.
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I describe this overcoming of himself as super-human as it requires a remaking of
himself It is at the same time super-divine as this self-remaking (atitopoiesis) is beyond
what even the gods can do.
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unstoppable and irresistible slaughter. There is little doubt that, in the name of piety,
Ajax would have been reduced to a mere animal killing machine, a position he barely
manages to hover above even without the shield.^“ Unable to break free of the “thus it
is” of the shield, (the specific content of which is “all is war”), Ajax would be doomed to
an incessant recreation of the conditions of its veracity.
After the death of Achilles, and perhaps even more so after Odysseus wins it, to
cany' the shield is always already a tainted exercise. Achilles exposes the subtle fraud
perpetrated by the claim of the shield when he reconciles with Priam. Odysseus,
renowned for his craftiness, his ruses and deceptions, wins the right to bear the shield. It
does indeed go to its most fitting successor. It is not that the formerly simple truth claims
made by the shield become inverted in the form of outright lies, rather it is more that the
language used to express such claims becomes less certain in its grasp on the world. It
becomes possible to both deceive and to tell the truth in the same statement. Odysseus,
as is to be expected, provides a very clear example of this when he gives his name
“Udeis” (“nobody”) to the cyclops, Polyphemus. This name that he provides permits his
escape - “nobody is killing me!”- and yet “Udeis” can also mean “hero.” Odysseus
thus truthfully identifies himself as a hero, while at the same time denying his very
presence. This shift is not applicable only to Odysseus, however. An equally telling
example is provided by Ajax.
The pun here is not entirely unintentional, as after losing the shield he does become an
animal killing machine. See Sophocles, "Ajax."
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, ed. Mieke Bal and
Hent de Vries, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford; Stanford University Press,
2002) p.47.
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The example in question is to be found in Sophocles’ Ajax. Having lost the bid
for Achilles arms, Ajax is outraged. He is so slighted that he devises a plan to slaughter
the entire upper echelon of the Achaean army, including Agamemnon and Odysseus. His
plan is thwarted by the intervention of Athena who tricks him into killing the livestock
instead. Having been doubly humiliated, Ajax resolves to kill himself. He says to the
chorus:
But now 1 am going to the bathing place
And meadows by the sea, to cleanse my stains,
In hope the goddess’ wrath may pass from me.
And when I’ve found a place that’s quite deserted.
I’ll dig in the ground, and hide this sword of mine,
Hatefulest of weapons, out of sight. May Darkness
And Hades, God of Death, hold it in their safe keeping.
His words are taken by the chorus to mean that the disgraced hero has set aside his
thoughts of self destruction and their fears for his safety are assuaged. Yet at the same
time, Ajax has described in detail the means by which he intends to kill himself.^^^
There is a kind of slippage between what is said, what is meant, and what is
heard. In book IX of the Iliad, Achilles says to Odysseus “1 hate that man like the very
Gates of Death / who says one thing but hides another in his heart.” (9:378-379) When
Achilles first carries the shield into battle, there is a direct line of communication. There
is no mistaking the message of his “thus it is.” After Achilles reconciles with Priam, and
especially after the death of Achilles, this changes. The “thus it is” no longer
corresponds to what is in any unproblematic way. What is said may or may not reveal
Sophocles, "Ajax," 1.665-60.
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He does find a hidden spot where he buries the hilt of his sword in the ground before
falling on its blade.
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what is meant. Neither is there any clear ground upon which to ensure that the audience
hears what is said or meant. That is, there is no vantage point from which to discern the
difference between what is said and what is “held in [the speaker’s] heart.” The shield in
many ways ceases to be a mirror and becomes recognizable as a tool, a means by which
to obtain some other end.
Neoptolemus
After Odysseus gains possession of the shield, its fate (as an artifact or object)
becomes somewhat unclear. He certainly does not arrive home in Ithaca with it. Given
that all his spoils of war are lost at sea, one could conclude that the shield was lost at sea.
Were this the case it would certainly support the argument that Odysseus's ability to
recognize and respond to the constant change in the world around him makes him a
suitable bearer of the shield. In other words, Odysseus is well aware that the claim “thus
it is” is just another bit of flotsam in a vast sea of change. The loss of the shield at sea
would also dovetail nicely with the image on the outer rim of the shield. All of the
images on the shield are bounded by a depiction of the “great ocean river.” (18:708-709)
Thus the depiction of the world thereon is revealed as an island of stability against a
backdrop of uncertainty and constant change. Its loss at sea is therefore a testament to
the fragility and transience of that stability.
Traditionally however it is thought that Odysseus passed the shield on to
Neoptolemus (a.k.a. Phyrrus), the son of Achilles. Interestingly enough, this also offers
evidence that to bear the shield, to make the claim “thus it is” is not what it seems to be.
Following the story of Sophocles’ Philoctetes, the Achaean army learns that victory over
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Troy can only come once both Neoptolemus and the bow of Heracles (then in the hands
of Philoctetes) reach the battlefield. Odysseus is charged with the task of bringing them
both to Troy. Odysseus had abandoned Philoctetes on the island of Lemnos ten years
earlier after he had been bitten in the foot by a serpent. Alone on the island, suffering in
pain, Philoctetes had fostered a deep hatred of Odysseus. Having already brought
Neoptolemus aboard his ship, Odysseus develops a plan to wrest the bow from
Philoctetes by guile. Neoptolemus is to be the operative party in this deception.
Odysseus encourages the young man to befriend Philoctetes under the pretense that
Neoptolemus too hates Odysseus. There is a telling exchange between the two on this
point that is worth quoting at some length:
Odysseus:! know, young man, it is not your natural bent
To say such things nor to contrive such mischief.
But the prize of victory is pleasant to win.
Bear up: another time we shall prove honest.
For one brief shameless portion of a day
Give me yourself, and then for all the rest
You may be called most scrupulous of men.
Neoptolemus: Son of Laertes, what 1 dislike to hear
1 hate to put into execution.
1 have a natural antipathy
To get my ends by tricks and stratagems
So, too, they say, my father was...
1 would prefer even to fail with honor
Than win by cheating.
Odysseus: You are a good man’s son.
1 was young, too, once, and then 1 had a tongue
Very inactive and a doing hand.
Now as I go forth to see the test, 1 see
That everywhere among the race of men
It is the tongue that wins and not the deed.
Neoptolemus: What would you bid me do but to tell lies?...
Do you not find it vile yourself, this lying?
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Odysseus: Not if the lying brings our rescue with it.
Neoptolemus: How can a man not blush to say such things?
Odysseus: When one does something for gain, one need not blush.^^^
This exchange shows Odysseus instructing Neoptolemus on how to craft a convincing
“thus it is” claim. Odysseus is teaching him what he must do in order to carry his father's
shield. He is telling him how to bear the shield in a figurative sense without falling under
the spell of its particularly potent enchantments. Neoptolemus must learn how to bear the
shield knowing its claim to be a ruse. He must learn to utilise "truth” claims to suit his
own purposes. In the context of the exchange, and as a first test, Neoptolemus must lie to
Philoctetes so that the fighting in Troy can stop. It is important to note that the pretext of
this ruse is that Odysseus has refused to hand over the arms of Achilles to Neoptolemus.
Yet there is some uncertainty as to whether or not Odysseus has actually handed them
over. The position taken here is that Neoptolemus will earn his fathers arms, including
the shield, once he has proven himself worthy ofthem by deceiving Philoctetes.
Neoptolemus proceeds to deceive Philoctetes under the tutelage of Odysseus, who
tells him that tricking Philoctetes will increase his reputation as “a wise man and a good.”
The young man gains the trust of the suffering hero by means of a tale of betrayal at the
hands of Odysseus and the Atridae, Menelaus and Agamemnon:
I his mourning son, wept for him [Achilles];
then, in a while, came to the two Atridae,
my friends, as it seemed right to do, and asked them
for my father’s arms and all he had else.
They needed brazen faces for their answer:
“Son of Achilles, all that your father had,
all else, is yours to take, but not his arms.
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Another man now owns them, Laertes’ son.”^^^
Philoctetes, operating on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” aligns
himself with Neoptolemus. The hero begs the young man to take him off of the island of
Lemnos where he has been stranded, and back to his homeland of Pios. Neoptolemus
agrees, and in so doing places himself in an existential quandary, an aporetic juncture
from which there is no easy path. Prior to looking more closely at the parameters of this
juncture, the conditions under which he enters it should be examined. Specifically, it
should be noted that his agreement to transport Philoctetes away from Lemnos comes
only after an exhortation from the chorus that he do so.
[1] would carry him
in your quick, well-fitted ship
to his home and so avoid offence before the face of god.^^"*
Just as he was motivated to deceive Philoctetes by a promise of glorification by his peers,
so too is he motivated to help him by a sense of shame at being out done by his peers.
1 should be ashamed
to be less ready than you [the chorus] to render a stranger service.^^^
The irony of these lines is that, given that they are a response to an expressed readiness to
offer service, Neoptolemus is already exposed as “less ready than you to render a stranger
service.” The irony of this moment comes into play again as Neoptolemus’ situation
works itself through.
Ibid., 1.360-68.
Ibid., 1.512.
Ibid., 1.524.
127
The critical moment for Neoptolemus comes when Philoctetes, wracked by pain,
goes to sleep while the young man is in possession of the bow of Heracles. As
Philoctetes sleeps, the chorus urges Neoptolemus to abscond with his prize. As
Philoctetes awakens, Neoptolemus says;
Now is the moment, what shall I do from now on?^^^
The next lines from Neoptolemus detail the parameters of his situation:
All is disgust when one leaves his own nature
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And does things that misfit it.
I shall be shown to be dishonorable:
I am afraid of that.^^^
Thus the situation is shown to have existential import. His decision will have
implications for who is to be both now and in the future. He is in a moment that will
redefine his very identity. The second quote shows the paradox to be one of honor.
Neoptolemus is honor bound in two incompatible directions. First, he is bound by the
authority of Odysseus and the princes who sent him. Odysseus, as if aware of the young
man’s impending identity crisis, is careful to remind him “it was to serve you came
here.” The honorable course of action here would be to return to Troy with the bow,
giving no further thought to the plight of Philoctetes. This is what leads Neoptolemus to
refuse to return the bow:
Ibid., 1.894.
Ibid., 1.902.
Ibid., 1.904.
Ibid., 1.7.
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Justice and interest
make me obedient to those in authority.^'^*’
Second, he is bound by his promise to Philoctetes. The honorable course of action here,
on the other hand, is to reject the mission he has been given, to not go to Troy but instead
return Philoctetes to his homeland. Philoctetes’ exhortations are very pointed:
Give it [the bow] back. Be your true self again.^’
And again:
You are not bad yourself; by bad men’s teaching
You came to practice your foul lesson.
Neoptolemus finds these pleas compelling, and Just as he is about to return the
bow, Odysseus arrives. In the ensuing scene, Neoptolemus recedes to the background as
the two rivals for his identity vie with each other. Philoctetes is most forward with his
invective and his accusations of hubris:
Hateful creature,
what things you can invent! You plead the Gods
to screen out your actions and make the Gods out liars.
Uncharacteristically — and yet entirely true to form — Odysseus does not reply to these
accusations.
If I had the time, I have much I could say to him.
As it is, there is only one thing. As the occasion
demands, such a one am I.
Ibid., 1.925.
Ibid., 1.950.
Ibid., 1.971.
Ibid., 1.991.
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When there is a competition of men just and good,
you will find none more scrupulous than myself.
What I seek in everything is to win
except in your regard: I willingly yield to you now.^**^
Odysseus then takes the bow and leaves. Here again there is a tremendous irony.
Odysseus “willingly yields” for more than one reason. First. Odysseus would be hard
pressed to defend himself against Philoctetes' charges. Indeed he has just proven the
hero right in simultaneously claiming the capture of Philoctetes to be his own doing - “I
and no other”^"^^ - and entirely at the behest of Zeus - “I am only his servant.”^'^
Second. Odysseus yields because he knows it is an empty gesture. He has the bow. He is
free to leave. Odysseus has already won. Furthermore, if Philoctetes is to cast an
accusation of hubris towards Odysseus, he is far from clean of it himself. When asked by
the chorus to come to Troy, Philoctetes responds;
Never, never! That is my fixed purpose.
Not though the Lord of the Lightning, bearing his fiery bolts,
come against me. burning me
with flame and glare.
Let Ilium go down and all that under its walls
^^Ibid., 1.1048-52.
Ibid., 1.980.
Ibid., 1.990. This simultaneous acceptance and denial of responsibility is also evident
in the opening lines of the play when Odysseus explains the abandonment of Philoctetes
to Neoptolemus. There. Odysseus says;
I had orders for what I did:
My masters, the princes, bade me do it. (1.7)
The same is also the case when, in the Odyssey, he meets the ghost of Ajax. Odysseus
says to the fallen hero:
For your dpath we grieved as we did for Achilles’ death -
we grieved incessantly, true, and none’s to blame
but Zeus, who hated Achaea’s fighting spearmen
so intensely, Zeus sealed your doom. (1 1 :637-640)
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Had the heart to cast me away, crippled
These are words that Philoctetes will choke on as his departure for Troy is
occasioned not by the greatest of the gods in all his power, but by a mere ghost of a
comparatively minor deity (Heracles). Once Odysseus and Neoptolemus leave
Philoctetes. a second and final exchange of views takes place. Neoptolemus is still tom
as to his next course of action. Having decided to deceive Philoctetes, he has heard the
hero s exhortations as to why he should not continue on that path. Now, in deciding to
undo what he has done, he hears the exhortations of Odysseus. Odysseus had promised a
double prize to Neoptolemus; an increase in his reputation both as a wise man and as a
good man. In this exchange, he takes away both by promising that the hatred and enmity
of the Greeks would come down upon Neoptolemus, and by denying the cleverness of his
actions.
What Neoptolemus fails to realize is that the change in himself that he seeks to
undo is already accomplished. This is implied in a simple question, posed by Odysseus;
Neoptolemus; 1 did wrong when 1 obeyed you and the Greeks.
Odysseus; What did we make you do that was unworthy?
Neoptolemus; 1 practiced craft and treachery with success.
Odysseus; On
This simply query highlights Neoptolemus’ position. In his success in obtaining the bow
from Philoctetes, he has proven himself treacherous and an accomplished liar. In
returning the bow, he does not erase that treachery, but compounds it, for now he has
Ibid., 1.1196-201.
Ibid., 1.1226-29. Emphasis added.
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betrayed the Greeks, too. The best he can do is to deny his own agency in the matter, and
thus maintain a sense of himself as honorable - a good man that has been taught by bad
men.“'*^ Yet in doing this he only renders himself treacherous and deceitful eveti to
himself. A single deception has been multiplied threefold. Neoptolemus remains a
deceiver and a liar, a dissimulator, but unlike Odysseus, not a self-conscious one. The
young man’s ’transparency” masks his duplicity.
The lesson that Odysseus has to teach is not one that Neoptolemus - whose name
translates literally as “new war” - can learn. He becomes like his father prior to the
reconciliation with Priam. Indeed it is Neoptolemus who kills Priam before the altar of
Apollo, along with “scores” of other Trojan defenders.^^° The extent to which he is
enthralled by the claim of the shield is made apparent in Odysseus’s retelling of his
actions while within the Trojan horse. As the soldiers wait for nightfall inside the hollow
belly of the great wooden horse, Helen walks around the outside of it, calling each soldier
by name in the voice each of their wives. Where all others are tempted to the breaking
point by this call from a peaceful life left behind, Neoptolemus alone does not flinch.
Unable to distance himself from the claim of the shield, he is unmoved by a call from a
life that does not exist. If all is war, there is no peaceful life to return to, so that call has
no import to him whatsoever. Furthermore, even after the conclusion of the war in Troy,
Neoptolemus decision to take this course of action would lead him to place all of his
decisions in the hands of the gods, and as such may go a long way in explaining the need
for the deus ex machina at the conclusion of Sophohcles’ play.
250 Many of his deeds are recounted when Odysseus meets Achilles in the kingdom of the
dead. See Homer, The Odyssey 1 1.576-606.
^^'ibid. 4.307-23.
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Neoptolemus continues in his violent ways. He sacks the temple of Apollo at Delphi
when the god refuses to side with him in a dispute. He meets his final end when he is
ritually murdered after refusing to allow the priests of Apollo to take the cattle he has
slaughtered m offering. In short, having taken up his father’s shield, he is unable to put it
down again. Since he cannot - or will not - recognize its portrayal of permanent warfare
as an effect(ive) tool for the furthering of a specific goal, within a specific context, he
becomes locked into the world it creates. He yields his authority to the shield, which then
rules him.
Neoptolemus provides an object lesson in what it means to bear the shield after
the death of Achilles. He bears the shield, but not in the same way his father did. Unlike
Achilles, Neoptolemus takes up the shield, but never puts it down again. In this sense he
provides an abject lesson, for he bears the shield at his own peril. He becomes locked
into his own illusion, unable to maintain any distance from it. He remains convinced of
the correctness and Justice of his own claims, to the point of demonstrating an extreme
level of hubris. His inflexibility in this regard renders conflict with others
unavoidable. Neoptolemus bears the shield both literally and figuratively. He may be
the last to bear it literally, but he is far from the last to do so figuratively. Thus the power
of the shield, which is from the outset based more in its figural than its literal operation.
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This is not to say that the conflicts themselves are unavoidable, and even less to say
that conflict in general is unavoidable. It may be that there is an irreducible possibility of
conflict, but this does not mean that it is inevitable.
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remains undiminished long after the disappearance of the physical object. Hence the
problem posed by the shield, namely the question as to how one can resist its power, also
remains. It is to this question that the argument now turns.
Odysseus: Artfulness Above All Else
It is true that after the death of Achilles, Odysseus wins his armour and the right
to bear the shield. It is also true that he never does bear the shield. It should now be
asked what it means that Odysseus wins the right to bear the shield, but does not bear it.
First, an observation from the tale of Perseus: The victory over Medusa (over the fatal
power of her gaze) is achieved only when Perseus relinquishes the severed head of the
Gorgon over to Athena. Perseus is successful, which in this instance means heroic rather
than tyrannical, when he abdicates the power that has rightfully become his to wield.
By not bearing the shield. Odysseus does much the same thing. He recognizes the shield
as a tool that for him is redundant. It is a bit of technological trickery that can permit a
decidedly “honest” or “truthful” character, like Achilles or Neoptolemus. to accomplish a
stunningly powerful ruse.^^^ Given his innate ability to execute such ruses, such a tool
253 Assummg, for the sake of argument that there ever was a physical object. Indeed the
figural power of the shield is brought into further relief when one considers that it only
ever existed in a notional sense, as a bit of textual fiction.
Perseus’ heroism in this sense is a dual victory both over the power of Medusa's gaze
and the tyranny of Polydectes. It should be noted that this victory is not simply
allegorical as Perseus’ last action before returning his prize is to reveal it to Polydectes,
petrifying him and ending his reign of terror over Perseus’ mother, Danae.
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The terms “honest” and “truthful” are placed in scare quotes here precisely because of
the difficulty Odysseus reveals in their typical usage. See Plato, "Lesser Hippias," in
Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
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would be all but useless in the hands of Odysseus. Better yet to say that it would be
redundant, but dangerously so.
Odysseus recognizes in the shield the extemalization of a power of manipulation
- of what amounts to mimetic poises on a grand scale - that threatens to be
uncontrollable so long as it is externalized. Placed outside of the actor, the
extemalization of the power to create is all too easily surrendered. The presence of the
external creation (the object in a material sense; the shield; the book) renders it all too
easy to abdicate one's powers of creation to the reified creation. Odysseus’ ruses, the
representations and images of himself he puts forward for others remain largely under his
control because they remain within himself This is to say that operating in an oral rather
than literary culture, he can shape and twist his stories of himself at will. Were any of his
tales to be written in stone, or rather in gold, silver, tin and bronze, he would lose that
control. He would become subject to his own creations.^^^ As it is, Odysseus nearly loses
himself in his own artifice, as is seen in his encounter with his aging father, Laertes.
Throughout his travels Odysseus tells many tales about himself, each designed to
both conceal himself and to hasten his homecoming. It is not difficult to see how his
concealment of himself as “Udeis” (Nobody) before Polyphemus is prudent. Likewise,
when he disguises himself as a beggar before the suitors. These fabrications are easy to
explain against the greater backdrop of his desired homecoming. The episode involving
This is not to say that he would necessarily lose all control, nor is it to say that poiesis
in a material sense is ill advised. It is to say that a different kind of control, of masteiy
over one’s self, is required. Odysseus’s self-mastery is one of the few redeeming
qualities Plato recognises in him. It also makes an appearance in Nietzsche’s work,
which will be discussed, below.
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Laertes is intriguing because it strips away much of the backdrop against which
Odysseus' other fabrications of his identity can be seen as legitimate or
justifiable. He
has achieved his goal. His enemies are defeated. He has returned and
reclaimed his
kingdom. It would seem that he has nothing left to fear, no agenda to advance. All the
same he introduces himself to his grieving father under the guise of yet another
false
identity. This scene has been read in a number of different ways, summarized nicely by
Barbara Clayton.^^’ The reading here has a certain affinity with Pratt's commentaiy:
The poem insists that we once more appreciate Odysseus’ ability to invent
and deceive, even though the results are hurtful. In asking us to accept
such a gratuitous falsehood, one that brings temporary but real pain to its
hearer without advancing the plot, the Odyssey seems to favour artfulness
above all else.^^^
However much of an ‘-appreciation” this is. it is also a warning. The emphasis on
‘“artfulness above all else” can indeed be found in the Odyssey and especially in its
eponymous hero. This same “artfulness” is to be found in the operation of the shield of
Achilles. It is with this artfulness that Plato takes issue.
To be sure, Plato does not mistake the threat of “artfulness above all else” but he
does appear to miss the fact that Homer himself recognizes the danger. Plato s treatment
of Homer in The Republic as a “bearer of the shield” tends to flatten out Homer's
perspective, to condense his message into a single, if contradictory, viewpoint. The
warning contained within the encounter between Odysseus and Laertes, and which Plato
misses in The Republic, is that this same “artfulness” can become too much “above all
Clayton, A Penelopean Poetics: Reweaving the Feminine in Homer's Odyssey pp.78-
79.
L. Pratt, quoted in Ibid. p.78n59.
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else.” The creator can too easily be taken in by his or her creation. The hazard then
resides in the artful obfuscation of artfulness itself If art works to conceal art. creativity
to conceal creativity, poiesis to conceal poiesis, then one can fall into a place where the
ethos “there is nothing to be done” can more easily hold command.^^® To fall into such a
state of belief (which will conceal itself under the guise of a state of knowledge) has
disastrous results. The hazard of bearing the shield is that one all too easily becomes
enthralled by its claim to invulnerability. One becomes increasingly less sensitive to
changes in context and one is therefore increasingly less prepared for the inevitable
collapse of that fa9ade. Machiavelli makes a strikingly similar point when he discusses
fortresses in The Prince?^^ The one who bears the shield runs the risk of trusting in its
claim of invulnerability, just as a Prince runs a risk of trusting too much in fortresses to
secure his kingdom in all circumstances.
I would therefore praise the one who erects fortresses and the one who dos
not, and would blame any one who, trusting in them, recks little of being
hated by his people."
The warning resides as much in the cruelty of Odysseus as in the fate ofNeoptolemus,
or even that of Achilles himself
Echoes of the seeming paradox of this position can be found in the existentialist
observation that if you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice. Poiesis
concealing itself does not nullify the power ofpoiesis, but rather confirms it.
The reading deployed here draws on the insights of R.B.J. Walker, who reads the
tradition of Realism against itself See R.B.J. Walker, "The Prince and "the Pauper":
Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the Theory of International Relations," in
International/lntertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, ed. James
Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, Issues in World Politics (New York; Lexington
Books, 1989).
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci, Signet Classic (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 109.
Homer does not so simply provide a readily identifiable “thus it is’ despite Plato s
tt-eatment of him in The Repiiblic^^'^ Once again, it is Odysseus who helps us see this.
Upon his return to Ithaca after numerous forestallings and postponements, Odysseus
weaves a series of stories about himself that have come to be called the
Cretan tales.
These stories are intertwined in that in each of them Odysseus presents himself as being
from Crete. Barbara Clayton offers a telling and detailed account of these tales,
but the
current argument will focus on a few salient points. First, as noted by W. B. Stanford the
ancient world held a stereotypical view of Cretans as liars. Second, each of these tales
is careful to avoid any reference to the more fantastical (and in this sense mythological )
episodes of his travels. Absent are references to cyclopses, monsters, concubinage with
goddesses, mystical conversations with the spirits of the dead. Instead there is reference
to pirates, ill-fated military campaigns, foul weather and general bad luck of an everyday
sort, albeit to a heightened degree. In these ways the Cretan tales are, at least to the
modem reader, more believable than the “real encounters the hero endures in the epic.
Neither, for that matter, does Plato maintain as unshakable a “thus it is” claim in his
later works as he does in The Republic. For example, in the the Lcnvs, imagining a
situation in which tragedians are requesting admittance to the city, the Athenian states:
Most honored guests, we're tragedians ourselves, and our tragedy is the
finest and best we can create. At any rate, our entire state has been
constructed so as to be a “representation” of the finest and noblest life
-
the very thing we maintain is most genuinely a tragedy. So we are poets
like yourselves, composing in the same genre. Plato, "Laws," in Plato.
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hacked Publishing
Company, 1997), 817b.
^
Stanford cites the Cretan poet Epimenides as well as Paul’s letter to Titus 1.12-13
which reads “One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, the Cretans are
always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. This witness it true. Wherefore rebuke them
sharply, that they may be sound in the faith.” W.B. Stanford, The Odyssey oj Hornet
(London: MacMillan, 1959) p.209.
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The sheer believability of these tales (which are self avowed falsehoods) has an
unsettling effect. The Cretan tales can only be deemed falsehoods against the backdrop
of the (far less believable) retelling of Odysseus’ other experiences. The only assurance
we have of the "truth” of these other experiences is the assurance of Homer that the latter
Cretan tales are lies. The illogical trumps the logical, the true/false pairing is inverted, or
rather suspended.
The suspension of the true/false pairing works to profoundly shake the reader's
certainty in the "true identity” of Odysseus. The reader suspects, in other words, that
perhaps the entire epic is a grand and complex Cretan tale. Consider that each of the
episodes retold in the Odyssey revolves around the question "Who is Odysseus?”
Furthermore, each episode provides a different answer, and often more than one. The
epic poses a question that can only be answered by means of the very events, or non-
events as the case may be, that pose the question in the first place. It is quite possible that
given Odysseus’ reputation as a master of deception, it is the Cretan tales of the second
half of the epic, and not the fanciful ("mythological”) ones of the first half that reveal the
bulk of what "really” happened to him. There is simply no standpoint from which to
conclusively tell. With the Cretan tales the reader is faced with Odysseus’s statement "I
hail from Crete’s broad land, I am proud to say.” (13:228) The audience (which includes
the reader) is in effect faced with a known liar making the statement “1 am a liar.” Hence
a paradox. Is Odysseus’ statement true or false? The problem is entirely self-referential,
and therefore perpetually unsettled.
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Given that Odysseus is renowned as a shrewd tactician, a crafty opportunist, and
an accomplished liar it is easy to see how he would garner considerable disdain from the
perspective of the avowedly philosophic Plato. Yet Odysseus is a much more complex
and problematic figure than this simplistic portrayal of him. Plato stiuggles with
this in
the Lesser Hippias. In that dialogue, Socrates questions Hippias's portrayal of Achilles
as the “best and bravest”^^^ as well as the most "truthful and simple”^^^ of the Greeks,
where Odysseus is "wily and a liar.'’^^^ Socrates does not dispute Odysseus' status as a
liar, but argues that because he lies voluntarily, he has the better soul than Achilles who
does so involuntarily. Socrates argues that Odysseus must know the truth if he is to
voluntarily distort it. Achilles on the other hand has a worthless soul as he has no
knowledge about the truth whatsoever, much like the bad runner who runs slowly not
because he chooses to but because he is incapable of doing otherwise. The character
of Odysseus tends to disturb easy categorization as true or false, good or bad. Simple
logocentrisms such as these are revealed as highly inadequate in his case.
The Homeric Question
One consequence of the instability of the identity of Odysseus is a corresponding
instability in any answer to the question “Where does Odysseus stand?’ “What is
Odysseus’ position?” Or even “What does Odysseus mean?” Authors such as Clayton,
Plato, "Lesser Hippias," 364c.
Ibid., 365b.
“’Ibid.
Ibid., 373d.
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Casey, Lampert and Nagy, even Plato himself, have tended to equate Homer and
Odysseus.^^^ Evidence for this conclusion is drawn from the clear favouritism granted
Odysseus by the bard. The connection between the two is not only drawn from this
favouritism, but from their shared polymetic and polytropic qualities.^™ Indeed, the
connection between the two is made by Homer himself when, for example, in Book 1 1 of
the Odyssey, Alcionus clearly identifies Odysseus as a bard;
What grace you give your words, and what good sense within!
You have told your story with all a singer’s skill.
The question of Homer's identity is not a new one. It was vexing even to the ancients.
Yet Plato's dismissal of Homer in The Republic is notably unconcerned with this
Gerard Casey, "The Shield of Achilles," Studies In Comparative Religion 10, no. 2
(1976), Clayton, A Penelopean Poetics: Reweaving the Feminine in Homer's Odyssey,
Laurence Lampert. "Socrates' Defence of Polytropic Odysseus: Lying and Wrong-Doing
in Plato's Lesser Hippias," Review of Politics 64, no. 2 (2002), Nagy, Homeric Questions.
™
Lampert is most forward about this:
Plato's Lesser Hippias suggests that insight into the imperial project on
behalf of philosophy can be aided by indefatigably questioning Homer and
reflecting on who is the better man in Homer, straight Achilles or
polytropic Odysseus. Because Odysseus is better, because Odysseus's
polytropism makes possible the fall of Ilium and his own homecoming, an
inference suggests itself about Homer: the great success of the educator of
Hellas derives from his own capacity and knowledge, his wise "injustice"
and "wrong-doing" able to create the gods and heroes imitation of whom
helped forge the singular Hellenic people. Homer's greatness peaks in his
polytropic capacity to create the shared horizon of heroic contest and
surpassing within which Greek achievement rose to unparalleled heights.
The best man in Homer is Homer.
Lampert, "Socrates' Defence of Polytropic Odysseus: Lying and Wrong-Doing in
Plato's Lesser Hippias."
Homer, The Odyssey 1 1.416-17.
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question. Plato is dismissive of Homer because Homer is logically inconsistent.
According to Plato, at least as his arguments play out in The Republic, the messages of
the works attributed to Homer do not coincide with that which reason tells us must be
true. Plato's dismissal of Homer is based on the premise that the Socratic, dialectical
logic Plato himself champions always already applied. Homer is thus open to criticism
and dismissal because he has failed to meet the stringent demands of this logic. Plato can
therefore say that the content of Homer s "thus it is is flawed. It does not even come
across as a possibility that Homer might be doing something other than making a thus it
is" claim.
This latter possibility is taken up in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. In his 1869
Inaugural Address at Basle University, Nietzsche takes up the Homeric question
explicitly. The gist of Nietzsche's approach is that Homer cannot be unproblematically
identified as a person to whom one might ascribe a certain and fathomable standpoint.
Nietzsche sees Homer as problematic not because his contradictions indicate an
untenable standpoint — a fatally flawed "thus it is
’
— but because his contradictions render
it exceedingly difficult, and perhaps impossible, to attribute any standpoint to him, once
andfor all. The Homeric question indicates a problem with the making of "thus it is
claims.
James I. Porter, "Nietzsche, Homer, and the Classical Tradition," in Nietzsche and
Antiquity: His Reaction and Response to the Classical Tradition, ed. Paul Bishop
(Rochester; Camden House, 2004), pp.10-1 1.
142
Nietzsche traces the history of the Homeric question back through Friedrich A.
Wolf to the “Alexandrian Grammarians” who “conceived the Iliad and the Odyssey as
the creations of one single Homer,”^’'^ then to Aristotle who “considered Homer as the
author of the original of all comic epics, the Margites."^^^
If we go still further backwards from Aristotle, the inability to create a
personality is seen to increase; more and more poems are attributed to
Homer; and every period lets us see its degree of criticism by how much
and what it considers as Homeric. In this backward examination, we
instinctively feel that away beyond Herodotus there lies a period in which
an immense flood of great epics has been identified with the name of
Homer.
Based on this early and rudimentary genealogy, and given the centralizing force
within the conglomeration of Greek identity exerted by Homer, Nietzsche raises the
question "Was the person created out ofa conception, or the conception out ofa person?
This IS the real ‘Homeric question," the central problem of the personality.” This
problem cannot be easily resolved “from the standpoint of the poems themselves which
Wolf argued that the Homeric epics were the end result of a long oral tradition of
composition and compilation. See F. A. Wolf et al.. Prolegomena to Homer (1795)
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, "Homer and Classical Philology," in On the Future of
Our Educational Institutions, ed. Oscar Levy (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,
1924),p.l52.
Ibid., p. 155.
Ibid.
Ibid. Nietzsche's choice of words indicates that the “Homeric question” is a problem
of “the personality” in general, not just that of the bard.
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have come down to Nietzsche says that it “costs us some trouble to obtain a clear
impression of that wonderful problem which, like a coin long passed from hand
to hand,
has lost its original and highly conspicuous stamp.”^’^^ The wide
diffusion (and
dissolution) of the available evidence and the absence of any unimpeachable
vantage
point from which to sift through it leads Nietzsche to say that “Homer as the composer of
^^280
the lUad and the Odyssey is not a historical tradition, but an aesthetic judgment.”
It is not that Nietzsche sees Homer alone as an aesthetic judgment but, as is
detailed in much of his later work, he sees all of existence, life itsef this way. Nietzsche
does see in Homer an emphasis on “artfulness above all else, but rather than
rejecting
this as somehow removed from the truth, he celebrates it. For Nietzsche
[one] feels ashamed and fearful before the Greeks; unless one respects
truth in all things and so also dares to admit to oneself that the Greeks as
charioteers hold the reins of our and every other culture in their hands, but
that almost always the chariot and horses are too slight and frail to live up
to the glory of their drivers, who then consider it a jest to spur such a team
into the abyss: while they themselves jump to safety with a leap of
Achilles.^^'
There is no question that the Greek ways of understanding the world have had a profound
impact on the development of all subsequent cultures. “Almost every period and stage of
cultural development has at one time or another with profound moroseness sought to free
2"«Ibid.
Ibid., p. 156.
^“ibid., p.l63.
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford;
Oxford University Press, 2000) 81. Hereafter BT.
itself from the Greeks.”^^^ In Plato’s case, this would seem to apply to the Greeks
themselves. The Socratic dialectics he champions as a reaction to the influence of the
“imitative poets” is such an attempt, albeit a tremendously powerful one. It has already
been shown that that Plato works to uncover all that is hidden, to know all that is to be
known, to contemplate the Good. For in his framework, “knowledge is virtue.” This has
come over time to be intimately linked with the project of the Enlightenment and in the
influential work of the likes of Kant, Hegel and Marx, not to mention its centrality in the
development of the tools of scientific inquiry. It is not difficult to see how many
“advances” have been made possible by the operation of this framework and the ever
expanding spheres of knowledge it makes possible. This is the logic of the shield and its
claim “thus it is” which must presuppose the fathomability of life in order to present its
depths. But Nietzsche sees a problem.
By attacking the poets in The Republic, Plato is reacting to what he sees as the ill
effects of “artfulness above all else.” His dialectical methods are intended to dispel the
representation, to uncover that which is behind them. However, in the quest for perfect
knowledge, there comes a point where
science, spurred on by its powerful delusion, hurtles inexorably towards its
limits where the optimism hidden in the essence of logic founders. For the
periphery of the circle of science has an infinite number of points and
while there is no telling yet how the circle could ever be fully surveyed,
the noble and gifted man, before he has reached the middle of his life, still
inevitably encounters such peripheral limit points and finds himself staring
into an impenetrable darkness. If he at that moment sees to his horror how
in these limits logic coils around itself and finally bites its own tail - then
this new form of knowledge breaks through, tragic knowledge,, which in
283
order to be tolerated, needs art as a protection and remedy.
Ibid, pp.80-81.
Ibid. p.84.
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What Nietzsche points out is that the iinfathomability of art, its illusion
and mystery, are
required, even by science that self-avowedly seeks to dispel such
things. The whole of
human cultural development, he tells us, is best understood not as a
dialectical operation
in which a thesis and its antithesis are both overcome in a linearly
progressive synthesis,
but in tenns of the interminable tensions between what he
calls the Apollonian and
Dionysian drives.
Apollo, god of the sun and of reason, is "the apotheosis of the
principium
. • 11284
individuatioms" and its central imperatives “know thyself' and "nothing in
excess.
He is the god of dreams.
He shows us with sublime gestures how the whole world of tonuent is
necessary in order to force the individual to produce the vision and then to
sit in calm contemplation of it as his small boat is tossed by the
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surrounding sea.
His counterpart is Dionysus, the god of intoxication. Where Apollo
demands
moderation, Dionysus is celebrated in the excess. Apollo s linearity, his orderliness,
is
met with the unrestrained exuberance and cyclical nature of the god whose
ritualistic
^Ibid. p.31.
Ibid. It is not surprising then to find a representation of the sun at the centre
of the
shield of Achilles. Extrapolating, Nietzsche is arguing here that the entirety of the
edifice
in all its order and aesthetic magnificence is Apollonian, at least up to the outer
rim
which depicts the Ocean River surrounding all. One can easily see the shield itself as
this
“small boat tossed by the surrounding sea.” This image also lends weight to
the
significance of the sea in the tale of Odysseus. The Iliad is a land based epic. Landmarks
are readily available. The lines of conflict are clear. It is a world that can quite
readily
sustain the “thus it is” claim of the shield. The Odyssey, on the other hand, is
ocean
based. There is a conspicuous absence of landmarks, and safe harbours are few and
far
between. It does not describe a world where the simple “thus it is” of the shield
can
maintain itself as unquestionable.
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celebrations end in his being tom asunder by its celebrants before he is reborn again. The
principiiim individuationis is met with the complete loss of the self, in the becoming
animal of the Dionysian celebration. Dionysus embraces both the torment and joy of life.
In the words of his companion Silenus, Dionysus teaches us that “the very best of all
things is completely beyond your reach: not to have been bom, not to be, to be nothing.
But the second best thing for you is - to meet an early death. In the face of this
terrible knowledge, Apollo weaves his veil of dreams, that which makes life tolerable.
Apollo and Dionysus are above all not opposites. Rather they rely on each other. To
favor one over the other in a logocentric pairing is to invite disaster. This is the error of
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Socrates, the anti-Dionysian.
In framing not only art, but also life itself as developing through “the duality of
the Apollonian and the Dionysian” Nietzsche is subtly reminding his reader that all of
the products of this developmental dynamic are to be held suspect. Apollo and Dionysus
alike are closely associated with musical instruments, the lyre and the pipes, respectively.
Yet both of these instruments are inventions of Hermes, the trickster, ancestor of
Ibid. p.27.
In the Symposium, Alcibiades says “Socrates will drink whatever you put in front of
him, but no one has yet seen him drunk.” He is apparently immune to intoxication as he
is to fear or bloodlust in battle. It is notable that in the same breath as he establishes
Socrates as “anti-Dionysian,” Alcibiades also compares him to Silenus, and calls him
“quite a flute player” - the flute being the instrument most closely associated with
Dionysus. What appears to be happening here is that Socates is supplanting Dionysus,
just as he supplants Achilles in the Apology. See Plato, "Symposium," in Plato:
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1997).;Plato, "Apology."
Nietzsche, Bt p.l9.
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Odysseus.^®^ Hermes was the messenger of the gods who swore upon being granted this
office by his father Zeus to “never tell lies, though I cannot promise always to tell the
whole truth.”^^ Thus in both the ordered representations of the Apollonian dream and
the frenzied chaos of the Dionysian intoxication there is an element of polytropism, of
craftiness and deceit, of trickery. Both the principium incHviduatioms and its dissolution
are something less than the “whole truths" they appear to be. Both Apollo and Dionysus,
as Nietzsche makes abundantly clear, require the other in a constant making and
unmaking of claims to show the world “as it is. The error of the anti-Dionysian
Socrates, as Nietzsche sees it, is that he has bought fully into what can only be, at best, a
partial truth. Socrates, as portrayed by Nietzsche, has rescinded his ability to see this
partial truth exposed in its partiality. What is worse is that through the writings of Plato,
he has worked to make his rescission universal. This is why the question “what is
Dionysian?" is so important for Nietzsche.
Nietzsche's emphasis on aesthetics reorients the framework employed by Plato.
Where Plato judges Homer severely against the backdrop of dialectical logic and the
transcendent Forms, in short against an ontological screen of Being, Nietzsche can say
that Plato, under the tutelage of the anti-Dionysian Socrates,
Hermes was the father of Autolycus, whose daughter was Anticlea, wife of Laertes
and mother of Odysseus.
Graves, The Greek Myths p.65. The connection between the three gods is drawn
closer when one takes into account that Hermes and Apollo were both associated with the
art of divinatiop, and that Hermes was the god of shepherds before that role was
increasingly taken by Dionysus. Graves notes that “the Apollonian priesthood constantly
trespassed on the territory of Hermes, an earlier patron of soothsaying, literature, and the
arts; as did the Hermetic priesthood on that of Pan.” (p.67) Pan is yet another god closely
associated with Dionysus.
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was obliged by full artistic necessity to create an art-form essentially
related to the existing art-forms which he had rejected. The main reproach
which Plato addressed to the older art - that it is the imitation of an
apparent image, and so belongs to an even lower sphere [of knowledge]
than the empirical world - certainly could not be directed against the new
work of art: and so we see Plato’s efforts to go beyond reality and to
represent the idea which lies at the basis of that pseudo-reality. But in this
way Plato the thinker arrived by a circuitous route at the place which had
always been his home as an artist.^^’
This can be understood as a criticism of Plato if one abides by Plato’s terms, but within
Nietzsche’s framework this is high praise indeed. It elevates Plato above the status of
“philosophical labourers after the noble exemplar of Kant and Hegel” to that of an “actual
philosopher.”
Actual philosophers...are commanders and law givers: they say “thus it
shall be!”, it is they who determine the Wherefore and the Whither of
mankind... they reach for the future with creative hand, and everything
that is or has been becomes for them a means, an instrument, a hammer.
Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is law giving, their will to truth
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is - will to power.
Platonic thought is thus both a scourge and a blessing. It is a scourge in so far as it has
become utterly convincing and therefore (apparently) unchallengeable, leading to a
stagnation in human self-overcoming. In this guise it is hostile to life itself, which is
overcoming. But it is also a blessing in that it forms a solid backdrop against which the
“new philosopher” emerges, against which Nietzsche emerges.
Nietzsche, Bt p.77.
Nietzsche, Bge p.21 1.
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Nietzsche’s Language
Language is Nietzsche's bugbear. In it he sees the embodiment and perpetuation
of “a tremendous error.”^^^ “Belief \n... identical facts and in isolated facts — has in
language its constant evangelist and advocate. Language, as with the perception of
the historical philosopher, is situated within a specific history from which it draws its
meaning. The specific history of the European languages is the same history of
metaphysical thought already addressed.^^^ The words of the European languages are
thus steeped in presumptions of Being.
To the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and
names of things as in ceternae veritates he has appropriated to himself that
pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that
in language he possessed knowledge of the world. The sculptor of
language was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things
designations, he conceived rather that with the words he was expressing
supreme knowledge of things.
Nietzsche sees a direct tension between the world and the word. Names presuppose
fixity, self-identity. As such they deny the constant flux of becoming. “The word killeth,
’yQ’l
everything fixed killeth."
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.l6. Hereafter HATH.
Ibid. p.306. See also Nietzsche, Bge p.50.
Here again is the difficulty of language in the use of the word “same.” This word
itself carries all the presuppositions of Being Nietzsche attempts to move beyond. See
Nietzsche, Hath p.22.
^^^Ibid. p.l6.
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols; and, the Anti-Christ, trans. R. J-
Hollingdale, Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) p.l56. Hereafter TI/AC.
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Change, mutation, becoming in general were formerly taken as proof of
appearance, as the sign of something which led us astray. Today, on the
contrary, we see ourselves as it were entangled in error, necessitated to
error, to precisely the extent that our prejudice in favor of reason compels
us to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being;
however sure we may be, on the basis of a strict reckoning, that error is to
be found here. The situation is the same as with the motions of the sun: in
that case error has our eyes, in the present case our language as a perpetual
advocate [. .
.] I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe
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m grammar...
Words in themselves presuppose the kind of self-identity of concepts Nietzsche
rejects. To speak of life, of becoming, is to fix it as a concept. In doing so, one
simultaneously denies it. The goal of the metaphysician is to uncover Being at which
time no further questions or answers are necessary. The aim of the metaphysician then is
to have done once and for all with the need to communicate. This may be related to the
conceit of the metaphysician that in uncovering Being, he also uncovers the proper means
for living in accord with it.^^^
Nietzsche is a metaphysician of sorts. But of what sorts? It seems contradictory
to say he is a metaphysician when he describes himself as a “godless antimetaphysician.”
The key to this apparent contradiction lies in the etymological origins of the word.
“Metaphysics” is derived from the philosophical works of Aristotle. It literally translates
as “the (works) after the physical (works)” and is a reference to those works of Aristotle
Ibid. p.48. There is an implication in this passage that the necessity of which
Nietzsche speaks can be avoided, but doing so requires an elimination of “our prejudice
in favor of reason.” It is a questioning ofjust that prejudice that serves as a backdrop for
the argument of this dissertation.
Some of the implications of this belief are to be found in Nietzsche, Hath p.216., and
Nietzsche, Bge pp.21-23.
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which follow his text entitled Physics?^ Etymologically the word is made up of two
components; the prefix meaning after, behind, or beyond, and yhysika" or the
physical. From this it has been traditionally employed as “beyond-”or “behind- the
physical.” It is this notion of metaphysics with its quest for categorical knowledge,
transcendental truths and eternal verities that Nietzsche has in mind when he describes
himself as “anti-metaphysician."
However, the etymological roots of the term contain an ambiguity, which justifies
the claim that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of sorts."’®’ The prefix “meta-” while
meaning after, behind, beyond, can also be used to denote transformation, as in
"metamorphosis.” There is thus a possible literal translation of "metaphysics” as "the
transformation of the physical.” Furthermore yhysika" meaning the body, is also the
root of “physician” (doctor) and “physic” (prescribed remedy, cathartic). The implication
here is that Nietzsche as meta-physician prescribes the embracing and celebration of
change as a treatment for the sickness of traditional metaphysics. This variation on the
traditional word emphasizes both Nietzsche's departure from that which precedes him
’®® See http://www.m-w.com/. Interestingly, the positional inference of this literal
translation meshes quite nicely with the insistence on contextualisation inherent to
Nietzsche’s “historical philosophy.”
The ambiguity is one Nietzsche as a philologist is no doubt aware. “Philology is to be
understood here in a very wide sense as the art of reading well - of being able to read off
a fact without falsifying it by interpretation, without losing caution, patience, subtlety m
the desire for understanding. Philology as ephexis in interpretation.” Nietzsche, Ti/Ac
pp. 18
1
-82 .
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and his proximity to it. In calling Nietzsche a meta-physician his work is placed within,
or rather beyond, and built upon a specific avenue of philosophical inquiry.
The aim of the meta-physician is to somehow come to terms with becoming,
knowing the impossibility of this task. Nietzsche implies that question marks and
“perhapses” are unending.^*^^ As a philologist, Nietzsche is well aware of the change in
the usage of words over time. Thus even if a spoken word can never capture becoming,
perhaps the speaking and re-speaking of a word over long periods of time can offer
insight into becoming.
It is good to repeat oneself and thus bestow on a thing a right and a left
foot. Truth may be able to stand on one leg; but with two it can walk and
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get around.
This last aphorism is key, and even more so when read in conjunction with one
almost immediately preceding it:
Thought in poetiy. - The poet conducts his thoughts along festively, in the
carriage of rhythm: usually because they are incapable of walking on
foot.'°5
This implies that the poet is capable of doing something the metaphysician can not. The
poet can name without fixing the named as a concept in the same way. For Nietzsche,
In so far as he goes beyond the tradition of metaphysics, he may be called a
wc/ometaphysician. To avoid excessive awkwardness 1 will continue with the use of the
term “meta-physician" to encapsulate both this and his widespread usage of the
medicalised analogy.
Nietzsche, Bge p.32.
Nietzsche, Hath p.307.
Ibid. p.93.
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naming is clearly an art. Any act of naming is also, in so
far as it is an inscription of the
speaker onto the world, an artistic expression:
Even when we are involved in the most unconmion experiences
we still do
the same thing: we fabricate the greater part of
the experience and can
hardly be compelled not to contemplate some event as its
‘inventor.’ All
this means: we are from the very heart and from the
very first
accustomed to lying. Or, to express it more virtuously and
hypocritically,
in short more pleasantly: one is much more of an artist than
one
realises.
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As with all artists, metaphysicians and meta-physicians alike
are dreamers.
The differences between them are subtle, but Nietzsche has forewarned
the reader of his
subtlety. He says of himself: “I suddenly woke up in the midst of this dream, but
only
to the consciousness that I am dreaming and that I must go on dreaming
lest 1 perish - as
a somnambulist must go on dreaming lest he fall."^'’^ The difference is
that the meta-
physician is aware of his own dreaming. He becomes a “somnambulist of the day.
The names this artist/philosopher/somnambulist gives emerge from his dream.
To start from the dream: on to a certain sensation, the result for example
of a distant cannon-shot, a cause is subsequently foisted (often a whole
little novel in which precisely the dreamer is the chief character). The
Nietzsche, Bge p. 1 1 5.
Nietzsche has already referred to metaphysical thought as “dream thinking.
Nietzsche, Hath p.l8.
Nietzsche, Bge p.59.
Nietzsche, Gs p.l 16.
^^“ibid. p.l 23.
Nietzsche takes the sceptical position found in Descartes as a necessary and
irreducible starting point. See Nietzsche, Ti/Ac p. 1 84.
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sensation, meanwhile continues to persist, as a kind of resonance: it waits,
as it were, until the cause-creating drive permits it to step into the
312
foreground - now no longer as a chance occurrence but as ‘meaning.’
If this is the process by which words acquire meaning, then all words are
inherently deceptions. Given that the metaphysician and the meta-physician alike deal in
deceptions, how can the standards of life affirming and life denying be decided? How
can Nietzsche give preference to one over the other?
The meta-physician, who speaks in terms of “life affirming’’ and “life denying”
instead of “true” and “false”, perpetuates an error in speaking at all. Even called
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“becoming” or “will to power” life is rendered a “thing”, (“and there is no ‘thing’”).
The metaphysician however commits a double error. Not only does he render life a
“thing”, but also he convinces himself of its thing-ness. He has convinced himself that
the claim he makes, his “this it is, ” refers to something outside of himself. Furthermore,
he has convinced himself that it is something to which he (and everybody else) is
beholden.
A metaphysician’s ambition to maintain a forlorn position, may actually
play a part and [he may] finally prefer a handful of ‘certainty’ to a whole
cartful of beautiful possibilities; there may even exist puritanical fanatics
of conscience who would rather lie down and die on a sure nothing than
on an uncertain something. But this is nihilism and the sign of a
despairing, mortally weary soul, however brave the bearing of such a
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Virtue may appear.
Ibid. p.l28.
Nietzsche, Hath p.22.
Nietzsche, Bge p.40.
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Although Nietzsche continually attacks morality, he
produces one himself. This
is indicated in his reproval of those who would -deny
life.” Yet Nietzsche's moral
language (his -immorality” to use his words) is structurally
different than those he
understands it to be supplanting. Nietzsche's (im)morality
must be pronounced a thing”,
but - here is the crucial difference - not a thing,
so that ftirther steps beyond it may be
taken. It must however be taken very seriously if it is to
solidify into useful material
from which the future may be built. For this to happen, its
originator must be convinced
of its truthfulness. The meta-physician thus plays the -the
dangerous game”'*' of having
to believe in the truth of his convictions while at the same
time having to be able to free
himself from both truth and conviction.
The special contribution of Nietzsche’s morality, his response to the
life-affirming
meta-physical challenge, is that his moral formula does not privilege a
specific content.
Rather it presents a privileged method. “The most valuable insights are
the last to be
discovered; but the most valuable insights are methods.”^'^ “Methods, one
must repeat
ten times, are the essential, as well as being the most difficult, as well as
being that which
Ibid. pp. 132-33.
Nietzsche, Ti/Ac p.l35.
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has habit and laziness against it longest.”^’’ This method, which places an emphasis on
artfulness above all else, is strikingly Odyssean.
Ibid. p.l94.
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CHAPTER V
EKPHRASIS AS CRITIQUE
Nietzsche blurs the divisions between reality and imagination,
between the
natural and the constructed, and allows for the broad scope of life to
be understood as
poetic. His emphasis on the centrality of the grammarians with their insistence
on the
hard and fast rules of language is important in that it reveals the
literary nature of
experience. Nietzsche leads his reader to the point where claims like the one
made by
Franz Bauml are possible:
I do contend that the tools with which one thinks affect one’s thinking,
that the way in which one thinks has its social consequences, and that
therefore control of the tools of thought is of the utmost importance for
the maintenance ot power.
But this is nothing new. It is from these same grounds that Plato launches his assault on
the poets.^'^ His use of mimesis as a critical tool adopts the strategy of Perseus as has
already been said. Foremost among the shortcomings of this strategy is that it tends to
leave the structural operation of the shield intact. Just as the decapitation of Medusa
does nothing to diminish the power of her gaze, so too does Plato s thus it really is do
Franz H. Bauml, "Writing the Emperor's Clothes On: Literacy and the Production of
Facts," in Written Voices, Spokensigns: Tradition, Performance and the Epic Text, ed.
Egbert Bakker and Ahuvia Kahane (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p.37.
This same sentiment is to be found in the work of George Lakoff. See Lakoff, Moral
Politics, Lakoff, Simple Framing: An Introduction to Framing and Its Use in Politics
([cited), Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By.
Plato too is Odyssean (Homeric) in his artistry, although he works to conceal that
artistry in The Republic. Nietzsche helps to expose that which is concealed.
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nothing to counter the structural power of the shield’s “thus it is.” Likewise
Baudrillard's “thus it is,” even if expressed as “thus it isn’t,” leaves the problematic
structure of a totalizing cosmos/ethos pairing intact. Mimesis, even if it is the mimesis
of mimesis, remains mimesis and preserves the natural or ontological status of that
which it purports to represent. It thus remains blind to the irreducibility of change. It
keeps in place, and relies on “the natural sign.” The argument thus far has that no
longer can mimesis be deployed as a means to evaluate claims against a fixed and
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fathomable backdrop of the Good, or the real, or, after Nietzsche, of Truth.
So where does this leave us? The problem is not only the totalising and
paralysing cosmological and ethical claim of the shield, which leaves its audience and
its speaker alike paralysed, devoid of responsibility (response-ability), but also its oft-
unintentional perpetuation. This is not a purely abstract problem, reserved for theorists
and philosophers. It shows up in multiple forms, including the branding of dissent
against the War on Terror as unpatriotic. It appears in the spate of suicide bombings
and the targeting of civilians by extremist groups of all stripes. “This is how it really
is,” we are told. “There is nothing to do but see the war through to its end,” we are told.
And the flood of messages to this effect sinks in. The messages become believable.
And so the war goes on and on. In the mathematics of such thinking, 138 becomes
The term is taken from Murray Krieger, and will be discussed in some detail below.
See Murray Krieger, Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign (Baltimore and
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
The capitalisation here is intended to indicate its transcendent status as something
beyond the reach of both spatial and temporal contextualization.
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2000 becomes 10,000.^^^ So the question remains: how does one
resist the power of the
shield?
From Perseus to Paris
Perseus defeats Medusa by means of a mimetic approach. He uses
the reflective
surface of Athena's shield to distance himself from the Gorgon
s gaze. His victory is
completed - it congeals as a victory - in the abdication of his
new power. Medusa’s
gaze. Recognizing its power as too great to be wielded by a mortal,
he relinquishes it to
Athena for safekeeping. But Nietzsche has told us "God is dead!”
Not only is
Perseus' abdication of this power a truly heroic act, beyond the horizon
of ordinary
human beings, but there remains no divine locus of responsibility to which
such a
power might be abdicated. There is an irony then in the observation that it is
exactly
those groups who insist on the presence of such a divine centre, be they "Christian,” or
“Muslim,” or “Jewish,” who are the most incapable of relinquishing this power. The
scare quotes are self-consciously employed, as there is some question as to
the
theological credentials of some of the groups currently bearing the shield. President
Bush spoke of al Qaeda as promoting a form of Islam so distorted that it can hardly be
called Islamic.^^"^ Yet the same kinds of arguments can be applied to President Bush s
These numbers being in reference to the total American war dead in Iraq. 138 prior
to President Bush’s declaration of victory and a cessation of major combat operations,
2000 at the time of this writing some two and a half years later. The figures say nothing
of the tens of thousands of Iraqi citizens killed.
Nietzsche, Zarathustra p.l2.
For a similar assessment, see Barry Cooper, "Why the Koran Matters in
Understanding Jihadist Terrorists" (paper presented at the Terrorism, Democracy and
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own form of Christianity. Heroism, as exemplified in the actions of Achilles, Odysseus,
and Perseus involves a setting aside of the shield. It is ironic that those contemporary
groups most prone to cloak themselves in the garb of heroism are often the most
pronounced bearers of the shield. Clearly another tactical approach is required.
One can be found in Paris: Paris the archer, son of Priam and Prince of Troy:
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Paris who neither bears the shield nor is paralyzed by it. ' Paris the archer is not
stunned into inaction by the shield precisely because he never directly faces it. As an
archer, his weapon only operates when he stands at the margins of the battle. Following
the clues left by Plato's use of mimetic poetry against itself, by Nietzsche’s linguistic
turn, and by Derrida's deconstructive techniques of reading a text from its margins, it is
advisable that one treat the shield of Achilles as a literary construct, which, obviously, it
is. By extension it is advisable that one treat every instance of the bearing of the shield
as a literary construct, subject to textual criticism. For it is literary criticism that offers
up a tool most useful for the critical theorist faced with an instance of the bearing of the
shield.
Empire, Carleton University, October 1 2005). Cooper makes use of what he calls
“pneumopathology” (soul sickness) to describe the condition in which one justifies
one’s actions based on what one knows to be a lie. At first glance this position may
seem indistinguishable from that of Odysseus, but there are very important differences.
The concept of “pneumopathology” as deployed by Cooper marks a very clear
distinction between the true and the false. As presented, the concept notes “their”
sickness and “our” health. As such, it is radically non-Odyssean for the simple reason
that it ignores the destabilisation of the categories of true and false occasioned by the
character of Odysseus.
But also Paris the home of the Ecole des Haiites Etudes en Science Sociales and
Jacques Derrida, not to mention Paris as the seat of government of the country foremost
among those opposed to the war in Iraq, and hence a symbol of resistance.
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Erich Auerbach makes headway along this road in his use of mimesis as a
comparative tool.^'*" By setting multiple examples of life-like representation side by
side, each quite different from the others. Auerbach calls into question not only the
beliefs or capacities of the audience that accepts these representations, but also that
which is being represented. If it is granted that each instance is life-like and an accurate
and believable representation of the world, then not only is the comparison a comment
on the developing ways of understanding the world, but it is also a comment on the
world itself Wliat kind of a world is this that it can be represented in so many,
sometimes incompatible ways? It is certainly not the kind of a world about which a
simple ’thus it is” statement can be made once and for all. Hence it is not the kind of
world that can easily sustain a simple ethos of “nothing to be done about it.” This is
obviously not to say that such claims are not made, and enforced. Nor is it to say that
such claims cannot be made. It is to say that if they are made (and they are), they
cannot be as unchallengeable as they claim themselves to be. Mimesis can give these
insights, but has difficulty maintaining this perspective unless deployed comparatively
across a number of different cases. But what if only a single case is available? Is there
a way to retain these insights? Indeed there is. This tool is not mimesis, but ekphrasis.
Krieger; The Still Mo(ve)ment of Ekphrasis
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Ekphrasis has an original meaning of “to tell in full.” It has come to refer to
the representation of art in poetry, and its archetypical example is Homer’s description
326 See Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation ofReality in Western Literature.
"yin
Krieger, Ekphrasis: The Illusion ofthe Natural Sign p.7.
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of the shield of Achilles in Book 18 of the Iliad. Although a relatively obscure and
minor genre, ekphrasis has proven remarkably long-lived. In an attempt to unify the
multitude of examples of ekphrasis from Homer and Virgil to Keats and Auden, James
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Heffernan defines ekphrasis as '’"the verbal representation of visual representation"
It is from a slight but important modification of this definition that the argument will
proceed. W.J.T. Mitchell notes, “from the semantic point of view, from the standpoint
of referring, expressing intensions and producing effects in a viewer/listener
[/audience], there is no essential difference between texts and images.” If this is the
case, then from a semantic point of view neither is there a difference between visual and
tactile representation. Following this implication, I propose to expand the definition to
ekphrasis by de-emphasising "visual representation” in favor of "non-verbal
representation.” Hence the definition of ekphrasis is amended to be “the verbal
representation of non-verbal representation.” This would appear to be paradoxical,
since by the logic of Mitchell's argument and its semantic point of view, there is no
non-verbal representation. For the time being this problem will be postponed, but it will
be taken up again in the discussion of the operation and destabilizing effects of
ekphrasis.
Ekphrasis is a powerful disturber of what Murray Krieger calls “the natural-sign
aesthetic. The natural-sign is that in which there is a certain, direct, non-arbitrary
James A. W. Heffernan, Museum of Words : The Poetics of Ekphrasisfrom Homer
to Ashbery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) p.3.
Mitchell, Ekphrasis and the Other ([cited).
Krieger, Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign p.7.
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relationship between the signifier and the signified. The natural-sign is the holy grail of
Nietzsche’s grammarians. It underlies the position of Cratylus in Plato’s dialogue that
bears his name. Krieger argues:
Our semiotic desire for the natural-sign is a reflection of our ontological
yearning: our anxiety to find an order or structure objectively,
"naturally,” "out there” - beyond society as well as ourselves - that
would authorise the signs and forms that our subjectivity projects and
that we then want - nay, require - others to respond to and acknowledge
as being there. It is an anxiety exploited by all holders of power and
bearers of doctrines that they seek to impose through a claim to a natural
authority. This attempted imposition so often succeeds because it meets
and satisfies our semiotic desire for the natural-sign, as it confers the
special privilege of mature upon the conventional - and arbitrary - signs
dictated by various motives, most of them politically suspect.
As should now be obvious, the natural-sign aesthetic underlies the power of the shield.
Its "thus it is” aspires to the status of the natural-sign, and it is in the garb of the natural-
sign that it is presented by its bearer.
Ekphrasis disturbs the natural-sign aesthetic by imposing multiple layers of
representation between the reader/audience and that which is represented. Where
mimesis works both to represent and to conceal itself as a representation - to "tell it like
it is” - ekphrasis constantly reminds the reader/audience of its status as a representation.
What is more, it openly displays itself as a representation of a representation. This
distance from the object being represented, if one can rightly call it that, leads Plato to
the wholesale rejection of poetry - at least on an ostensible level. But if one does not
place this doubly distant representation against the backdrop of a fixed object "out
there” then ironically enough, the ekphrastic representation "corresponds” more closely
Ibid, p.237.
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to a reality which is not representable in its totality (or perhaps at all). The ekphrastic
image is a natural-like-sign of an unrepresentable referent in that it is a reminder of the
contingency and artificiality of the natural-sign.
Ekphrasis leaves us in very much the same situation as does Derrida’s encounter
with a fragment left by Nietzsche:
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“1 have forgotten my umbrella.”
Derrida notes in this short line of text a radical and irreducible inaccessibility. It may or
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may not have “some hidden secret,” and what is more:
To whatever lengths one might carry a conscientious interpretation, the
hypothesis that the totality of Nietzsche’s text, in some monstrous way,
might well be of the type “I have forgotten my umbrella” cannot be
denied.
Which is tantamount to saying that there is no “totality to
. . 334
Nietzsche’s text.” not even a fragmentary or aphoristic one.
This is not to say that because this possibility cannot be denied, that another possibility,
namely that there is “some hidden secref’ must be denied. For that would be an
extreme form of relativism and nihilism. (This is the pitfall that claims Baudrillard.) It
is just that one cannot tell. Both possibilities must remain, hence “the text remains
Nietzsche quoted in Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles / Eperons: Les Styles
De Nietzsche, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1978)
p.l23.
Ibid. p. 125.
Ibid. pp. 133-35.
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closed, at once open and closed, or each in turn, folded/unfolded (ploye/deploye), it is
just an umbrella that you couldn't use {dont votis n 'otiriez pas I’emploi)."^^^
Ekphrasis disturbs the natural-sign, but it does not eradicate it entirely. Rather it
renders explicit the difficulties of making a "thus it is" (hence also a "nothing to be
done") claim.
What we call "nature” thus comes more and more to be
deconstructed into a mirror of our own historically conditioned selves, of
our desires, and of our desire to validate those desires by grounding them
in what we claim to be an objective nature out there. .
.
Once nature is thus relativised, so that it loses its ontological
grounding, it can of course serve no longer as the fixed referent for a
natural sign. And the natural sign, no longer authorised, will be
consigned to the realm of myth and will give way to the
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acknowledgement of the conventional character of all signs.
The disruptive features of ekphrasis are self reflexive as well. Ekphrasis by its very
definition operates on the contested borderlines between "the Sister Arts" of poetry and
plastic media such as painting or sculpture. It disrupts the clean provincialities of
Gothold Lessing who insisted that the proper domain of art is space, while the proper
335
Ibid. p.l37. There is an intriguing connection between Derrida's observation,
(immediately preceding the lines quoted), that "there is dissimulation only if one tells
the truth, only if one tells that one is telling the truth,” and the scene in which Homer
tells of Odysseus’ encounter with Athena upon his return to Ithaca. Notably, it is only
after Athena drops her disguise and reveals herself to Odysseus that the hero doubts her:
you’re mocking me, I know it, telling me tales
to make me lose my way. Tell me the truth now,
have I really reached the land I love? Homer, The (1 3:371-73).
Odysseus is in this way less dubious of the disguise than he is of the truth it supposes to
conceal. For a detailed discussion of this scene, see Clayton, A Penehpean Poetics:
Reweaving the Feminine in Homer's Odyssey.
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Krieger, Ekphrasis: The Illusion ofthe Natural Sign pp.25 1 -52.
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337domain of poetry is time. It even appears to disturb any clear-cut and final
delineation of its own purpose or intent. Krieger has pointed to the ekphrastic principle,
which in the circular form of the poem “must convert the transparency of its verbal
medium into the physical solidity of the medium of the spatial arts.” Thus ekphrasis
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effects a “total mastery of moving life, the capturing of it in a ‘still’ pattern.” But
this is not “still life” as in nature mart. Krieger uses the term “still” in a much different
way:
[He has] freely used it as an adjective, adverb and verb; as still
movement, still moving, and more forcefully, the stilling of movement:
so “still” movement as quiet, unmoving movement; “still” moving as a
forever-now movement, an action that is at once the quieting of
movement and the perpetuation of it, the making of it. like Eliot’s wheel
and Chinese iar, a movement that is still and that is still with us, that is -
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in his words -“forever still.”
Mitchell: Ekphrastic Hope
Krieger’s “stilling” expresses a subtle and difficult feature of ekphrasis, namely
its simultaneous freezing and perpetuation of motion. This point is difficult in that it is
all too easy to ignore the latter half of its function. It is all too easy to read Krieger, as
W.J.T. Mitchell does, as propagating an understanding of ekphrasis that is akin to
Nietzsche’s understanding of the name. Nietzsche held that the name worked to fix,
G.E. Lessing, Loocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetiy, trans.
Edward Allen McCormick (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
Krieger, Ekphrasis: The Illusion ofthe Natural Sign p.266.
Ibid, p.267.
Ibid, p.268.
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and therefore to kill, that which it names. “The word killeth, everything fixed
killeth."^^^ Mitchell is critical of Krieger precisely because Mitchell takes the “stilling”
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of ekphrasis to refer to its “descriptive “arresting of movement.'” In the context of a
discussion of Shelly's poem “On the Medusa of Leonardo DaVinci in the Florentine
Gallery" Mitchell states, “if the poet's ekphrastic hopes were fulfilled, the reader would
be similarly transfixed, unable to read or hear.”^^^
Mitchell sees ekphrasis as having “three phases or moments of realization. The
first might be called "ekphrastic indifference,' and it grows out of a commonsense
perception that ekphrasis is impossible.” This is to say that if ekphrasis is “the verbal
representation of a visual representation” then it can never fully complete its task.
Language, no matter how detailed, cannot bring the visual presence of a visual
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representation before us. Homer's description of the shield of Achilles, for example,
can never make it as present for his audience in the same way it would be present for
those on the battlefield of Troy. In the same way, a news report, however in-depth,
cannot place its audience in the situation being reported on in the same way as actually
Nietzsche, Ti/Ac p.l56.
Mitchell, Ekphrasis and the Other ([cited).
Ibid.([cited).
^
Ibid.([cited).
One may suggest that typographical portraits are an exception. But in these cases it
is more the shading and density of the physical medium of the text that is responsible
for the image rather than the text itself. It serves my point - and Mitchell’s for that
matter - that such portraiture would not have the same effect if read aloud. For
examples of such portrature, see http://ni9e.com/typo_illus.html
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being there. The description in short always remains a description, and not the object
described.
The second phase of ekphrasis, called “ekphrastic hope” by Mitchell, comes
“when the impossibility of ekphrasis is overcome in imagination or metaphor, when we
discover a ‘sense’ in which language can do what so many writers have wanted it to do:
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‘to make us see.’” This phase sees the dissolution of the obscurity of ekphrasis. It
ceases to be something out of the ordinary and “begins to seem paradigmatic of a
fundamental tendency in all linguistic expression.”^^^ The greatest hope of this phase is
that a kind of dialectically synthetic closure will be obtained in the rise of the “verbal
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icon or imagetext.” It is at this stage that Mitchell places Krieger, although wrongly
so, for reasons discussed below.
The third phase closely follows on the second. “This is the moment of
resistance or counterdesire that occurs when we sense that the difference between the
verbal and visual representation might collapse and the figurative, imaginary desire of
ekphrasis might be realized literally and actually.” This is “ekphrastic fear.”
According to Mitchell, ekphrastic fear highlights “the difference between verbal and
visual mediation [as] a moral, aesthetic imperative rather than (as in the first
Mitchell, Ekphrasis and the Other ([cited).
lbid.( [cited).
Ibid.([cited).
Ibid. ([cited).
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•indifferent' phase of ekphrasis) a natural fact that can be relied on."^'^‘’ Mitchell sees
this phase as being quite widespread.
It would be easy to show its place in a wide range of literary theorizing,
from the Marxist hostility to modernist experiments with literary space,
to deconstructionist efforts to overcome “formalism" and “closure," to
the anxieties of Protestant poetics with the temptations of “imagery^ to
the romantic tradition's obsession with a poetics of voice, invisibility,
and blindness. All the goals of •‘ekphrastic hope," of achieving vision,
iconicity, or a “still moment of plastic presence through language
become, from this point of view, sinister and dangerous.
The main aim of ekphrastic fear is to undo the veiled threat of ekphrastic hope. It is to
expose the notion of the imagetext as a “deceitful illusion, a magical technique that
threatens to fixate the poet and the listener."
These three phases centre on ekphrastic hope, which, as has been noted, rests on
a misreading of Krieger's “still moment." This is not to say that Mitchell s architecture
is to be disposed of entirely. He is quite correct to emphasize the destabilizing effects
ekphrasis and its inherent ambiguity. This ambiguity is evident in the very phases of
ekphrasis, even if there is an issue to be taken with Mitchell's nomenclature. It is not
the case that each phase follows as a consequence of another, but rather that each phase
is simultaneous with the others. It is part and parcel of ekphrasis to be impossible,
hopeful and fearful all at once.
Ibid.([cited). Mitchell calls attention to Lessing who argued that poetry and the
plastic arts (painting is his favoured example) should operate in mutually exclusive
spheres rather than allow poetry to “employ the same artistic machinery" as the painter,
thereby “convert[ing] a superior being into a doll." See Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay on
the Limits ofPainting and Poetry.
Mitchell, Ekphrasis and the Other ([cited).
Ibid.([cited).
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The problem is that Mitchell tends to equate Krieger’s ekphrasis with what he
calls ekphrastic hope. In doing this, he runs the risk of glossing over much of its
unsettling operation, its ability to upset, to render the obvious difficult, and to make the
simple problematic. Mitchell is quite right to place such an emphasis on ekphrasis as
resistant to “placement,” not only in regards to its object, but also in its own operation.
That is, ekphrasis disturbs the naive realist notion, the “natural sign aesthetic,” by being
doubly removed from its “object” as a representation of a representation.^^^ At the
same time ekphrasis is self-referentially disruptive. It disturbs its own operation as “a
minor and relatively obscure literary genre” and “paradigmatic of a fundamental
tendency in all linguistic expression.” Simultaneously ekphrasis is “an ornament to
epic,” (following Lessing's description), and epic is an ornament to ekphrasis.
If Lessing could have seen the subsequent development of Homeric
criticism, he would have found his worst fears justified. Not only did
ekphrasis establish itself firmly as a distinct poetic genre, but the great
prototype of Achilles’ shield seems, in the work of modem classical
scholarship imbued with assumptions of formalism, to have established a
kind of dominance over the epic of which it is supposed to be a mere
ornament... Indeed, the shield (and ekphrastic hope along with it) may
have even more grandiose aspiration than this synechdohcial
representation of the whole in the part, for the shield presents much more
of Homer’s world than the Iliad does. The entire universe is depicted on
the shield... the entire action of the lUad becomes a fragment in the
totalizing vision provided by Achilles’ shield.
•5C-3
There is not even a guarantee that this “object” even has an independent existence
outside of its linguistic representation, as the shield of Achilles so readily exemplifies.
Mitchell, Ekphrasis and the Other ([cited).
Ibid. ([cited).
171
Mitchell says “ekphrasis resists ‘placement as an ornamental feature of larger textual
structures, or as a minor genre. It aims to be all of literature in miniature."^*'^ But this
is only partly right. His misreading of Krieger leads him to gloss over the equally
pronounced resistance of ekphrasis to being “all of literature in miniatuie. Krieger s
“still moment” shows that it adopts and resists both roles at once, generating an
irreducible and irresolvable tension.
Becker: Breaking the Illusion
The disruptive power of ekphrasis extends the same promise of critical distance
that could not be followed through by mimesis. It remains to be seen if ekphrasis can
follow through on this promise. One hopeful sign is noted very early on in Andrew
Sprague Becker’s survey of the history of ekphrasis. He notes
a double movement of literary representation in ekphrasis: acceptance of
the illusion proposed by the ekphrasis is accompanied by a
complementary breaking of that illusion. The phrase “breaking the
illusion” carries, here, a rather mild sense; it indicates that a certain self-
consciousness expressed in the description adds another dimension,
perhaps unsettling the illusion, or balancing it, or bracketing it. The
illusion is still in play, but it is held a bit more lightly and with an
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acknowledgement of its irony.
Becker not only delineates that ekphrasis accomplishes this feat, but also
outlines the way in which it is accomplished. He details four levels of representation to
which ekphrasis calls attention. These are:
Res Ipsae - Referent.
Opus Ipsutn - A focus on the physical medium.
Ibid.( [cited).
Becker, The Shield ofAchilles and the Poetics ofEkphrasis p.23.
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Artifex el Ars - a focus on the creator and the creation of the work of art
and their relation to the medium and the referent.
Animadversor- A focus on the effect of or reaction to the work of visual
358
art.
It is through the interplay of these levels of representation that ekphrasis both sustains
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and disrupts the mimetic illusion. It is possible to utilize this “termimstic screen” to
offer a critical perspective on a significant range of political pronouncements, including
the rhetoric coming from the Bush Administration concerning the War on Terror.
However, before reaching that end, the contours of this “terministic screen” should be
more carefully laid out.
The res ipsae or referent is the mimetic level of representation and it is “based
upon the recognition and elaboration of what is depicted by the image.”^^^ Under the
rubric of the res ipsae "the subject matter is often turned into a small story. As a
mimetic representation, there is in this phase an establishment of the object. That which
lies behind any representation is brought to the fore. This phase has three subdivisions;
naming, interpreting and dramatizing. The name fixes the object, interpretation endows
it with meaning, and dramatization sets the object in motion. Working in conjunction,
the three serve to create a mimetic illusion; a presentation of (the image of) the object
Ibid, pp.42-43.
Becker quotes Kenneth Burke as saying “Pick some particular nomenclature, some
one terministic screen... that you may proceed to track down the kinds of observation
implicit in the terminology you have chosen... [A] given terminology coaches us to look
for certain kinds of things rather than others... Some terminologies contain much richer
modes of observation than others.” Ibid. p.43n79.
Ibid. p.42.
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before the mind's eye. The phrase “the image of’ is bracketed here because although
all that is presented is an image, part of the power of that image is to conceal itself as an
image. Hence “the surface of the work becomes a transparent window to the scene
evoked therein."^*"^ Thus in the Iliad the res ipsae is discernable in Homer's tendency
to “forget that he is representing graphic art; he suppresses all reference to metal as he
tells the gruesome story of the lions and the ox.”^^^ The hazards of this “forgetting,” if
left unchecked, have already been discussed in the terms of the tendency of mimesis to
conceal itself and thus to perpetuate the bearing of the shield.
Fortunately, ekphrasis builds into itself several checks on this “forgetting.” One
of these is the opus ipsiini. Here the focus is not the perpetuation of an illusion through
its dramatization. Instead there is an emphasis on the physical medium, “the surface
appearance.” If the res ipsae offers a view of the referent through “a transparent
window,” then opus ipsum draws attention to the glass. “Attention is paid to color,
shape, texture, arrangement, size, and, at times, material. In its interaction with res
ipsae, opus ipsum can be somewhat jarring. For example:
And the earth churned black behind them, like earth churning
Solid gold as it was. .
.
( 1 8:637-638)
Becker quotes Andrew Ford who, speaking of Homer, says: “The poetry of the past
fulfilled its design as long as audiences forgot the performing poet, and themselves, and
everything but the vivid and painless presence of heroic action of old.” Ibid.
Heffeman, Museum of Words : The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashhery
p.20.
Becker, The Shield ofAchilles and the Poetics ofEkphrasis p.43.
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Here Homer focuses the attention of his audience on the “earth” - and notably not the
representation of earth - but then says it “churned... like earth churning.” This latter
connection destabilizes the image that had formerly concealed itself It is redundant to
say “earth chums like earth,” for how else could it chum? Thus the mere fact that
Homer says it indicates something amiss about this “earth.” This something is
explained in the immediate shifting of the audience’s attention to the medium in which
the representation is created (“solid gold”). Thus “earth” (the image) is not earth (the
referent). This difference is only made “visible” through the interplay of res ipsae and
opus ipsum. Opus ipsum renders the viewpoint of the reader highly mobile, shifting as
it does from an immersion in the illusion to a vantage point outside of it and back again.
The mimetic illusion is placed within a context, not of faithful retelling (“telling it like it
is”) but of artificiality; of craftsmanship rather than correspondence. It therefore
accomplishes what Becker calls a defamiliarization, which he takes to mean, "that the
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description is making the representation more representation-y.”
Opus ipsum works to defamiliarize and recontextualize res ipsae. Artifex et ars
continues this process. Here, by means of a direct reference to the artist and the process
of artistic creation, the audience is further distanced from the illusion. The audience is
shown what that illusion is made of, who makes it, and how it is made. It is more and
more the case that a solidly established sense of critical distance is established for the
audience. From such a distance the audience has the ability to render judgments on the
illusion that are not possible from within it. In this third stage of ekphrasis, the natural
sign aesthetic is no longer possible as the ontological grounds upon which such an
Ibid. p.43n78.
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aesthetic have been shaken. It is perhaps better to say that in this third level of
representation (and even more so in the fourth) the natural sign for the first time appears
as on aesthetic - rather than given - feature of the world.
The fourth level of representation, anhnodversor in Becker's terminology,
supplies exactly the kind ofjudgment that is made possible by artifex et ars. Here the
interlocutor, the author, exposes himself or herself as yet a further intermediary between
the audience and the illusion. This is accomplished through the offering of a reaction to
the work described. Returning to the previous example taken from Homer:
And the earth churned black behind them, like earth churning
Solid gold as it was - that was the wonder of Hephaestus’ work.
Homer's awe at “the wonder of Hephaestus' work” is a reaction intended to guide that
of his audience. This guidance does not take the commandeering form of an imperative.
Nor is it the case that the reaction of the author is the only one permitted to the
audience. If it were, the author would be guilty of making yet another “thus it is” claim
of exactly the type ekphrasis works to undermine. Rather the author offers a guide to
the audience who is then able to make up his or her own mind, and to form his or her
own response. The reaction of the author is therefore an invitation for the reader to
react. The mimetic illusion makes a double claim: “thus it is” attended by “nothing to
be done” (which is voiced in the imperative “do nothing!”). Ekphrasis embraces the
power of this representation in its focus on res ipsae, yet at the same time undermines it.
admonishing the reader to “do something!”
Utilizing these four levels of representation, an ekphrastic tactical approach
serves to wedge open an otherwise easily overlooked gap in any claim to certainty.
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absoultivity, or unimpeachabilty. This tactical approach is made possible once one
comes to realize, following Nietzsche, that ideologies, institutions, customs and faiths
are shaped by human action and are in this manner examples of poiesis. These are
representations of what is thought to be right, good appropriate, true. They are never
themselves the right, the good, the appropriate, the true despite any claims that they are
- and such claims are both numerous and forceful. Although the interplay of the four
levels of representation do open up an opportunity for critical distance, they can also
draw the reader further into the illusion. The author offers the reader distance from the
object described, but in so doing enhances the reader’s trust in the author. It is as if the
author, by revealing his or her own distance from the illusion puts his or her own
“objectivity” on display. Ironically it is the “subjective” value judgments of the
animadversor that bring this “objectivity” into relief
Plato and Baudrillard alike have displayed the power of the mimetic image, "the
illusion.” To simply disregard this power is a mistake. The ability of ekphrasis to hold
the illusion “a bit more lightly and with an acknowledgement of its irony” is of
tremendous importance. This ironic stance can stave off what Baudrillard calls “realist
abjection,” as well as Baudrillard’s own “hyperrealist abjection.” If this is stated in the
terms of the double claim of the shield, the exposure of the “thus it is” as illusory, as
ironic, renders the “nothing to be done” that rests upon it equally illusory, equally
ironic. If “it” is an illusion, then the categorical dictates of “its” contents (“all is war,”
“to know the Good is to be good”, “all is simulation,” etc.) do not carry categorical
force. Rather, they carry the unsettled illusion of categorical force. Hence any ethical
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imperatives derived from the “thus it is” - specifically the “nothing to be done” and its
imperative “do nothing” - are illusions based on illusions.
There is a conscious effort here to avoid the language of “the real.” Such
language is highly charged and steeped in a long history of Platonist and Enlightenment
thinking which presupposes that to call something illusory is to deny its reality.
However, these are not mutually exclusive categories. It may well be that the Athenian
embassy to Melos was enthralled by an illusory notion that “the strong do what they
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept,”^^^ but this alone
does not render their swords less sharp or the fate of the Melians any less bloody or
cruel. That the arms of the Athenian soldiers were guided by an illusion does not render
the suffering they inflicted any less real. Similarly, the presence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq may have been an illusion, but that does not make the war or its
economic and human costs any less real.
The disruptive, ironic power of ekphrasis renders any appeal to a self-evident
reality problematic. Appeals of this sort underpin the “thus it is” of the shield and the
“thus it really is” of the mimetic challenge. If mimesis renders the “thus it is' claim the
equivalent of “thus it is like,” ekphrasis adds another layer of distance: “thus it is
something like it is like.” This double distance does not eradicate the possibility of
there being a reality behind the image, but it does remove the possibility of getting
beyond the image to find out once andfor all. The question of the real is suspended,
which is to say it is maintained in suspense. This is different from Baudrillard s
Thucydides and M.I. Finley, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner
(London: Penguin Books, 1972)p.402.
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position because it is not that the real is no longer a question, or no longer relevant, but
rather that the real is maintained as a perpetual question (always still a question). Hence
any “thus it is” claim presenting itself as unquestionable is immediately suspect. Any
attempt to bear the shield is an open admission that one is dealing in illusion. Ekphrasis
marks the shift from “thus it is” to Nietzsche’s “let it be thus!” By rendering the real
(the “it is”) a permanent question, ekphrasis also allows for a shift from “there is
nothing to be done” to “what is to be done next?”
“This is [Something Like] Civilzation’s Fight;”
The Shield of George W. Bush, Revisited
The present argument opened with a comparison between Homer’s Iliad and a
speech given by George W. Bush to a joint session of Congress on September 20,
2001.^^^ For the sake of symmetry, an admittedly aesthetic choice, it is to that speech
the argument now returns in order to demonstrate the application of ekphrasis as a
critical tool. Ekphrasis is most often used to describe the poetic description of a work
of art such as a painting or sculpture. In Homer’s description of the shield of Achilles
the representational relationships are fairly obvious. The poem offers a representation
of the shield, and the shield offers a representation of the world. Nietzsche, in his
expansion of what counts as a work of art, opens up the possibility that ekphrasis can be
applied in situations that do not at first glance appear to be related to poetry at all. Such
is the case with the rhetoric of the Bush Administration in regards to the War on Terror.
See Appendix A.
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Here the relationships are more difficult to discern, if only because doing so is an
unfamiliar exercise.
The President's speech, in the guise of a modified State of the Union address,
puiports to outline the situation facing the American people in the aftermath of the
events of September 11. In order to identify the representational relationships within
this speech that warrant its treatment as ekphrasis, it helps to place it in context. The
speech of September 20, 2001 came at a time of tremendous uncertainty. In the near
term, there was still very little public knowledge about who or what was responsible for
the events of September 11. Due to this uncertainty there was no clear path of response.
A variety of possibilities remained open. Was it a criminal act, best met with a legal
response? Was it an attack by another state? Was it a random act of violence?
President Bush's speech attempted to answer these questions and to close down all
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avenues of response but one. The speech therefore offers a depiction of a particular
understanding of the world, one that sees the world as being at war.
This particular understanding of the world makes a good deal of sense when it is
seen in the context of a longer term uncertainty that had been prevalent since the end of
the Cold War. For much of the twentieth century the world had indeed been at war.
The end of the Cold War which accompanied the collapse of the great other, the Soviet
Union, had left the Western world, led by the United States, in a profound state of
uncertainty. Its institutions and ideological orientations had been built on the premise
of warding off a dangerous global enemy that was no longer there. Hence this speech
The attempt is common to instances of the bearing of the shield. It does, however,
remain an attempt, never quite fully successful once and for all.
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aimed, in part, to redraw those lines between us and them, thereby putting the
institutional structures of the West back on a more even keel.
In Book 1 8 of the Iliad, there are three distinct levels of reference, as there are in
Plato’s Republic. There is the world, Hephaestus’ depiction of the world as it appears
on the shield, and Homer's representation of Hephaestus’ work. In the speech of
September 20, 2001 these levels are also present. There is the world. Bush’s
understanding of the world, and his depiction of that understanding to his audience. On
a surface level. President Bush’s speech differs from Homer’s account of the shield in
that Bush is describing his own creation. He is, in other words both artifex and
animadversor. And yet this difference begins to become less clear when one accepts
the reasonably obvious argument that the shield was never a physical object, but a
poetic invention of Homer. Homer is thus both artifex and animadversor. He creates
the object and tells his audience how to respond to it. Four years after the speech given
by the President, it is difficult to see how Bush’s ekphrasis is itself purely notional.
Since its initial delivery, more and more evidence has been produced to justify his
understanding of the world as one at war. This is to say that his understanding of the
world has shaped his actions in the world, which themselves reshape the world. The
world becomes more and more the way it is imagined to be. This is the crux of
Baudrillard’s hyperreality. Where Baudrillard goes wrong is that he sees these
representations as perfectible, thus revealing his overconfidence in the persuasive and
coercive powers of the state or media, if not an overconfidence in the ontological
fathomability of the world. This self-generative effect is particularly clear in the case of
the war in Iraq. There is a tendency to naturalize the situation, to make it a mere fact
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about which nothing can be done and for which no responsibility can be borne (at the
very least not on “our” part).^^^
The mimetic effect of the speech cannot be denied, but this does not mean that it
cannot be challenged. An ekphrastic reading of the speech, focusing on the operation of
Becker's four levels of representation will be of assistance in undoing this effect of
mimesis concealing itself as mimesis.^^^ The reading to follow will show ekphrasis at
work within the speech, destabilizing the certainty claimed therein. It will proceed
under the precautionary words of Becker who says:
Some passages, phrases, and words can be pushed more than others;
some otfer more to unfold and consider: hence the commentary will be at
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times more extensive or repetitive and at others somewhat cursory.
As already mentioned. President Bush presents to his audience the description of
a particular worldview. It is not surprising that his speech should open with a guide to
what this world looks like. Bush presents a world divided into two camps, and in the
opening twenty paragraphs he offers a description of what each camp looks like. After
a formal opening, he begins in paragraphs two through eight with an outlining of his
main topic of interest, the American people. As might be expected, these paragraphs
(one might consider them stanzas) are rife with examples of opus ipsiim. It is also not
unexpected that res ipsae should also be apparent here given the intent to “tell it like it
This is the entire thrust of the bearing of the shield. It is this thrust that ekphrasis as
a critical tool is useful in parrying.
370 Or in Becker’s terms, opus ipsum disguising itself as res ipsae.
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Beeker, The Shield ofAchilles and the Poetics ofEkphrasis p.87.
182
is” - an intent revealed in the identification of the speech as a modified State of the
Union address. The fourth paragraph offers a good example of this;
We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers,
working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the
lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers - in
English, Hebrew and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and
giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.
The clear references to visual appearance, “we have seen" indicate that this passage is
an example of opus ipsitm. Yet although there is a visual component to the actions
being described, this is much more a comment on character than appearance. While it
is easy to picture the "unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the
saying of prayers” Bush does not give detailed descriptions of the size and color of the
flags, the shape of the candles, the details of the blood donation facilities, the
ornamentation or lack thereof of the houses of worship. These features are irrelevant to
the purpose of his depiction, which is to delineate a certain character. Each of these
activities are largely symbolic acts indicating a selflessness on the part of the American
people, or a recognition of belonging in a community larger than the self.
There is more going on here. The verbs "working,” “unfurling,” "lighting,”
"giving,” “saying” set these descriptions in motion. This sense of motion adds a mild
element of dramatization, bringing them to life as more than simply appearance. “The
endurance of rescuers working past exhaustion” is most clear in this regard. This is to
say that the mild dramatization, the setting in motion of the image, is indicative of res
ipsae. The audience is encouraged to see through the representation and into the world
itself
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The remaining two levels of representation, ars and animadversor are also to be
found in this passage. A description of the material out of which “we” are made, ars,
can be discerned in two places. First, there is a description of the prayers as being “in
English. Hebrew and Arabic." The choice of these languages is notable as each is
intended to correspond to one of the major monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism
and Islam. There is no indication that the prayers differ in any way other than the
language in which they are spoken. The use of the plural “prayers" is set in a series of
iterative actions, “the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood.”
These actions are plural by virtue of their repeated perfonnance, and not by a variety in
content. He is speaking of a repeated unfurling of the Stars and Stripes, not to the
unfurling of a variety of flags. Likewise, the “saying of prayers" designates the
repeated saying of what amounts to a single prayer. The material of which the Union is
made, the ars, is thereby shown to be a monotheistic, yet multilinguistic and multiethnic
citizenry. Furthermore, the audience is also told that this Union is composed of “a
loving and giving people.” Again, the selflessness of the people is emphasized when it
is noted that they “have made the grief of strangers their own.”
There is even a hint of animadversor here. It comes in the single word,
“decency.” This is a value judgment made by an as yet unidentified narrator. It can be
presumed that this narrator is President Bush himself, as is made clear later in the
speech. However the repeated use of “we” tends to blur the line between narrator and
audience. Animadversor in general offers a response to the opus and in doing so, guides
the audience towards that same response. Here it remains deliberately unclear as to
whose judgment this is, that of the narrator or that of the audience. In remaining
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unspecified, the judgment is intended to be that of both. This serves as a means by
which the audience comes to trust the narrator, rendering his particular representations
more amenable to acceptance as res ipsae.
Having established this particular representation of the American Union - “the
entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union, and it is strong” - President Bush
in paragraph six places it against the backdrop of a larger world.
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend
freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and our anger to resolution.
Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies,
justice will be done.
The emphasis on action in these lines is strongly indicative of res ipsae, but this is
intertwined with opus ipsiim. Indeed this is the first indication of the scope the opus in
its portrayal of a dangerous world within which freedom is under threat. It is through
the lens of this opus ipsum that the appropriate course of action becomes clear. This
course is couched in terms ofjustice, but at the same time is steeped in the language of
war, as seen in the repeated use of the tenn “enemies.” This is not the justice meted out
377
by the institutions of criminal prosecution, but that of a just war.
The following paragraph again intertwines the different levels of representation.
Turning from the people to the leadership. President Bush says, “all of America was
touched on the eve of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on
The question as to whether or not the War on Terror meets the standards of a just
war has been a topic of debate. See Neta Crawford, "Just War Theory and the Us
Counterterror War," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003), James Turner Johnson,
"Jihad and Just War," First Things (2002), Michael Novak, 'Asymmetrical Warfare' &
Just War : A Moral Obligation [online journal] (2003 [cited July 6 2005]); available
from http;//www.nationalreview.com/novak/novak02 1003.asp, Saddam's Capture May'
Bring Peace, Doesn't Excuse War, Cardinal Says (American Catholic.org, 2003 [cited
July 6 2005]); available from http://www.americancatholic.org/News/JustWar/Iraq/.
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the steps of this Capitol, singing ‘God Bless America.'” This line contains within it
elements of animadversor (“touched”), opus ipstim (“Republicans and Democrats
joined together"), and ars (“singing ‘God Bless America'”). Furthermore, the
recollection of this sight as an event indicates the operation of res ipsae. Once again,
there is a reference to the course of action noted above. The reference to $40 billion to
rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military clearly indicates that this
course of action is to be a military response.
The first eight paragraphs focus primarily on one aspect of the opus, namely a
strong and unified America. In paragraphs nine through twelve this same unity and
singularity of purpose (which, for the time being, is underspecified, but military in
nature) is expanded outwards. The scope of the opus ipsum increases to encompass a
global demographic. As above, the references to opus ipsum are intertwined with the
other levels of representation, particularly res ipsae. This broader community is made
up of “the sounds of our national anthem,” “prayers of sympathy,” “moments of silence
and days of mouming,”^^^ and even a shared experience of mortality. Paragraph twelve
is quite explicit in its reference to a unity of purpose. Speaking of Great Britain and
America, President Bush says, “once again, we are joined together in a great cause.
The temporal qualifier “once again” is a veiled opus ipsum as it offers a description that
is not exactly visual, but brings forth a powerful mental image nonetheless. The phrase
places the relationship in an historical context of prior episodes of “joining together.
This series of joinings includes the three defining conflicts of the twentieth century.
These descriptions of the global America tell the audience both what it looks like
{opus ipsum) and the materials of which it is put together {ars).
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World War One, World War Two, and the Cold War. This reference is implicit here,
but made explicit later in the speech. Each of these conflicts was understood as total
and as having the highest stakes. Furthermore, each of these conflicts resulted in a
victory for the partnership. That the two are “once again joined in a great cause” thus
implies the presence of yet another epochal conflict with a global reach and the highest
of stakes, and that this conflict will ultimately be won. As above, this implication is
rendered explicit later in the speech. Although the word has not yet been mentioned, it
is clear that the world being crafted in Bush’s speech is to be a world at war.
It comes as no surprise that the very next paragraph opens with the statement
“On September the 11*, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our
country.” This paragraph marks a transition in the references to the opus ipsiim. Where
the preceding statements placed an emphasis on a description of “our side,” or what has
been called the “city at peace,” the subsequent references are focused on “their side,” or
the “city at war.” This “other” face of the opus is marked by overt aggression. The key
descriptors in this transitional paragraph are "war,” which is mentioned four times in
near succession, “casualties,” and “attack,” mentioned twice in succession. This is the
stage upon which the “loving and giving,” “free” people of the global America appear.
Their counterparts are then detailed at some length. Just as President Bush has shown
what “our” side looks like {opus ipsum), what it is made of {ars), and how “we” should
respond to it {animadversor), so too does he speak of "their” side. It is not unexpected
that the depictions he offers are inversions of what has come before.
Americans are asking: Who attacked our counti'y? The evidence we
have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist
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organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted
for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and
responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole.
As may be expected, opus ipsum figures prominently in this passage. It is most
notable in the depiction of al Qaeda as “loosely affiliated” where “we are joined
together” with a "unity of purpose.” In many ways this leaves al Qaeda in a hazy,
borderline space somewhere between a solid identity (such as “we have) and a non-
identity. There are subtle, tacit indications of ars here when one considers that the
strength of the global America resides in its “joining together" and in its unity. By
comparison, al Qaeda, which is presented as ambivalent in regards to its status as an
organization or multiple organizations, cannot possibly be made of the same stuff. Its
lack of unity in this regard implies an inherent weakness. As may also be expected, res
ipsae on the level of naming (“al Qaeda”) and interpreting (“murderers” and
•lerrorists”) is evident in these same lines. It is obvious that the interpretations are also
intertwined with animadversor, as these terms are far from complimentary, nor are they
intended to be received as complimentary.
Keeping with the theme of describing “them,” paragragh fourteen provides an
example of opus ipsum that operates through an analogy:
Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not
making money; its goal is remaking the world -and imposing its radical
beliefs on people everywhere.
This analogy creates a vivid image of brutality in the minds of the audience. It also
plays off of the language used so far in the speech that has been notably ambivalent
between the statuses of the events as either acts of war or criminal acts. This
ambivalence' has been noted in the use of the term “justice” and can also be seen in
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Bush’s repeated use of “murderers” and “indictment,” even after he has declared the
events to be acts of war. In his analogy he makes an attempt to bridge this uneasy gap.
It may well be that a law enforcement based approach is warranted and appropriate
when dealing with the Mafia, whose main concern is with money - which is well within
the parameters of the state apparatus. The remaking of the world however is not subject
to state regulation in the same way currency is. The implication is that an appropriate
response to this threat must move beyond the constraints of a given legal code or
judicial system. In short, it must take the form of any other mortal conflict between
incompatible systems, namely, war.^^^
To say that war is the only acceptable response is still a powerful and
controversial claim at the time the speech is given. As if to ease its acceptance, its
declaration is couched in language that is rife with examples onitnadversor. The beliefs
of the terrorists are described as “a fringe form of Islamic extremism" and “a fringe
movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.” It is clear that this description
is intended to guide the audience's reception of the statements. It is a particularly
forceful guide, especially in the first description, which renders 'their” position
extreme, even among extremisms. Not only is it “extremism.” but also it is a "fringe
form” of it. It is an extremism even most extremists would reject. Set against what the
audience has already been told about “us” the marginalization of ’them” is highlighted.
There remains the difficulty that war generally defines a particular relationship
between states, and al Qaeda is clearly not a state. This is quite entirely glossed over in
the President's speech, in part by his deployment of the Pearl Harbour analogy. The
focus on the state (and hence the central position occupied by its institutional structures)
is thrust to the fore in the naming of the “Axis of Evil” (Iran. Iraq, and North Korea; all
states in the traditional sense).
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Paragraphs fourteen through twenty are notable in that President Bush’s
discussion of the world the terrorists wish to construct is an ekphrasis within an
ekphrasis. President Bush, in the role of bard, offers a verbal representation of a non-
verbal representation of the world. The referential relationships in this sub-ekphrasis
are between the world, al Qaeda’s representation of the world (Afghanistan under
Taliban rule), and Bush's commentary on that representation. Bush deliberately
downplays res ipsae here, except in the most pejorative terms ("Afghanistan's people
have been brutalized"), in order to more starkly reveal this representation as distinct
from the world it purports to represent. Each of the four levels of representation
inherent in ekphrasis is to be found in these paragraphs. There is direct reference to
opus ipsum ("in Afghanistan we see al Qaeda's vision for the world”), artifex ("Osama
bin Laden"), a?s ("women are not allowed to attend school. ..Religion can be practiced
only as their leaders dictate”), and of course aniniadversor. Aniwadversor is perhaps
the most pronounced here as it provides distance from the representation, breaking its
mimetic power. Recall that in Homer’s account of the shield of Achilles, aniniadversor
is often seen in the poet’s praise of the beauty and wondrousness of Hephaestus's work.
Here it is seen in the “condemnation” of the work of al Qaeda and its allies. Thus Bush
speaks of the “brutalization” and “repression” of the Afghan people, the “evil” plotted
by the terrorists, and their “murderous” nature.
One other function of the blatant ekphrasis of these passages is that it serves to
increase the audience’s trust in the narrator. Bush places the "remaking of the world”
firmly on "their” agenda, thereby obscuring its presence on his agenda as well. The
sub-ekphrasis works both to expose “their” representation of the world as a distortion.
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and to conceal the status of Bush’s own representation as a representation. One
ekphrasis works to conceal the presence of another. Evidence for this is to be found in
the re-emphasis on res ipsae in the next three paragraphs. In the first twenty paragraphs,
two opposing aspects of the overall picture have been introduced. At this point the
audience has an idea of what “we” look like, what “they” look like, and what the
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situation as a whole looks like. The next phase of the greater ekphrasis sets these
representations in motion. Gone are the depictions of a distorted worldview. Instead
there is a departure from this worldview, back into “the real world” in which
America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to the
United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your
land. (Applause.) Release all foreign nationals, including American
citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists,
diplomats, and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and
permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over
every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate
authorities. (Applause.) Give the United States full access to terrorist
training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. (Applause.)
The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the
terrorists, or they will share in their fate.
The language here is immediate, dramatic, and consequential. Here in its most obvious
form, is the “thus it is” and “nothing (else) to be done about if' that characterises the
bearing of the shield. As an example of res ipsae it is as though this passage is a retort
to al Qaeda's.vision of the world from the unmediated perspective of the world itself. It
renders the problems of waging a war on a non-state (al Qaeda) moot by effacing the
distinction between it and its state sponsor, Afghanistan. It does not treat war as one
A visual metaphor is used here, although the important features ot their respective
“appearances” have much more to do with their respective characters.
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possibility among many, but speaks as if it were always already there. Rather, given the
impossibly broad scope of the demands, the passage also ensures that the opus Bush
seeks to create, a global America unified within the context of world at war, is all but
guaranteed.
Later in the speech it will become even clearer that not only is the war here now,
it has been and will be here on an existential level. This begins with Bush's
pronouncement that:
Our war on terror begins withal Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated.
Note that the war in question has shifted to become “our war.” Res ipsae seems to hold
sway here, but it can be seen as opus ipsuni when one recalls the context within which
the speech was given. A mere nine days after the events of September 1 1 it was far
from a given that this was an act of war rather than a heinous criminal act, as other
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instances of terrorism had been treated to that point. The same can be said of Bush’s
comment “Americans are asking, why do they hate us?” This is presented as res ipsae.
but is revealed as opus ipsum when it is recalled that at that time, many Americans had
377
no inclination ofwho “they” were.
The foremost example is the 1 995 Oklahoma City bombing, although one might also
make reference to the 1982 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, or the blowing
up of a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland. In each of these cases the response
was to launch a criminal investigation rather than a war.
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Based on personal and anecdotal observations made at the time, this was not a
question on the minds of many people at all. More common were the questions “What
is happening? How could this happen? How many were killed? How can 1 / we help
those in need?”
192
Indeed this question seems somewhat incongruous as res ipsae when only a few
paragraphs before these same Americans are depicted as asking, “who attacked our
country?” More attention is required here to resolve this incongruity. There is a
presumption in Bush’s question that its temporal horizon extends back to September 11.
The President indicates that this question is something he found “out there” in the world
since the attacks. In this guise it does act as an example of res ipsae. However, as
indicated, this would be a rather odd question to ask if there was no known "they.” It is
a question suitably asked once “they” are identified, and given that this identification
was made publicly only minutes earlier, the temporal horizon of the question must be
seriously foreshortened. The President establishes the outline of a framework within
which hatred plays a large role. For those who have accepted Bush's framework and its
implications as they have been presented in the speech so far the question is a
legitimate one, and an accurate description of their state of mind. In other words, the
temporal horizon of the question extends back only a few paragraphs, and not to
September 1 1
.
This foreshortened horizon in turn reveals an interesting feature of the term
“Americans.” If it is the case that Americans - and the language used to this point in
the speech makes it clear that the President is speaking of all Americans - are asking
this question, then it can be implied that to not ask the question is to be un-American.
As it is the case that the only people asking this question are those in agreement with
President Bush's representation of the situation, then to disagree with the President is
also to be un-American. This is a theme that will come up over and over again, and in
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not nearly so subtle a form, not just in this speech, but also in much of the rhetoric
coming from the Bush Administration.
A fleshing out of the opus ipswn as to what “they” are like and what “they” want
follows the President's question. Paragraph twenty-eight is notable for its particularly
powerful imagery.
We are not deceived by their pretences to piety. We have seen their kind
before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the
twentieth century. By sacrificing human lives to serve their radical
visions -by abandoning every value except the will to power - the
follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they
will follow that path all the way. to where it ends; in history's unmarked
grave of discarded lies.
The opening sentence and the allusion to “the will to power” offer enticing clues as to
how this speech is to be understood. Any reference to “the will to power” unavoidably
raises the specter of Nietzsche. It has already been shown that Nietzsche is a
proponent of becoming over Being, and it is through Nietzsche's work that it is possible
to understand all of life as poiesis. It is through Nietzsche that it becomes possible to
treat the speech in question as an ekphrasis, thereby diminishing the power of its dual
claim of “thus it is” and “nothing (else) to be done.” The President's claims are
vulnerable to such a reading, and it is no surprise that he dismisses the possibility of
such a reading as one of history's “discarded lies.” At the same time to be “not deceived
by their pretences to piety” is to bring to mind Socrates as Plato presents him in the
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Euthyphro. The earlier chapters of this argument presented an antagonism between
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President Bush employs the phrase “will to power” as a reference to Naziism, (as he
makes immediately clear), an ideology that is known for its blatant (mis)appropriation
of Nietzsche’s thought.
Plato, "Euthyphro."
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Plato on the one hand and Nietzsche on the other. Plato’s position was presented as one
in which a “thus it is” claim could be made more or less unproblematically. Given that
it is just such a claim that Bush hopes to make, it is expected that he would place
himself on this side of the debate. Furthermore, Bush clandestinely places his audience
in the same camp when he insists that ""we are not deceived.” This passage testifies not
only to the drawing of a battle line in the “war on terror,” but also one in what has since
come to be known as “the culture wars.”
These lines are also notable in that they mark a return to the theme of a “great
cause,” making explicit that which was previously implied. In paragraph twelve. Bush
mentions Great Britain and America “once again...joined together in a great cause.” In
paragraph twenty-eight he explicates the circumstances of the prior occasions of
“joining together.” Bush’s mention of “fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism” calls to
mind the open combat of World War Two and the proxy battles of the Cold War. Each
of these “murderous ideologies” was met with an armed response, and each was thereby
defeated. Each conflict resulted in a victory for “our” side and this is not an insinuation
that is meant to go unnoticed. For “we” just like “they” will “follow that path all the
way, to where it ends.” For them, the results are explicitly stated. For us, certain
victory remains implicit, at least for the time being.
Paragraphs twenty to thirty one effect a transition from opus ipsiim to res ipsoe,
even though the other elements of ekphrasis are present. This transition is completed at
the end of paragraph thirty-one when President Bush states:
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you
are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any
nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by
the United States as a hostile regime.
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This statement definitively establishes the war not as one option among many, or as
simply between America and Afghanistan, but as tangible, global, and necessary. There
is no neutral ground in this war, even for God, as will be made explicit at the end of the
speech. The ethos corresponding to Bush’s "thus it is” takes form, appropriately
enough, as a paraphrase of the words of Jesus Christ, "you are with us or. you are with
the terrorists.”'"**’ This paraphrase puts Bush in the role of Christ. He effectively claims
for himself a divine authority on the matter. As is the case with the shield of Achilles,
to resist is to defy God. However, George W. Bush is not God, however much he might
wish to claim that title, and this statement therefore speaks of the hubris often
associated with the bearing of the shield.
Although this is a rather striking example of hubris, its impact is lessened by the
early paragraphs in the speech. President Bush has eased his audience into his own
worldview, and worked to gain the trust of his audience. This is evident in his use of a
sub-ekphrasis. discussed above, and in his intertwining of opus ipsum and res ipsae. It
is a testimony to the power of his poetry that he can blur the line between image and
referent so effectively. In setting forth his opus as referent. Bush has narrowed the
options of appropriate response to the challenge of September 1 1 . Indeed, he has
narrowed them to a single binary choice. He has blocked other avenues through which
this choice appears arbitrary, and thus he has lessened the impact of his hubris upon the
sensibilities of his audience. Imagine, for a moment, if he had opened his speech with
this stark and theologically burdened statement. It is likely that any persuasive power
See Matthew 12:30 and Luke 11:23 both of which read “He that is not with me is
against me.”
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of the speech would have been greatly reduced. It would have been reduced to an
extended example of preaching to the converted.” But instead he buries the comment
well into his depiction of the world, after he has already brought his audience along
with him.
Confident in the mimetic power of what he has presented. President Bush is free
to specify more clearly the creator of this artifice. It is at this point that the role of
artifex becomes more prominent. The audience has seen what is being made, and of
what it is made - each intended to be understood as what is. Now they can see by whom
it is made. In paragraphs thirty-two through forty-six, examples of self-referentiality
become apparent. More than anywhere else in the speech. President Bush speaks of
himself in the first person. He speaks of himself as the one who ”create[s]” new
governmental structures (“the Office of Homeland Security”), “announce[s]” the people
who will run them, “call[s] the Armed Forces to alert,” and answers the question “what
is expected of us [Americans]?” Having presented his work, he wishes to take credit for
it. However, lest his emphasis on his own authority in regards to this opus result in a
reduction of its mimetic effect, he returns to the use of the plural “we.” The fluctuation
between “I” and “we” serves to render a firm distinction between the two terms
difficult. This in tum serves to distribute responsibility for the situation “on the
ground” more broadly. Hence, although he has identified himself as the instrumental
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actor in the creation of the war.^*' this is not George W. Bush's fight, but America's
fight.
This is not. however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not
just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's
fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism,
tolerance and freedom.
By setting the conflict in these terms, he renders it existential, beyond the capacity of
any one individual to create. Thus he claims his creation, and denies it so that it might
prove more effective.^^^ He claims a monopoly on the meaning of the events, and
bolsters his position by rendering that meaning unchallengeable. An earlier example of
this strategy has already been discussed. Here the implications of resistance are more
clearly spelled out. It has already been made explicit that one must agree with President
Bush's assessment and proscriptions or be a terrorist. Here, to suggest even an
alternative to fighting is to be outside of civilization, to be a non-believer in “progress
and pluralism, tolerance and freedom." By these terms, one cannot possibly speak out
against war - or any other polices of the Bush Administration for that matter - in the
name of any of these ideals.
The value laden terminology within which the war is couched is a tip off to the
presence of aniwadversor. Indeed the remaining paragraphs of the speech are
particularly strong in it, although its presence pervades almost the entire speech. Of the
four levels of representation within ekphrasis, animadversor is the most self-referential,
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This is to say that he has identified himself as artifex in the creation of a world in
which war is both inevitable and necessary. This is his opus, though it is not the only
possible one that could have been made.
382
This is a profoundly Odyssean moment in the speech.
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and therefore the most useful in achieving critical distance from the image presented. It
allows the attentive reader to see the mimetic images of the opus ipsum as images,
distinct from that which they purport to represent. At the same time it can lead the
audience closer to the referent. In this later capacity, it is a guide to audience
response and. conveniently, in the transcript of the President’s speech there are
notations of audience response in the form of applause. The notation “(Applause)”
appears a total of thirty times over the course of the speech, and all but four are
preceded by clear examples of onimadversor. One of these four comes at the
conclusion of the speech and may be treated as conventional. This is to say that the
notation of applause at the conclusion of any speech need not be taken as acceptance of
or agreement with anything said in the speech, but is rather related to the platitudes of
recognizing its coming to an end. The other three come after decisive statements of
intent: “These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion,” “it [the war] will not
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”
and “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”
The last of these quotes is the easiest to deal with, and is therefore a good
starting point for a closer examination. Animadversor is expressed as value judgments
of the opus by a narrator. These value judgments are intended to guide the response of
the audience. Although no such judgments are present in the quote, it is still a clear
guide to audience response. It is obvious that there is a right way and a wrong way to
respond to this binary choice. This therefore qualifies as an example of animadversor,
Becker, The Shield of Achilles and the Poetics of Ekphrasis p.l53. It is most
appropriate to say that animadversor does both simultaneously, celebrating in itself the
destabilising effects of ekphrasis as a whole.
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even if the audience is brought closer to the referent (a world where “freedom and fear,
justice and cruelty, have always been at war”) rather than being offered distance from it.
Along the same lines, it is also apparent that the first of the quotes above is a guide to
audience response. The audience in this case is being told that “negotiation or
discussion” is not an appropriate or acceptable course of action. The applause noted in
both of these cases indicates an acceptance on the part of President Bush’s immediate
audience - the members of the House and Senate - of the response parameters as they
have been set in the speech. It is, for all intents and purposes, an acceptance of the
power of the mimetic effect of his words. It is an acknowledgement of pride in the fact
that “we” are doing the right thing. At the same time, the notation of applause within
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the transcript of the speech is itself a value judgment of the contents of the speech.
Each notation is therefore a second order animadversor, intended to guide the response
of a broader audience than those sitting in the room while the speech is given.
With this in mind, the remaining quote also falls under the category of
animadversor. The applause noted after the declaration that “it [the war] will not end
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated”
indicates to the reader that this is a worthy project, and that this opus is (quite literally) a
laudable one. As with the other two quotes, the audience is directed towards the
referent {res ipsae) and any mediating distance from it is occluded. The opus ipsiim is
represented as res ipsae (the mimetic effect) and at the same time it is as if the applause
is saying “what a magnificent creation!” There is a simultaneous collapse and
384
The one possible exception at the conclusion of the speech having already been
noted.
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expansion (implosion and explosion) of critical distance. The destabilizing effect of
onimadversor in this instance, and in ekphrasis as a whole, sets the entire image of a
fixed world (“thus it is”) in motion.
By exposing the thus it is claim as a representation of a representation,
ekphrasis as a critical tool opens the possibility for things to be otherwise. President
Bush’s worldview as presented in the September 20 speech does not offer unfettered
access to the world as it is, but is rather a particular telling of a particular telling (in this
case, a Neoconservative ideological understanding of the world). Like the childhood
“telephone game” the possibility - even the likelihood - that each subsequent telling
will leave something out, or add something in, or alter things entirely remains
irreducible. Thus any ethical imperative based on the “thus it is” is equally open to
challenge. The “nothing else to be done” and its imperative “do nothing else!” thus
becomes the question “what else is to be done?”^^^ Ekphrasis does not in itself offer
specific policy suggestions, but it does set limits on what such suggestions might look
like. Whatever course of action is to be taken, ekphrasis as a critical tool reminds us
that it cannot be backed with the force of absolute, unimpeachable certainty or by an
unqualified must.
385 Or the imperative “Do something else!”
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APPENDIX A:
PRESIDENT BUSH’S ADDRESS TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
United States Capitol
Washington, D.C.
September 20. 200
1
9:00 P.M. EDT
[1] THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker. Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of
Congress, and fellow Americans:
[2] In the nomial course of events. Presidents come to this chamber to report on
the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been
delivered by the American people.
[3] We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save
others on the ground - passengers like an exceptional man named Todd
Beamer. And would you please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here
tonight. (Applause.)
[4] We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working
past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the
giving of blood, the saying of prayers - in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We
have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of
strangers their own.
[5] My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself
the state of our Union — and it is strong. (Applause.)
[6] Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend
freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we
bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be
done. (Applause.)
[7] I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of
America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and
Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless
America." And you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering $40 billion to
rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military.
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[8] Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and
Senator Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your
service to our country. (Applause.)
[9] And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of
support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at
Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate.
[10] We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our
embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We
will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa
and Latin America.
[11] Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our
own: dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of
India; men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan; and hundreds
of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. (Applause.)
Once again, we are joined together in a great cause — so honored the British
Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with
America. Thank you for coming, friend. (Applause.)
[12] On September the 1 1th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against
our country. Americans have known wars — but for the past 136 years, they have
been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have
known the casualties of war - but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful
morning. Americans have known surprise attacks -- but never before on
thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day - and
night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.
[13] Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who
attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection
of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the
same murderers indicted tor bombing American embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.
[14] Al Qaeda is to tenw what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making
money; its goal is remaking the world — and imposing its radical beliefs on
people everywhere.
[15] The terrorists practice a fringe fonn of Islamic extremism that has been
rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics — a fringe
movement that perverts the peaceful teachings ot Islam. The terroiists directive
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commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no
distinction among military and civilians, including women and children.
[16] This group and its leader — a person named Osama bin Laden — are linked
to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these
terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations
and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they
are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to
hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.
[17] The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports
the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al
Qaeda's vision for the world.
[18] Afghanistan's people have been brutalized — many are starving and many
have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for
owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A
man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.
[19] The United States respects the people of Afghanistan — after all, we are
currently its largest source of humanitarian aid — but we condemn the Taliban
regime. (Applause.) It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening
people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By
aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.
[20] And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on
the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who
hide in your land. (Applause.) Release all foreign nationals, including American
citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats
and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every
person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. (Applause.) Give
the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they
are no longer operating.
[21] These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. (Applause.) The
Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or
they will share in their fate.
[22] I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We
respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by
millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good
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and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the
name of Allah. (Applause.) The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying,
in effect, to hijack Islam itself The enemy of America is not our many Muslim
friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of
terrorists, and every government that supports them. (Applause.)
[23] Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated. (Applause.)
[24] Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right
here in this chamber — a democratically elected government. Their leaders are
self-appointed. They hate our freedoms — our freedom of religion, our freedom
of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.
[25] They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries,
such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the
Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia
and Africa.
[26] These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of
life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from
the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in
their way.
[27] We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind
before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th
century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions - by abandoning
every value except the will to power — they follow in the path of fascism, and
Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where
it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. (Applause.)
[28] Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct
every resource at our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and
every necessary weapon ot war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global
terror network.
[29] This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive
liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war
above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single
American was lost in combat.
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[30] Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated
strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike
any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and
covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding,
turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no
refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to
teiTorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you
are with us, or you are with the ten'orists. (Applause.) From this day foi-ward,
any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be i-egarded by the
United States as a hostile regime.
[31] Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune fi'om attack. We
will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today,
dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local
governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts
must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a
Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me — the Office of Homeland
Security.
[32] And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to
strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true
patriot, a trusted friend — Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge. (Applause.) He will lead,
oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our
country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come.
[33] These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a
threat to our way of life is to stop it. eliminate it, and destroy it where it
grows. (Applause.)
[34] Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence
operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks,
and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, 1
have a message for our military: Be ready. I've called the Armed Forces to alert,
and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will
make us proud. (Applause.)
[35] This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just
America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is
the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.
[36] We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of
police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The
United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations
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have already responded — with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin
America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO
Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on
all.
[37] The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if
this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be
next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the
stability of legitimate governments. And you know what — we're not going to
allow it. (Applause.)
[38] Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives,
and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to
be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.
[39] I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have
come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to
live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words
because of their ethnic background or religious faith. (Applause.)
[40] I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your
contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information,
libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
[41 ] The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may
need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.
[42] I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may
accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.
[43] I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American
economy. TeiTorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not
touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity,
and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy
before September 1 1th, and they are our strengths today. (Applause.)
[44] And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their
families, for those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted
us in soiTow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead.
[45] Tonight 1 thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and
for what you will do. And ladies and gentlemen ot the Congress, I thank you.
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their representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do
together.
[46] Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come
together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals
on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come
together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance
during this emergency. (Applause.)
[47 ] We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs
to track down terror here at home. (Applause.) We will come together to
strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they
act. and find them before they strike. (Applause.)
[48] We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's
economy, and put our people back to work.
[49] Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all
New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki. and Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani. (Applause.) As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will
work with Congress, and these two leaders, to show the world that we will
rebuild New York City. (Applause.)
[50] After all that has just passed — all the lives taken, and all the possibilities
and hopes that died with them — it is natural to wonder if America's future is one
of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and
dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by
them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this
will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the
world. (Applause.)
[51] Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our
grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear
are at war. The advance of human freedom — the great achievement of our time,
and the great hope of every time — now depends on us. Our nation — this
generation — will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our
future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We
will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (Applause.)
[52] It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to
normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief
recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will
remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember
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the moment the news came — where we were and what we were doing. Some
will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories
of a face and a voice gone forever.
[53] And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George
Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given
to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder
of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. (Applause.)
[54] I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will
not yield; 1 will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and
security for the American people.
[55] The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom
and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is
not neutral between them. (Applause.)
[56] Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice — assured of the
rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies
before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States
of America.
[57] Thank you. (Applause.)
END 9:41 P.M. EDT
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APPENDIX B:
THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES
Quoted fiom
And first Haephestus makes a great and massive shield.
Blazoning well-wrought emblems all across its surface.
Raising a rim around it
,
glittering, triple-ply 560
With a silver shield-strap run from edge to edge
And five layers of metal to build the shield iself.
And across its vast expanse with all his craft and cunning
The god creates a world of gorgeous immortal work.
There he made the earth and there the sky and the sea
And the inexhaustible blazing sun and the moon rounding full
And there the constellations, all that crown the heavens.
And the Pleiades and the Hyades. Orion in all his power too
And the Great Bear that mankind als calls the Wagon:
She wheels on her axis always fixed, atching the Hunter, 570
And she alone is denied a plunge in the Ocean's baths.
And he forged on the shield two noble cities filled
with mortal men. With weddings and wedding feasts in one
and under glowing torches they brought for the the brides
from the women's chambers, marching throught the streets
while choir on choir the wedding song rose high
and the young men came dancing, whirling around in rings
and among them flutes and harps kept up their stirring call -
women rushed to the doors and each stood moved with wonder.
And the people massed, streaming into the marketplace 580
Where a quarrel had broken out and two men struggled
Over the blood-price for an kinsman just murdered.
One declaimed in public, vowing payment in full —
The other spumed him. he would not take a thing -
So both men pressed for a judge to cut the knot.
The crowd cheered on both, they took both sides.
But heralds held them back as the city elders sat
On polished stone benches, forming the sacred circle,
grasping in hand the staffs of clear-voiced heralds,
and each leapt to his feet to plead the case in turn. 590
Two bars of solid gold shone on the ground before them,
A prize for the judge who’d speak the straightest verdict.
But circling the other city camped a divided army
Gleaming in battle-gear, and two plans split their ranks:
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To plunder the city or share the riches with its people.
Hoards the handsome citadel stored within its depths.
But the people were not surrendering, not at all.
They armed for a raid, hoping to break the siege -
Loving wives and innocent children standing guard
On the ramparts, flanked by elders bent with age 600
As men marched out to war. Ares and Pallas led them.
Both burnished gold, gold the attire they donned, and great.
Magnificent in their armour - gods for all the world.
Looming up in their brilliance, towering over troops.
And once they reached the perfect spot for attack,
A watering place where all the herds collected.
There they crouched, wrapped in glowing bronze.
Detached from the ranks, two scouts took up their posts.
The eyes of the army waiting to spot a convoy.
The enemy’s flocks and crook-homed cattle coming... 610
Come they did, quickly, two shepherds behind them.
Playing their hearts out on their pipes - treachery
Never crossed their minds. But the soldiers saw them,
Rushed them, cut off at a stroke the herds of oxen
And sleek sheep-flocks glistening silver-gray
And killed the herdsmen too. Now the besiegers.
Soon as they heard the uproar burst from the cattle
As they debated, huddled in council, mounted at once
Behind their racing teams, rode hard to the rescue.
Arrived at once, and lining up for assault 620
Both annies battled it out along the river banks -
They raked each other with hurtling bronze-tipped spears.
And Strife and Havoc plunged in the fight, and violent Death -
Now seizing a man alive with fresh wounds, now one unhurt.
Now hauling a dead man through the slaughter by the heels.
The cloak on her back stained red with human blood.
So they clashed and fought like living, breathing men
Grappling each other’s corpses, dragging off the dead.
And he forged a fallow field, broad rich plowland
Tilled for the third time, and across it crews ot ploughmen 630
Wheeled their teams, driving them up and back and soon
As they’d reach the end-strip, moving into the turn.
A man would run up quickly
And hand them a cup of honeyed, mellow wine
As the crews would turn back down along the fuiTows,
Pressing again to reach the end of the dep fallow field
And the earth churned black behind them, like earth churning.
Solid gold as it was - that was the wonder of Hephaestus’ work.
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And he forged a king's estate where harvesters laboured.
Reaping the ripe grain, swinging their whetted scythes. 640
Some stalks fell in line with the reapers, row on row.
And others the sheaf-binders girded round with ropes.
Three binders standing over the sheaves, behind them
Boys gathering up the cut swaths, filling heir arms.
Supplying grain to the binders, endless bundles.
And there in the midst the king.
Scepter in hand at the head of the reaping-rows.
Stood tall in silence, rejoicing in his heart.
And off to the side, beneath a spreading oak.
The heralds were setting out the harvest feast. 650
Tliey were dressing a great ox they had slaughtered.
While attendant women poured out barley, generous.
Glistening handfuls strewn for the reapers' midday meal.
And he forged a thriving vineyard loaded with clusters.
Bunches of lustrous grapes in gold, ripening deep purple
And climbing vines shot up on silver vine-poles.
And round it he cut a ditch in dark blue enamel
And round the ditch he staked a fence in tin.
And one lone footpath led toward the vineyard
And down it the pickers ran 660
Whenever they went to strip the grapes at vintage -
Girls and boys, their hearts leaping in innocence.
Bearing away the sweet ripe fruit in wicker baskets.
And there among them a young boy plucked his lyre.
So clecar it could break the heart with longing.
And what he sang was a dirge for the dying year.
Lovely... his fine voice rising anfd falling low
As therest followed, all together, frisking, singing.
Shouting, their dancing footsteps beating out the time.
And he forged on the shield a herd of longhorn cattle, 670
Working the bulls in baten gold and tin, lowing loud
And rumbling out of the farmyard dung to pasture
Along a rippling stream, along the swaying reeds.
And the golden drovers kept the herd in line.
Four in all, with nine dogs at their heels.
Their paws flickering quickly - a savage roar! -
A crashing attack - and a pair of rampaging lions
Had seized a bull from the cattle’s front ranks -
He bellowed out as they dragged him off in agony.
Packs of dogs and the young herdsmen rushed to help 680
But thelions ripping open the hide of the huge bull
Were gulping down the guts and the black pooling blood
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While the herdsmen yelled the fast pack on - no use.
The hounds shrank from sinking teeth in the lions.
They balked, hunching close, barking, cringing away.
And the famous crippled Smith forged a meadow
Deep in a shaded glen for shimmering flocks to graze.
With shepherds steadings, well roofed huts and sheepfolds.
And the crippled Smith brought all his art to bear
On a dancing circle, broad as the circle Daedalus 690
Once laid out on Cnossos’ spacious fields
For Ariadne the girl with lustrous hair.
Here young boys and girls, beauties courted
With costly gifts of oxen, danced and danced.
Linking their arms, gripping each other's wrists.
And the girls wore robes of linen light and flowing.
The boys wore finespun tunics rubbed with a gloss of oil.
The girls were crowned with a bloom of fresh garlands.
The boys swung golden dagges hung on silver belts.
And now they woud run in rings on theor skilled feet, 700
Nimbly, quick as a crouching potter spins his wheel.
Palming it smoothly, giving it practice twirls
To see it run. and now they would run in rows.
In rows crisscrossing rows - rapturous dancing.
A breathless crowd stood round them struck with joy
And through them a pair of tumblers dashed and sprang.
Whirling in leaping handsprings, leading on the dance.
And he forged the Ocean River's mighty power girdling
Round the outermost rim of the welded indestructible shield.
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APPENDIX C:
THE SHIELD OF AGAMEMNON
Quoted from
And he grasped a well wrought shield to encase his body
Forged for rushing forays - beautiful blazoned work.
Circling the center, ten strong rings of bronze
With twenty disks of glittering tin set in.
At the heart a boss of bulging blue steel
And there like a crown the Gorgon's grim mask -
The burning eyes, the stark, transfixing horror- 40
And round her strode the shapes of Rout and Fear.
The shield-belt glinted silver and rip[pling on it ran
A dark blue serpent, two heads coilig around a third.
Reared from a single neck and twisting left and right.
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